Terror Strategy: Is The U.S. Losing The Information War?

By J.M. Berger

INTELWIRE.com



Last week, John Kerry outlined his plan for fighting terrorism, which he offered a sharp alternative to President Bush's prosecution of the War on Terror so far. (external link to related story)



But while Kerry made several key changes in execution, his plan is based on many of the same underlying assumptions that fuels the Bush Administration's policy toward terrorism.



These assumptions, treated as articles of faith by the U.S. government and media, are dangerously flawed. If they are not corrected, the outlook for U.S. security for the foreseeable future is grim.



Kerry's plan is more closely aligned with the realities of geopolitics and global terrorism today, but the tactics and targets he identifies are many respects very similar to those identified by both the Bush and Clinton administrations.



At best, Kerry's proposals would reduce the damage that the Bush Administration's policy is currently causing to U.S. security, global standing and civil liberties. But "do no harm" is only the first principle in an effective counterterrorism strategy.



Both camps are still neglecting some of the most important elements of al Qaeda's broad global network. This failure of imagination puts America and its allies at more risk than ever against an implacable enemy that has already adapted to to the changing reality of a post-September 11 world.



There are several policy failures currently wreaking damage on U.S. security. Rather than debating the particulars of how to apply the same flawed strategy, U.S. politicians at every level need to take a hard look at several areas where a dramatic change in focus can lead to swift improvement.



INTELWIRE will publish a series of strategy briefings between now and the election, dealing with key areas in the War on Terrorism, including information strategies, prosecution of terrorist suspects, practical steps to secure the homeland, and defining the enemy.



The first article in the series addresses information management strategies employed by al Qaeda and the United States. This topic, which has not been discussed extensively by either candidate, was raised by the 9/11 Commission to some degree.



The commission, however, focused on specific information bottlenecks and technological improvements. While important, these issues obscure an underlying problem that affects U.S. information flow at every level.



The information issue is integral to the conflict between Western governments and the global network of terrorist groups generally referred to under the heading of "al Qaeda."

Information Strategy

The name "al Qaeda" means "the base." Although the term is commonly construed in the sense of a military base or foundation, it is more accurately understood as "data base."



al Qaeda originated in the mid-1980s as a compilation of names and addresses, collected by Osama bin Laden for the purpose of sending money to the families of Afghan Arab volunteers.



But the list had an ulterior purpose. It was used to keep track of the Afghan Arabs and to categorize their skills and nationalities, allowing bin Laden's network to maintain links between the volunteers and the "corporate" al Qaeda organization.



This database of names and networks, the world's most dangerous rolodex, is at the very heart of al Qaeda's capabilities. al Qaeda operatives today add their names to the database using an application form, much like any employee seeking a job. The base is used to recruit operatives for terrorist operations, to solicit logistical support of those operatives (such as lodging and food), and to solicit and launder money to fund terrorist attacks.



By the early 1990s, significant parts of the database had been computerized. Known al Qaeda operatives used laptop computers, floppy disks and PDAs to file away names, phone numbers and addresses, in addition to collecting business cards and traditional handwritten address books.



Since its founding, the informational component of al Qaeda has skyrocketed in importance. In addition to collecting information, the network also sends information around the world.



The terror network's primary function today is managing and disseminating information of every kind, including contact names and phone numbers, fatwas in support of terrorist goals, university-level courses in terror tactics, and an gigantic library of printed, CD-ROM and online reference materials (including "how to" guides on making bombs, kidnapping Westerners and infiltrating communities).



al Qaeda even publishes a magazine, al-Battar, which includes inspirational religious tracts, coded instructions to operatives, helpful tips on waging guerrilla war, and suggestions of P.R. strategies. (external link)



With only an ad hoc network of personal computers, Web sites, printing presses, rolodex cards, handwritten address books and human brains, al Qaeda has created an information-rich infrastructure designed to aggressively push information out to terrorist operatives around the world.



Because so much of al Qaeda's information base moves so freely, the organization is also extraordinarily effective at restricting its relatively small pool of truly sensitive information, such as attacks in progress, and the location of top leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. When you have fewer secrets, they are easier to keep.



