Exclusive: CIA Documents on 9/11

The CIA has released nearly 800 pages of newly declassified documents on Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks.

The documents were released in response to an INTELWIRE Freedom of Information Act request for material referenced by the 9/11 Commission. Numerous documents were withheld, and those that were released have been heavily redacted. Despite this, it is highly unusual to receive any material from the CIA in response to a FOIA request, and they provide a fascinating look at the state of the agency's understanding of Al Qaeda over the years.

While much of the material has been previously described, by the 9/11 Commission and other sources, seeing the actual documents still has an impact. For instance, the following extracts:






The documents are presented here in two large PDFs. Each individual document is bookmarked within the PDF. Almost everything in the release was previously classified secret or top secret. The CIA also released several items already available on its Web site or in public testimony, which I omitted.

The documents are presented here in no particular order but I grouped material near the top related to warnings about the activities of Khalid Al Mihdhar, one of the hijackers, and material related to 1998 efforts to capture or kill Osama bin Laden together in roughly chronological order.

You are welcome to report from these documents, but you must credit Intelwire.com. If you wish to break out a specific document for a major media outlet, contact me. Smaller outlets, please feel free to grab excerpts using screencaps, but kindly remember to add the credit.

CIA 9/11 Binder 1:

• DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al Qa'ida 
• DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning, 29 May 1992 
• 2003-03-18 Bin Attash in Los Angeles in 2000 
• 2001-05-15 Email,  Suspicious travel, Khaled and Nawaf 
• 2001-05-24 Email,  Khalid Al-Mihdar in Malaysia 
• 2001-08-21 Email, re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 2001-Undated, Email, Khallad 
• 2001-08-21, Email, Re: Khalid Al Mihdhar 
• 1998-05-05 Email, To Michael Scheuer, OBL Rendition 
• 1998-09-02 Talking points RE OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-18 Memo re: OBL Rendition 
• 1998-11-24 Options for OBL (Rendition) 
• 1998-12-20 Email to Michael Scheuer, re: urgent re: UBL (missile ) 
• 1999-02-10 Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama bin Ladin 
• 1999-05-17 Email from Scheuer, your note, UBL ops 
• 2001-05-03 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attach 
• 2001-06-25, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks 
• 2001-06-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent 
• 2001-06-30 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,  Bin Ladin Threats Are Real 
• 2001-07-02 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues Despite Delay 
• 2001-07-25 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing 
• 2001-08-07 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1998-12-04 Memorandum, Usama Bin Laden, From Director CIA 
• Presidential Daily Brief, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability 
• 1997-01-06 Usama bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability  
• 1992-07-17 Improving Intelligence Warning 
• 2001-08-23  DCI Update, Terrorist Threat Review, Islamic Extremist Learns To Fly 
• 12 JUN 20 01 Biographical Information on Usama bin Ladin Associates 
• 2001-06-24 MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training 
• 2002-12-06 Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa'ida Travel 
• Undated, Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft 
• 2003-06-20 Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al Qa'ida Train on the Run? 
• DCI Counterterrorist Center: Attack on the US Cole, Preliminary Findings, 10 November 2000 
• 2000-10-18 The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen 
• 1999-04-09  Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively
• 1999-11-12 DCI UBL Update 
• 2001-08-12 CIA document, Atta did not travel to Prague 
• Undated, Planning by Usama Bin Laden to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport
• 2001-04-12 Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target  
• 2002-02-27 Identifying Al Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers, A Status Report 
• Undated, Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam -- An Update
• 1997-08-25 DCI Talking. Points  Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin 
• 1997-01-08  Memo on OBL Fatwas 
• 1997-06-17 UBL financial support to Gamaat Islamiyya and others 
• 1998-12-24 Timeframe for hijacking operation 
• 1999-01-08 Hijacking Operation 
• Undated, Sudanese [redacted] ties to Gamaat Islamiyya 
• Undated, UBL funding of Gamaat Islamiyya 
• 1998-12-04  Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
• 1998-09-22 Incorporation of Ayman Al Zawahiri's Al Jihad into UBL's Al Qa'ida 
• Undated, Terrorism: Extremists planning attacks against US interests in Pakistan 
• 2001-03-27 Afghanistan: An Incubator for International  Terrorism
• 2002-11-14 Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations 