In contrast, the U.S. government is built to perform in exactly the opposite manner. U.S. government information structures are tasked primarily to restrict information and its flow. Complex layers of classification and secrecy combine with massive bureaucratic hurdles and obsolete technologies to create a gigantic information sink. Data goes in, but only a small percentage of that data comes out.



Philosophical questions aside, the strategy of information restriction is not particularly effective at hardening American targets. Using a combination of undercover moles and open source documents, al Qaeda has managed to collect intelligence on everything from fleet movements, to nuclear power plant security and design, to military tactics and techniques.



The much discussed failure to watchlist 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhamzi is a perfect example of the data sink at work. Since September 11, little has been done to correct the problem. There is still no unified terrorism watchlist for use in border interdiction and restricting air travel by suspected terrorist operatives. (external link to related story)



What little watchlisting exists is deeply flawed, and has been documented to include substantial amounts of inaccurate, outdated and politically motivated information, such as the names of anti-war activists. After the arrest of Jose Padilla, an alleged al Qaeda operative, there were anecdotal reports of airline passengers with the same name being singled out for additional screening, even though the suspect was already in custody and despite the fact that the name Jose Padilla is extremely common.



Singer Yusef Islam (previously known as Cat Stevens) was recently targeted by a no-fly list. While the inclusion of Islam's name on the no-fly list was the subject of light-hearted commentary in the media, the deeper story of the day was that his watchlist status wasn't detected until after his plane had crossed the Atlantic Ocean.



Obsolete technology makes matters worse.



A recent FOIA request by INTELWIRE to the FBI yielded a response that the agency's chief of records and information dissemination is incapable of searching its own archives for information related to a specific criminal case in which the FBI participated extensively. The case, the prosecution of Ramzi Yousef's so-called Bojinka plot, was one of the FBI's most important investigations of the last decade. (link to document)



The FBI has at least eight independent information processing systems, none of which are integrated. A recent congressional report on modernization efforts reports that the FBI is "hamstrung by outdated technology in networks, hardware, software and infrastructure support."



While the CIA's systems are shrouded in secrecy, the situation there is believed to be comparable, and aggravated by an institutional loathing for paper trails and accountability. In the past, the agency routinely kept the most sensitive -- and most important -- information on paper only, in a vault, where it cannot be centrally indexed for processing and analysis. On top of this institutional resistance to putting things "on the books," new collection technologies and a flood of recent prisoner interrogations have resulted in a glut of new data, which is then dumped into a system already floundering from information overload.



On the homeland security front, intelligence gathered concerning al Qaeda tactics and personnel does not consistently or timely make its way to the front lines -- first responders such as local police departments, or even travel between regional FBI and ATF offices. Information about a recent theft of 3,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate (a popular ingredient in al Qaeda bombs) from a North Carolina factory was not known to ATF officials, nor to FBI headquarters, nor even at FBI offices in the region, despite the fact that local police had called both agencies in to investigate, and despite the fact that the FBI had concurrently announced that al Qaeda might be planning truck bomb attacks. (related story)



In another case, an al Qaeda strategy to blow up several apartment buildings simultaneously was only disclosed as part of a political decision to defend the administration's detention of al Qaeda dirty bomber Jose Padilla. (related story) The apartment bombing plan was not apparently disclosed to local law enforcement officials in the FBI's weekly homeland security bulletin, where such detailed intelligence most certainly belonged.



In fact, almost every substantial release of real intel about al Qaeda tactics and personnel since September 11 has been politically motivated, while the government's Homeland Security resources for citizens have consisted of simplistic and nonspecific advice like "buy duct tape" and "in the event of a dirty bomb attack, take shelter." (DHS resources for citizens)



We live in an age of unprecedented information management potential, and yet the most sensitive government functions are woefully behind the curve in exploiting their massive data banks. In many cases, it's possible for private individuals to collect and process more information about terror suspects using commercial data banks like Lexis-Nexis than it is for government officials to draw conclusions from its many compartmented and classified data sources.