CIA 9/11 Binder 2:

• 2001-07-03  DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review
• 2001-02-06 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing 
• 2004-03-11 Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates 
• 2000-06-30 Intelligence Community Threat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks 
• 2001-03-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin For Now 
• 2001-05-23 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terroristr Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plan 
• 2001-05-24 Call-In Threat Of High- Explosive Attack
• 1996-12-17 Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan 
• 1999-09-06 UAE Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin's Finances 
• 1999-03-16 Iraqi Delegation  Meets with Bin Ladin 
• 1997-07-14 Activities of Bin Ladin's in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India 
• 2003-07-02 Bin Ladin Finances 
• 1997-02-13 Al Qaeda Links to Hosni Mubarak Assassination Attempt 
• 1997-08-11 Al Qaeda Plan to Establish Anti-Saddam Hussein Unit 
• 1997-01-31 COOPERATION AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN' S ISLAMIC ARMY, IRAN, AND THE NIF (Sudan) 
• 1997-01-31 TERRORISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT  AMONG USAMA BIN LADIN, IRAN, AND THE NIF
• 1997-03-18 UBL's Attempts to Obtain Uranium  
• 1997-04-30 USAMA BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND SUDANESE NI F SUPPORT
• 1997-03-05 USAMA BIN LADIN' S LINKS TO A SOUTHERN YEMENI  GROUP
• 1997-01-08 Regarding 1992 UBL Fatwa 
• 1996-12-19 RESPONSIBILITIES AND BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC ARMY SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS 
• 2003-03-10 Al Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths 
• 1996-11-26 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY,  AND BIN LADIN'S MOVE FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SUDAN 
• 1997-04-18 USAMA BIN LA DIN'S HISTORICAL LINKS TO 'ABDALLAH AZZAM
• 2000-11-02 Bin Ladin's Terrorist  Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable 
• 1999-07-29  Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities
• 2001-07-06 Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States 
• 1999-12-11 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays 
• Afghanistan: Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin
• Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus 
• 2001-08-24  TERRORISM: SANITIZED VERSION OF THREAT REPORT
• 2000-07-14  DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-07-07 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat  
• 2000-05-22 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-04 -05 DCI UPDATE: Islamic Extremist Update
• 2000-03-06 EXDIR Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-04-03 Islamic Extremist Update 
• 2000-02-18 DCI Update: Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat 
• 2000-01-07 Update:  Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat
• 1999-12-16 DCI Briefing Millennium Threat 
• DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1: Production of the [redacted] Usama Bin Ladin  Situation Reports
• 1999-10-28  DDCI UBL Update
• 1999-08-03 UBL Update 
• 2002-08-07 Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes To Keep  al-Qa'ida Functioning
• 1997-01-27 UBL Fatwas 
• 1996-12-18 Structure of UBL's Islamic Army 
• 1996-12-19 TERRORISM: ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY'S MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND POLITICAL AND SHARIA COMMITTEE; PROCESS OF APPROVING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
• 1999-01-27 How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network 
• 2003-12-10 Letter to Douglas Feith from Stanley Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, re: Corrections to Iraq-AQ claims 
• 1999-04-05 Targeting Study of US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 
• 1995-12 Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network
• RESPONSE TO DCI DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 52, ITEM 2 (9/11 Commission) 
• 2001:  Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution
• 1994-10 OIG Inspection Report: The Agency's Counterterrorism Effort 

Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

RECENT WORK

Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam

New America Foundation Panel: Infiltration and surveillance

New America Foundation report: PATCON, a case study on infiltration

FOREIGN POLICY

Exclusive: Why American jihadist Omar Hammami fears Al Shabab will kill him

Patriot Games: FBI Undercover Operations And Timothy McVeigh

A Nation of Spies and Snitches

The Boy Who Cried Lone Wolf

Al Qaeda's Merger: 40 New Americans

Monsters and Children: Politics And How We Talk About Muslims

Anwar Awlaki: Gone But Not Forgotten

The Myth of Anwar Awlaki

Did You Hear The One About U.S. Internment Camps? 

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, CIA, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Hijackers, Osama-Bin-Laden, September-11

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New America Foundation: Surveillance and Infiltration

I will be appearing at this event to discuss PATCON and to mark the release of a new and much more detailed report on the undercover operation and its implications for U.S. law enforcement policy. Please come! I will post a link to the extended report once it become available.

The New York City Police Department's surveillance of Muslim communities in New York has been widely debated since being publicly revealed in a Pulitzer Prize winning series of Associated Press reports. Defenders argue such techniques are crucial tools in an era of homegrown terrorism. Critics allege that the NYPD's techniques amount to blanket surveillance and alienate the very communities that government needs to work with against extremists. Please join us for a discussion about these techniques with two of the Pulitzer Prize winning reporters that broke the NYPD surveillance story and the author of a New America Foundation report revealing the FBI's efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist networks in the early 1990s.

Sign up for the event On an unrelated note, if you haven't taken the "One Year After Bin Laden" survey sponsored by Selected Wisdom, please take a few minutes to do so. It's an important snapshot of our current view of Al Qaeda. Clint Watts also has an interesting post today on the fact that Al Qaeda, like most Western stakeholders in the war on terrorism, may not really know what it means to be in Al Qaeda. Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: FBI, Infiltration, Informants, Oklahoma-City-Bombing, PATCON, Patriot-Movement, Surveillance, Timothy-McVeigh, Undercover

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Posthumous Awlaki Article Claims CIA, FBI Tried to Recruit Him as Informant

Anwar Awlaki claimed he was repeatedly targeted for recruitment as a spy or an informant for the U.S. government in an article published posthumously in the most recent issue of Inspire, the English-language jihadist magazine published by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

It has long been speculated that Awlaki may have been an informant for the FBI while he was an imam in San Diego in the period around when he met the September 11 hijackers, but clear evidence has never emerged, and the account from Inspire does little to settle the question. 

Awlaki's version of his time in America has a clear editorial slant and should be taken with a very large grain of salt, but the account given touches on several controversial and little-understood events from his life.

As reported by Catherine Herridge, Awlaki falsified immigration documents when he moved back to the United States as a college student in the 1990s in order to qualify for a U.S. government scholarship for foreign-born immigrant students (Awlaki was born in New Mexico). According to Awlaki:

When I finished high school in Yemen I was accepted on a scholarship to study in the US. But there were two problems: I was an American citizen and these scholarships are only for foreign students and number two the scholarship was to study agriculture and I wanted to study Engineering. My father at the time was a Minister of Agriculture and the Americans were happy to make some exceptions for him. 

Awlaki claims the scholarship program was a CIA recruiting initiative. 

Coming from a privileged family in Yemen, son of a father who was a high government official and a former US student himself, being a student at a private school were all of the sons of influential people went to, and graduating with scores among the top twenty in the country, has probably made me of some interest to my sponsors. I was feeling the flirting of the Office of International Students at my university. They were being very helpful and wanted to extend the relationship with me beyond business to a personal level.

Even though I was not fully practicing back then but I had an extreme dislike to the US government and was very wary of anything concerning intelligence services or secret orders. Thus, I was cold when it came to my relationship with the Office of International Students (which in my belief is a front for recruitment of international students for the government and is also a front from spying on them and reporting on them to the authorities). I also received an invitation to join the Rotary Club which I turned down.

In 1991, as has been previously reported, Awlaki traveled to Afghanistan. Previous stories on this trip were only weakly sourced with little detail. Awlaki does not flesh out the trip substantially but he does acknowledge that he went to Afghanistan for jihad. 

The invasion of Kuwait took place followed by the Gulf war. That is when I started taking my religion more seriously and I took the step of traveling to Afghanistan to fight. I spent a winter there and returned with the intention of finishing up in the US and leaving to Afghanistan for good. My plan was to travel back in summer, however, Kabul was opened by the mujahedeen and I saw that the war was over and ended up staying in the US.

Awlaki claims that he scholarship (obtained fraudulently in the first place) was withdrawn after he returned from Afghanistan. Awlaki moved to San Diego where he became imam at the Ar-Ribat mosque. According to Awlaki, the drumbeat of attempted recruitment continued. 

There was nothing happening at the mosque that would fall under the loose category of what we today refer to as terrorism but nevertheless, it is my firm belief that the government, for some reason, was actively trying to plant moles inside the mosque. There were some people who would just show up from nowhere who would try to mingle and fit in the mosque's community in suspicious ways. When things do not work out well with them they just disappear, only for someone else to take their place. These people would deal with me in particularly peculiar means that makes me wonder if they were really being send over by the government. Couldn’t they afford to send anyone better?