In response to this obvious information crisis, the U.S. chose to focus on enhancing collection techniques, seeking dramatically expanded law enforcement powers to obtain data through the USA-PATRIOT Act and its follow-on legislative fixes.



This approach is flawed on several fronts. In addition to the civil liberties issues raised by the legislation, the PATRIOT Act serves only to increase the flow of raw information into a system already glutted with unusable information. Before they ask for more collection power, federal authorities first need to demonstrate that they can process the information they already have.



Before the fact, U.S. authorities had collected more than adequate intelligence to prevent the September 11 attack or at least mitigate its severity. The major flaws were not in the collection systems, but in failing to integrate the intelligence in a central data system, and to subject the information to timely, competent and thorough analysis at the headquarters of the FBI, CIA, NSA or the White House itself.



According to Richard Clarke, former director of counterterrorism for the Bush and Clinton Administrations, U.S. officials were able to confirm that the names of al Qaeda operatives appeared on the passenger lists of the hijacked flights by midday on September 11. The information had been sitting in a compartment, useless. The problem wasn't collection, it was dissemination.



Obviously, it is not a technical impossibility to move the names of suspected terrorists from one node to another. At the most basic level, the U.S. disadvantage in the information war has much more to do with intent than it does with capability.



al Qaeda's intent is to distribute its information, and because of that clear focus, it succeeds despite significant technological disadvantages. al Qaeda's information strategy is executed using the materials at hand, including laptop computers, desktop computers, electronic organizers and file cabinets.



The U.S. government's intent is to restrict information, as evidenced by its government secrecy and classification efforts. Massive bureaucratic inertia makes it even more difficult for information to move from its collection point to headquarters. On the odd chance the information actually makes it to headquarters, it frequently crawls into a compartmented bureaucratic drawer and only emerges when investigators start seeking accountability for a failure.



And accountability is perhaps the key issue here. The philosophy of restricting information is entrenched by a fear of accountability on the part of both politicians and bureaucrats. That fear is such a powerful motivator that incoming presidential administrations almost never blow the whistle on the classified mistakes of their predecessors, in an unspoken honor system designed to keep information under lock and key.



But accountability can usually only be deferred; it is rarely denied. And as Richard Nixon famously observed, it's the cover-up that kills you. It's better for America to learn from its mistakes quickly than to bury evidence of its failures for months, years or even decades.



While many specific technical and policy fixes would be required to entirely fix the information crisis on a pragmatic level, none of those fixes will be worth much unless the U.S. leadership changes its intent from restricting to disseminating.



No one is suggesting the U.S. advertise battlefield strategies during war, or release a detailed description of White House security procedures. But there is a desperate need to make good data about the real terror threat available to the public, the media, legislators, and most importantly, to front-line law enforcement officials at the local and national level.



The only way change will happen is through an act of political will by the current or future occupants of the White House. The decision will almost certainly result in a dramatic wave of accountability, shock and blame for both political parties, as previously undisclosed information begins to flow out to the public.



However painful it may be, the process is necessary so that Americans can make informed decisions -- everyone from law enforcers, to legislators, to business leaders, to judges and juries, to voters.



Our information systems represent one of the country's biggest vulnerabilities. The War on Terrorism is an information war on every front, and the U.S. has unilaterally disarmed.

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Commentary: Bush Invites Comparison Between East Germany and South Iraq

By J.M. Berger

INTELWIRE.com



One of the most shocking statements during President George Bush's speech to the Republican National Convention last week was a historical comparison between the American occupation of Iraq and its post-WWII occupation of Germany:

America has done this kind of work before -- and there have always been doubters. In 1946, 18 months after the fall of Berlin to Allied forces, a journalist wrote in the New York Times, "Germany is -- a land in an acute stage of economic, political and moral crisis. [European] capitals are frightened. In every [military] headquarters, one meets alarmed officials doing their utmost to deal with the consequences of the occupation policy that they admit has failed." End quote.