Awlaki said his much-heralded arrests for soliciting prostitution were efforts to coerce him into acting as an informant.  

So a more aggressive means was employed. In 1996 while waiting at a traffic light in my minivan a middle aged woman knocked on the window of the passenger seat. By the time I rolled down the window and before even myself or the woman uttering a word I was surrounded by police officers who had me come out of my vehicle only to be handcuffed. I was accused of soliciting a prostitute and then released. They made it a point to make me know in no uncertain terms that the woman was an undercover cop. I didn’t know what to make of the incident. However a few days later came the answer. I was visited by two men who introduced themselves as officials with the US government (they did not specify which government organization they belonged to) and that they are interested in my cooperation with them. When I asked what cooperation did they expect, they responded by saying that they are interested in having me liaise with them concerning the Muslim community of San Diego. I was greatly irritated by such an offer and made it clear to them that they should never expect such cooperation from myself. I never heard back from them again until in 1998 when I was approached by a woman, this time from my window and again I was surrounded by police officers who this time had go to court. This time I was told that this is a sting operation and you would not be able to get out of it.

Awlaki did not detail his connections to the September 11 hijackers, but he discussed the FBI's scrutiny of those contacts after the attacks. 

September 11 was a Tuesday. By Thursday the FBI were knocking on my door. The questions revolved around the attacks. They visited me again but this time they were asking for cooperation which I made it clear that they shouldn’t expect and the third meeting which was the last I had my lawyer attend the meeting.

Documents obtained by INTELWIRE indicate there was a fourth meeting between Awlaki and the FBI during this time period. 


For more about Awlaki, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Abbottabad Documents Shed Light on Al Qaeda's Use of Internet

Documents seized from Osama bin Laden's hiding place in Abbottabad reveal a fractious divide over key elements of the organization including one of its primary tools -- jihadist Web forums.

Prior to September 11, Al Qaeda distributed most of its propaganda and informational material through a handful of select outlets, including a London media office and the distribution by hand of videotapes.

Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has relied on a handful of sanctioned Internet message boards to distribute its materials. The specific outlets have morphed over time, as some were shut down or had their security penetrated by Western governments.  In addition to two or three "official" Web forums at any given time that are usually the first to distribute Al Qaeda material, there are a host of secondary forums where Al Qaeda supporters can redistribute releases and discuss issues that matter to jihadists around the world.

A letter attributed to Adam Gadahn, released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, highlights concerns about the forums being a collection of hateful bigots whose infatuation with violence and harsh fundamentalism makes Al Qaeda look bad. Gadahn writes:

As for the Jihadi forums, it is repulsive to most of the Muslims, or closed to them. It also distorts the face of al-Qa'ida, due to what you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants in these forums. It is also biased towards (Salafists) and not any Salafist, but the Jihadi Salafist, which is just one trend of the Muslims trends. The Jihad Salafist is a small trend within a small trend.

Gadahn also points to his own reservations about Al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, saying he disapproved of Zarqawi's moves but kept his comments internal to Al Qaeda to avoid creating an appearance of dissent.

Although the forums represent Al Qaeda's only way to release authenticated material, Gadahn (believed to head Al Qaeda's media committee) indicates that at some point he lost control of the process. For instance, Osama bin Laden's speeches were recorded as videos but often released as audios. (See this INTELWIRE report from May 2011.) Gadahn writes that there is no security-related reason to withhold the video portion of bin Laden's speeches, but that there is a strong propaganda value and urges that the material be released in high definition:

I would think that it is suitable for the Shaykh to address a video speech to the Mujahidin in all the arenas, consoling, urging them to endure, confirming their steps and guiding them. The message that he sent when Shaykh Sa'id -may God bless his soul- was strong and influential, so may God reward him well. Many people do not read, and even if they read, they are more influenced by visuals.

Despite this, Gadahn's wishes were not accommodated. When the speeches eventually made their way to the forums, they were presented as audio only. The interesting question, which is not addressed in the released documents, is who in the process had the authority (or the temerity) to override Gadahn's wishes.

A letter attributed to bin Laden praises the rise of interest in jihad on the Internet while fretting about Al Qaeda's loss of control both online and off. However, bin Laden strongly approved of the use of the Internet to promote jihadism, at one point suggesting that trainees at Al Qaeda camps in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area be sent back to their home countries to incite online. Bin Laden saw jihadist Internet activity as a sign of success.

One indication of that is the wide-scale spread of Jihadist ideology, especially on the Internet, and the tremendous number of young people who frequent the Jihadist websites—a major achievement for Jihad, through the grace of God, despite our enemies and their efforts. On the other hand, after the war expanded and the Mujahidin spread out into many regions, some of the brothers became totally absorbed in fighting our local enemies, and more mistakes have been made due to miscalculations by the brothers planning the operations or something that arises before it is carried out.

Specifically, bin Laden objects to loose interpretations of rules of jihad pertaining to the death of Muslims as collateral damage or even as direct targets in terrorist attacks.

[We should not] underestimate the fact that these issues, amongst others, led to the loss of the Muslims sympathetic approach towards the Mujahidin. What also led to the loss of the Mujahidin was exploitation of the foes to several of their mistakes and tainting their picture before the crowds of the nation; the purpose was to split them from their popular bases, and needless to say that this issue involving the loss of the nation's audience paralyzed the Jihadist movements.

Interestingly, while bin Laden was pushing for a more restrained approach to killing, especially where Muslims were concerned, a ruling by American Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula propagandist Anwar Awlaki (published by AQAP yesterday) pushes in the other direction. Awlaki writes:

If combatants and non-combatants are mixed together and integrated, it is allowed for the Muslims to attack them even if women, children, the elderly, farmers, merchants and slaves get killed but this should only be done with the intention of fighting the combatants. If Muslims kill non-combatants in fighting there is no liability on the Muslims. ... If Muslims get killed unintentionally or by mistake during the fight with the disbelievers, there is no sin on the Muslim who killed him... If the number of Muslims among [the disbelievers] is equal to the disbelievers we should not strike them but if they are less, then we can strike them because most of the harm would not be on the Muslims.

The indiscriminate focus on killing found throughout the run of Awlaki's Inspire magazine appears to have contributed to bin Laden's reservations about the magazine, which have been previously reported but are only glancingly referred to in the documents released today.

Overall, bin Laden appears to have been deeply concerned about the state of Al Qaeda's messaging and propaganda and had ordered a complete review. He writes:

We are in need of an advisory reading, with constructive criticism to our entire policy and publications at the center and in the regions internally; as such have two available brothers ready for this mission. From abroad, seek safe routes to achieve a contact with one of the knowledge seekers so long as he is credible and trusted; inform him that we are in a new phase of amendment and development and require an advisory reading and development of our entire policy and publication at the center and in the regions. The purpose is to amend our mistakes and develop our Jihadist work according to their suggestions and opinions, especially in corresponding with the masses of the nation in context and shape. ...

I intend to issue a statement, in which I would discuss starting a new phase to amend what we have issued – as such we would regain the trust of a large portion of those who had lost their trust in the Mujahidin; we would increase the lines of communication between the Mujahidin and their nation.

A letter from a "Shaykh Yunis" to bin Laden also excited the Al Qaeda leader, who quoted it:

Presently we are experiencing the most favorable atmosphere in the history of the Islamic nation. There is a base of youths adopting our teachings and following our path without any efforts on our parts to teach them the faith. They are ready for anything posted for them on the "spider web [Internet]", after validating the source.

You can read the Gadahn letter here:

Adam Gadahn letter from Abbottabad documents

You can read all the newly released documents in a single PDF here:

Abbottabad documents released by CTC

You can read the CTC's analysis of the documents here:

Letters from Abbottabad

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

AQAP: Inspire Magazine Will Continue

Two new issues of Al Qaeda's English-language magazine "Inspire" hit the virtual newsstands today, with a promise that more will follow.

"To the disappointment of our enemies, issue 9 of inspire [sic lowercase] magazine is out against all odds," wrote Yahya Ibrahim, the only surviving member of Inspire's original masthead. "[Inspire] is here to stay because it was not found to end with the end of its founders."

Issue 8 of Inspire is the last issue overseen by its founding editor, American Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula member Samir Khan, prior to his death by drone in September 2011. Although it was not released at the time, the issue had been finalized almost two weeks before Khan and his mentor, American cleric Anwar Awlaki, were killed.