Maybe that same person is still around, writing editorials. Fortunately, we had a resolute president named Truman, who, with the American people, persevered, knowing that a new democracy at the center of Europe would lead to stability and peace. And because that generation of Americans held firm in the cause of liberty, we live in a better and safer world today.

The comment has been widely criticized in the press for the spurious comparison between conditions in 1946 Germany and conditions in modern-day Iraq, which bear virtually no resemblence to each other.



But there's a much, much bigger problem with the comparison: The occupation of Germany in 1946 was a policy failure that cost American dearly by creating a major front in the 50-year Cold War.



The basic outline of the occupation, as summarized by the Columbia Encyclopedia:

A line formed mostly by the Oder and Neisse rivers was made the eastern boundary of Germany, as East Prussia and Upper and Lower Silesia were placed under Polish administration (except N East Prussia, which was awarded to the USSR). In the west, the Saarland was occupied by French military forces. What remained of Germany was divided into four zones, occupied separately by the armies of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR. (...) By 1947, the Western occupation zones were increasingly coordinating their policies (especially in economics), whereas the Soviet zone followed an increasingly divergent policy. The split between the three Western Allies and the USSR became complete in 1948.

When the New York Times editorialized that the occupation was going badly in 1946, Germany was still (in principle) one country. Within a few short years, the occupation had collapsed completely and Germany was divided into two sovereign nations.



West Germany became the democratic success story that Bush was attempting to invoke in his speech. East Germany became an implacable foe dominated by America's most dangerous enemy for the next 50 years.



It's alarming that the President's grasp of history should be so selective, but what's even more alarming is the fact that Iraq could indeed go the way of Germany, in an entirely different way than the President intended.



Where Germany split into East and West, Iraq has a boundary running North and South. The still unresolved political struggle between the al-Sadr militias and the U.S.-dominated central Iraqi government could easily fracture the nation into two or more parts.



Deepening the problem, America has not yet defeated its primary enemy in the world today, al Qaeda, nor has its leader, Osama bin Laden, been captured or killed.



When the U.S. began its failed occupation of Germany, Hitler was dead by his own hand, an inglorious and shameful defeat that broke the moral back of the Nazi party. (In fact, bin Laden's demise is more likely to inspire his troops than demoralize them.)



The Third Reich's military might had been equally destroyed, and the U.S. was the only nation in the world that possessed the devastating atomic bomb. Despite all this, the country split into two nations, one which was a friend to America, and one which was its enemy.



Now imagine a Germany where thousands of suicidal military volunteers streamed into the country through porous borders, waging a guerilla campaign inspired by a defiant, surviving Axis leader who had escaped the Americans, like Hitler or Hirohito.



Then ask yourself whether a 50-year War with South Iraq is likely to be Cold.



The comparison between the occupations of Iraq and Germany may have been facile, misinformed and misguided, but it could also be unintentionally prophetic. As the old saying goes, those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it.

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U.S. Secretly Held Mohammed Jamal Khalifa For Four Months After Purported May 1995 Deportation

Prior To Detention, Controversial 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick Signed January Order Sending Mohammed Jamal Khalifa To Face Death Sentence In Jordan; Major Intelligence On al Qaeda Was Obtained Soon After

UPDATE: Jamal Khalifa Killed: His Life-and-Death Secrets

This story is being extensively updated and expanded and will be re-published at the earliest opportunity with significant new disclosures.

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

The U.S. government secretly detained Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law for four months in 1995, after the INS announced he had already been deported to Jordan, according to documents obtained by INTELWIRE using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The Jordan deportation was authorized by then-Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, at the request of Secretary of State Warren Christopher. A member of the independent commission investigating the September 11 attacks, Gorelick came under fire earlier in 2004 for possible conflicts arising from her role in the Clinton administration's war on terrorism.

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, an alleged terrorist financier married to a sister of bin Laden, was arrested in San Francisco, Calif., in December 1994. U.S. and Philippines authorities describe Khalifa as a top al Qaeda lieutenant of the 1990s and an intimate of bin Laden. A Saudi national, Khalifa reportedly funneled money from bin Laden to help form the Abu Sayyaf Group and other Islamic separatist movements in the Philippines starting in the late 1980s.

Within a month of his arrest, the Justice Department instituted extradition proceedings to deport Khalifa to Jordan, where he had been convicted in absentia for his alleged involvement in a terrorist plot to bomb movie theaters.

According to a public statement by the INS, that deportation was completed on May 3, 1995. The deportation has been widely criticized as a failure of vision in the War on Terrorism. But newly revealed documents obtained by INTELWIRE show the case is much more complex than it seemed. (To view all the documents cited in this story, click here.)

Behind The Scenes Of The Arrest

Khalifa was in the Philippines in November 1994. According to a 2002 FBI affidavit, he was in contact with a terrorist cell in Manila during that time (link to document). Led by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the cell was plotting to bomb a dozen U.S.-bound airliners in mid-January 1995, according to trial records.

Authorities now claim that Khalifa helped fund the plot, known as Bojinka, through a network of charities and businesses he had founded in the Philippines. Khalifa has denied all these charges and says he has never been connected to terrorist activity.

Khalifa traveled to the U.S. on Dec. 1, 1994. He was arrested by the FBI and the INS on Dec. 16, shortly before his scheduled return to the Philippines. According to INS records obtained by INTELWIRE, his visa was revoked because he was wanted by Jordanian authorities for funding a series of movie theater bombings earlier that year.

According to the 2002 affidavit, a founding member of al Qaeda was arrested while traveling with Khalifa. Mohamed Loay Bayazid allegedly tried to purchase uranium for al Qaeda in the early 1990s, according to the affidavit and other court records.

Although he was arrested with Khalifa, INTELWIRE has been unable to ascertain the existence of public records which indicate what happened to Bayazid after his arrest. According to the 2002 affidavit, Bayazid was released under unclear circumstances and later fled the country.

After his arrest, Khalifa was held at the Santa Rita County Jail for several months in a high-security cell, according to the San Francisco Examiner. The detention in a local facility was consistent with INS practice at the time.

On Dec. 20, a search warrant was executed for Khalifa's baggage, according to court records obtained by INTELWIRE. An electronic organizer in his luggage contained a phone number linked to Bojinka, according to the 2002 affidavit.

That phone number was for a unit in the Dona Josefa apartment building in Manila, where a member of Yousef's terrorist cell was living. Yousef was living and building bombs in another unit at the same building. Despite the date of this discovery, U.S. and Philippines authorities maintain they had no knowledge of the Manila cell prior to January 1995.

On December 21, 1994, Khalifa was convicted and sentenced to death in absentia by the Jordanian government on charges of aiding terrorist activity. The next day, the ambassador of Jordan requested that Khalifa be extradited, according to an official copy of his letter, obtained by INTELWIRE.

On January 5, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a letter to Attorney General Janet Reno, formally requesting that Khalifa be deported specifically to Jordan. The letter came nearly three weeks after deportation proceedings had already begun.

The next day, Gorelick sent a letter to the Office of the Immigration Judge which stated that she was aware deportation proceedings were underway and stipulates that Khalifa should not be deported to any country except Jordan. The letter was obtained by INTELWIRE under FOIA (link to document).

Bojinka Busted; Khalifa Cuts A Deal

The very same day that Gorelick signed the order to deport Khalifa to Jordan, a virtual death sentence for the detainee, Philippines police raided Ramzi Yousef's apartment at the Dona Josefa.

Police and trial records indicate the raid came on Jan. 6, 1995, after an accidental fire in the apartment sent smoke billowing out the window of the unit. However, the documents uncovered by INTELWIRE indicate that U.S. authorities were in possession of information linking Khalifa to the Dona Josefa by late December 1994.

During the Bojinka trial, Yousef (who represented himself) claimed there had been no fire, and he explicitly argued during his closing remarks that the police had planned the raid in advance.

"You have two more witnesses from the Philippine National Police, who their testimonies both combined would show that all the events of January 6, 1995, are all made up by the Philippine National Police, and would prove, would certainly prove that the Philippine National Police prepared well in advance for the alleged events in room number 603," Yousef said. (It should be noted that Yousef made several claims during the trial and closing remarks, some of which were demonstrably false and all of which were self-serving.)

As Khalifa's deportation moved forward slowly, the Philippines government sent intelligence reports to U.S. law enforcement officials tying Khalifa to Yousef's Bojinka cell. These reports, obtained by INTELWIRE, include extensive information on Khalifa's alleged activities in the Philippines.

While Khalifa was still in custody, two suspects were arrested in the Bojinka case, Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad. Yousef was also wanted for his role in bombing the World Trade Center in 1993.

Both men were questioned about their ties to Khalifa within hours of being taken into U.S. custody, according to documents obtained by investigative journalist Peter Lance for his book, "1000 Years for Revenge."

During the spring of 1995, the U.S. developed its first direct intelligence on Osama bin Laden. A joint congressional inquiry into the 9/11 attack said that some time between March and May "[ redacted ] provides most significant reporting on UBL to date."

Based on the 2002 affidavit and numerous other sources, both Khalifa and Bayazid would have been able to provide significant intelligence on bin Laden, although there were several other suspects in the U.S. with similar information. INTELWIRE has found no documentation that indicates the source of the reporting.

However, on March 27, the Justice Department agreed without objection to return the belongings seized from Khalifa's luggage, closing out a civil lawsuit filed by Khalifa, according to court records obtained by INTELWIRE.

In early April, Jordan overturned Khalifa's in absentia conviction. (There is some ambiguity about the date this occurred, but it had been accomplished by April.)

On April 18, 1995, Khalifa appeared in immigration court and argued against deportation, according to reports in the San Francisco Chronicle. His attorney promised "long term litigation" to prevent the deportation from proceeding.

Long-Term Turns Into Short-Term

One day after this court appearance, the Alfred E. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City was destroyed by a terrorist truck bomb attack. The method of attack was extremely similar to that used by Yousef in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Hours after the explosion took place, Murad informed a prison guard that Yousef's terrorist cell was responsible for the attack, according to court records and FBI interrogation reports obtained by Peter Lance.

A few hours after Murad's claim of responsibility, Khalifa was moved from a county jail to a high-security federal prison in California (FCI Dublin), according to a Bureau of Prisons inmate data record obtained by INTELWIRE under FOIA. (link to document)

Timothy McVeigh was picked up the same day on a traffic violation. On April 21, Terry Nichols surrendered to police. His Philippines ties were immediately discovered, as detailed in an FBI "302" interrogation record dated April 21.

Khalifa, Yousef and Murad all had documented contacts in the town where Nichols stayed during a visit to the Philippines from November 22, 1994, to January 16, 1995 (related story, related story).

Not all of these details may have been clear to U.S. authorities at the time, but the FBI possessed a substantial amount of evidence that would have made Khalifa an important witness (at the least) in the Bojinka case, the second World Trade Center trial and possibly the Oklahoma City bombing as well.

Although subsequent investigations have yet to demonstrate a concrete link between the Manila cell and the Oklahoma City bombing, the investigation had barely begun by the time Khalifa returned to immigration court -- and at least two investigative leads linking back to Khalifa were already on the table.

On April 26, 1995, Khalifa appeared in court again, reversing his previous position and requesting that he be immediately deported to Jordan. In exchange for his cooperation, the INS agreed to strike any allegations of terrorism from his U.S. record, according to newspaper accounts of the proceedings.

On May 5, 1995, UPI published the following report:

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has deported a Saudi Arabian national to Jordan, where he has been convicted in absentia of bankrolling terrorist attacks on public theaters, officials confirmed Friday.

Thomas J. Schiltgen, INS district director for Northern California, said Mohammed Jamal Khalifah was actually returned to Jordan on Wednesday, but the announcement was withheld for two days.

In Reality, Khalifa Remained In U.S. Custody Until August

The Bureau of Prisons document obtained by INTELWIRE appears to refute the INS statement that Khalifa had been turned over to Jordan. (The exact wording of the INS statement was not available at the time of this posting.)

The BOP document contains an entry for May 3, 1995, indicating that Khalifa had been transferred to an "in-transit facility." According to a BOP document obtained from the agency's Web site, " 'IN TRANSIT' means the inmate has been moved from a BOP facility, and may or may not be returned."

The facility to which Khalifa was transferred was designated "4-I." When contacted, two BOP spokespersons confirmed that the designation indicates Khalifa was being held in custody by another agency of the U.S. government, but neither source would disclose the identity of that agency. Both spokespersons said the meaning of the 4-I designation was "not public information." There is no indication of whether the detention was voluntary or involuntary.

Khalifa was detained with "4-I" status until August 31, 1995, at which point his status was changed to "P95" after an action designated "release." Both BOP spokespersons refused to disclose the meaning of the P95 designation, but one of them indicated that the final two entries on the inmate data record appear to indicate Khalifa's transfer to the custody of a foreign government.

Both spokespersons concurred that the form indicates Khalifa remained in U.S. custody until Aug. 31, 1995. A followup FOIA request for the meaning of the 4-I and P95 facility codes had not received a response at the time of this posting.

9/11 Commission Questions

After his return to Jordan, Khalifa was cleared of all charges after a witness in the movie theater bombings recanted his previous testimony. Khalifa was freed and lives freely in Saudi Arabia today, where he runs a seafood restaurant in Jeddah, according to media reports. In media reports and civil court filings as recent as 2004, Khalifa has denied ever having any ties to terrorist activity.

The new documents obtained by INTELWIRE raise several question about exactly what happened in the Khalifa case, including why he was deported instead of being prosecuted in the U.S., why the evidence seized from his belongings was returned to him, which government agency detained him between May and August 1995, and why he was detained.

The quick deportation agreement (struck only a week after the Oklahoma City bombing) is also noteworthy, given that the federal investigation into Terry Nichols' Philippines ties had barely begun and that a suspected accomplice of Khalifa had already professed to having a role in the bombing.

Furthermore, Khalifa's alleged links to Yousef (who had two major trials ahead of him) were no secret at the time he was deported. Newspaper reports from 1995 about Khalifa's extradition proceedings cited suspicions about such ties, in addition to the links cited above.

The revelation that Khalifa was secretly held in U.S. custody for four more months further elevates the importance of the case. The handling of Khalifa's deportation is one of the most prominent issues in the early 1990s investigation into Osama bin Laden, Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

Gorelick's role in signing the Jordan deportation letter may have been a routine administrative task, but it raises questions that cannot be answered until the full facts of the case are known. The document does not suggest that Gorelick was responsible for initiating Khalifa's deportation proceedings. The deportation was formally requested by Secretary of State Warren Christopher one day earlier, in a letter to Attorney General Janet Reno obtained by INTELWIRE.

Gorelick came under fire in 2004 for potential conflicts of interest in her role as a independent commissioner investigating the 9/11 attacks, when Attorney General John Ashcroft declassified a terrorism policy memo she had authored.

Gorelick was not the only figure on the 9/11 commission tied to the case.

Deitrich Snell, the commission's senior counsel, prosecuted Yousef and Murad in 1996 for the Bojinka plot. Khalifa's links to Yousef were kept obscure during the Bojinka trial. Phone calls between Khalifa's mobile phone and the Bojinka conspirators were mentioned during the trial, but attributed to a "Mr. Jamal." Khalifa's full name was never mentioned, unless in sections of the transcript which were sealed under a court order.

The trial also deleted virtually every mention of September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who was deeply involved in the Bojinka plot. The only citation of KSM during the trial came when a letter on Yousef's laptop was read aloud. No context for the name was provided during the trial, with the possible exception of sealed deliberations. Partly as a result of that omission, KSM remained virtually unknown in the West until after the September 11 attack, which he reportedly devised and supervised.


Civil court records cited in the report include Khalifah vs. USA (CV-95-15 MISC. MHP), Northern District of California.

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