Issue 9 is the first post-Khan issue, and the downgrade to Inspire's staff is clearly evident from the quotes above and on the cover, which features a grievous typo.



As Jihadica's Will McCants observed on Twitter, they "left off the 'h' in 'whining'."

Khan's absence is felt throughout the issue in ways large and small. For instance, the issue display of martyr's tribute for Awlaki and Khan lack Khan's trademark design flourish to emphasize their importance. Despite its release this week, the issue does not strongly reference the death of bin Laden. Headlines throughout the issue often fail to reflect the articles, and a autobiographical piece attributed to Awlaki is in sore need of editing.

As far as content, Issue 8's most important feature is a previously promoted article by Awlaki justifying the murder of American civilians. Awlaki takes a bloodier tone than he has in the past with a fairly sweeping imprimatur for nearly any tactic or approach to killing Americans. Operational notes features instruction on the use of handguns, continuing AQ's trend toward encouraging smaller and more reliable attacks. In most other respects, the issue continues the content seen in previous editions.

Issue 9 attempts to maintain continuity and succeeds to a degree, despite the noticeable drop in quality. In addition to Yahya Ibrahim's assurance that Inspire will continue, AQAP religious leader Ibrahim al-Rubaish also indicates that AQAP will continue to strongly support Inspire. Much of the issue is dedicated to personal accounts of Awlaki by those who knew him, as well as a lengthy piece on Samir Khan.

In a sharp break from previous issues, Inspire 9 urges would-be "individual jihadists" (i.e., lone wolves) to contact them directly via e-mail and provide a wealth of identifying information, which I imagine most American CT officials would wholeheartedly endorse. Previous issues of Inspire urged would-be lone wolves to act without contacting AQAP or anyone else about their plans. I may have a bit more to say about this later.

Operational elements in Issue 9 include a focus on assassination, which can be read as significant in conjunction with Issue 8's focus on handguns. Both issue 8 and 9 strongly suggest President Obama as an assassination target, although issue 8 is more explicit.

For more about Inspire and American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

OKC Anniversary: A New Investigative Report by J.M. Berger

An FBI undercover program known as PATCON spent more than two years collecting intelligence on the Patriot movement, without producing a single conviction. Timothy McVeigh was in contact with members of the targeted groups at the time of the investigation, but those links escaped notice, even after the Oklahoma City bombing.

The program and its connections to the bombing are the subject of a major new investigative report by J.M. Berger for Foreign Policy.

Read the full story

PATCON will be examined in more detail in a forthcoming report by J.M. Berger for the New America Foundation, which looks at the double-edged sword of infiltration techniques and raises questions about how undercover agents and informants should be used in light of current controversies.

Documents related to the case will be published on INTELWIRE in the weeks to come.

For more investigating reporting on terrorism, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: American-Pistol-and-Rifle-Association, Andreas-Strassmeir, Civilian-Materiel-Assistance, Louis-Beam, OKBOMB, Oklahoma-City-Bombing, PATCON, Roger-Moore, Texas-Light-Infantry, Timothy-McVeigh

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Is Al Qaeda coming back to NY?

Al Qaeda’s Internet forums have not been having a good month. The two forums officially designated for distributing the terrorist group’s propaganda have been offline for days, leaving online jihad aficionados with a lot of free time on their hands.

One of those “jihobbyists” posted a picture of New York City with the phrase “Al Qaeda: Coming Soon Again in New York” to the Ansar Al-Mujahideen Arabic forum, which is where terrorist trolls have been hanging out while their elite forums are offline.

The image is apparently a stock photograph, which can be found on at least 45 Web sites, sans the text, according to a TinEye search. The NYPD is investigating, as reported with a certain amount of hyperventilation by the Daily News.

It’s not the first time that Al Qaeda’s online images have provoked alarm. Inspire Magazine, brainchild of the late American jihadist Anwar Awlaki, often featured pictures of U.S. landmarks, including the Capitol. Analysts pounced on the images as possible warnings of an imminent terrorist attack, but the threats were never fulfilled.

The online posting at Ansar, while understandably upsetting, has even less credibility as a threat than the Inspire images. Although a lone jihadist or Al Qaeda proper could certainly choose to advertise their intentions in this manner, it is unprecedented for the terrorist organization or any of its online adherents to make so specific a threat.

I recently asked a number of government intelligence analysts whether any of the hundreds of threats and wishful plots they had tracked on jihadist forums had ever been realized in an actual terrorist attack. The answer was stark. No plot begun on the forums had ever culminated in a successful attack, and only one person was willing to cite one plot that became operational (unsuccessfully).

In 2011, I interviewed one of the most prolific online provocateurs, known by his username Abu Suleiman Al Nasser. Abu Suleiman has been the subject of many alerts transmitted by various terror-watchers over the last couple of years because he’s a jihadist idea machine, constantly proposing tactics and attacks. None of them, thus far, have come to fruition.

“I am not a leader in Al Qaeda and do not speak for them,” he explained, “but I consider myself a member of Al Qaeda and the new generation of jihadists.” As part of his duties, Abu Suleiman posted countless ideas, warnings and calls for attacks, but he explained that this was part of a process of giving the West fair warning and not so much the substantial product of his criminal mastermind.

There’s a first time for everything, but volumes of venom are spewed on the forums every day. Most of them will never amount to anything. The challenge for counterterrorism professionals is figuring out where the needles lie in a very large haystack.

Update: More on the origins of the image here from Rusty Shackleford, and a pretty much similar comment to mine here from Daveed Gartenstein-Ross.

Update 2: I and my friend Aaron Zelin, of the excellent Jihadology site, are quoted in this New York Times story on the image.

Also, if we're going to start worrying about the threats contained in jihadi artwork, may I suggest that Mujazilla should be our greatest concern.

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Check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Internet, Jihadist-Forums

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Beatings and Bureaucracy: The Founding Memos of Al Qaeda

A new INTELWIRE e-book provides a candid glimpse at the origins of Al Qaeda in its own words.

"Beatings and Bureaucracy: The Founding Memos of Al Qaeda" offers the full text of 30 different Al Qaeda founding documents, most of which have never been published before, including notes from the meetings at which Al Qaeda was imagined and created, letters to and from Osama bin Laden and other key Al Qaeda figures, and detailed descriptions of conflicts between bin Laden's allies and the followers of his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.

Click here to read on Kindle

If there's enough interest in these documents, additional material will follow.

Several of the documents in this collection were written by American jihadist Mohamed Loay Bayazid, an Al Qaeda founder. For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abdullah-Azzam, Al-Qaeda, American-Al-Qaeda, Benevolence-International-Foundation, Mohamed-Loay-Bayazid, Osama-Bin-Laden

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Omar Hammami Hides Out With Fellow American While Shabab May or May Not Be Trying To Kill Him

UPDATED: Saturday, March 17, 2012

American Omar Hammami, lately of the Al Shabab affiliate of Al Qaeda in Somalia, has released an "urgent" message online saying he is afraid for his life after a split with the group.

"To whomever it may reach from the Muslims... I record this message today because I fear my life may be endangered by [Al Shabab] because of some differences that occurred regarding matters of the Sharia and of strategy."

Full video may be seen at Jihadology, which broke the news on Twitter.

Per Jihadology, Al Shabab announced via Twitter that it had no idea what Hammami was talking about and said he was in no danger.

Hammami had better hope that is true, since the video he posted appears to have been filmed at a location he previously frequented with his fellow American Shabab recruit Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax. A child, possibly Faarax's, can be heard in the background of the video.



For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Omar-Hammami

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Visualizing CVE Audiences

Over at Jihadica, Will McCants has been posting some important pieces on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), a topic that is taking on an ever-greater focus in Washington with very little clear thought behind it.

Will has done something that almost no one else has -- clearly defined CVE and delimiting the scope of the situations in which CVE can even reasonably be considered. I strongly recommend reading those posts in full.

Over the last day or two, Will and I have been tinkering with the chart from the original Jihadica post with an eye toward making a fuller visual representation of the concepts discussed in those posts. The two charts below may be useful in seeing the scope of potential CVE target audiences.





Previous INTELWIRE posts on CVE:

A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds

Monsters and Children: How Politicians Talk About Islam

The Value of Exposing Collaborators

The 'You Name It!' Problem

White House CVE Strategy Full of Sound and Fury

Terrorist Acts, Terrorist Thoughts

For more about American jihadists and homegrown violent extremists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: CVE, Jihadica, Will-McCants

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink