More Al Qaeda in Egypt

The mainstream media has finally noticed what you read about here two weeks ago -- al Qaeda in Egypt. The experts are, so far, dismissive of the idea that al Qaeda has operational influence in Egypt. I fear they'll have to learn the hard way. al Qaeda sprang from Egypt, and its most capable membership (prior to 9/11) was overwhelmingly Egyptian. The network reaches into Egypt, there is no question. I will be posting some more historical documents on this topic in the near future. The two below were posted about a month ago.

1989: Guide to Egyptian Gama'aat

2001: History of the Muslim Brotherhood

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U.S. Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman Before Controversial Visa Application

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Followers of Omar Abdel Rahman made overtures to U.S. diplomats one year before the radical sheikh entered the United States on a visa approved by a CIA agent.

During several meetings with diplomatic officers at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) provided extensive details about the operations of one of Egypt's most notorious terrorist organizations.

Initiated by al-Gama'a, the meetings were aimed at creating a dialogue with the U.S. in the hopes of eventual, unspecified cooperation. The initiative was based on a perception that the U.S. enjoyed similar cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Less than four years after the approach, an al-Gama'a terror cell led personally by Abdel-Rahman bombed the World Trade Center in New York City.

The 1989 meetings are described in secret cables from the U.S. embassy in Cairo, which were declassified and released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request by INTELWIRE.

THE APRIL 1989 MEETING

Click here for document (PDF)

An April 25, 1989 cable from the Cairo embassy describes several meetings between unidentified "embassy officers" and a self-proclaimed member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. The name of the member is redacted, as are several other sections of the cable.

Signed by U.S. ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner, the cable is addressed to several other U.S. embassies and to U.S. intelligence services and military posts. An ambassador's name is often used on cables written by other embassy offices. Contacted by INTELWIRE, Wisner said he was not aware that any meetings with Rahman's people had taken place. The cable was classified as "secret."

Known as the "blind sheik," Rahman was considered the main spiritual guide for both al-Gama'a and al-Jihad, otherwise known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. At the time of the meeting, Rahman was under detention in Egypt but was expected to be released shortly.

In meetings with embassy officials, the member said al-Gama'a and al-Jihad were, in fact, the same organization. Historically, the two groups have had overlapping membership and agendas. Today, they are considered separate organizations, and Al-Gama'a has renounced the use of violence.

The member estimated al-Gama'a membership as between 150,000 and 200,000, a figure which the embassy suspected was exaggerated.

The member said he was part of al-Gama'a Shura Council while he was in prison, between September 1981 and October 1988. He said his specialty was organizing protests and demonstrations. The member disputed government characterizations of al-Gama'a as "secret" and "violent" and disavowed attacks that had been attributed to the group.

The member provided printed material concerning Rahman and al-Gama'a beliefs and goals. He said the group found the government of Saudi Arabia to be "the best Islamic government today" but faulted Saudi King Fahd for failing to take a hard line against Iran.

However, the member said, Rahman met with an Iranian delegation in Pakistan during the autumn of 1988 and was "favorably impressed."

Rahman also traveled to the United States in 1988 to speak a conference, the member said. The "blind sheikh" traveled to the U.S. yearly, the member said, on trips supported by Saudi Arabia.

Embassy officials were skeptical about some of the claims made by the member and recorded their suspicions concerning his motives, as well as questioning whether his approach to the embassy had the blessing of his superiors in al-Gama'a.

Embassy officials noted that their skepticism "leaps instantly from the fact that he has revealed much more than we would have considered prudent."

THE MAY 1989 MEETING

Click here for document (PDF)

In May, embassy officials met with "a young lawyer of 'The Islamic Group' (or Jihad as it is called by the government)." The meeting came after "repeated recent contacts" between al-Gama'a and U.S. diplomats, the cable states.

The May cable is addressed only to the Secretary of State, the consul in Alexandria and the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C. It is signed by Wisner and classified "secret" and "department only."

The lawyer repeated the figure of 150,000 to 200,000 members and reiterated other key points from the April cable. Embassy officers believed this figure included a loose group of "sympathizers" and did not "represent an Islamic revolutionary vanguard."

He claimed "he was informing us about his group as a result of a 'change in thinking' within the group."

Al-Gama'a was "concerned about the 'radical and violent image' of the group presented by the government," according to the lawyer.

The laywer said an individual, whose name was redacted, "had persuaded them that U.S. diplomats were 'sincere,' so they decided to present this 'true picture' directly to" embassy officers. It's not clear whether this is a reference to the individual described in the April cable, or whether that individual and the lawyer are the same person.

The cable states:

"[redacted] had told us separately that [redacted] had opined that the government was not persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood because the U.S. was 'supporting' the Muslim Brotherhood against the more radical Islamic trends. On this widely accepted conspiratorial premise, the 'Islamic Group' may be making its own bid for outside support."

An embassy officer told the lawyer that "the U.S. does not intervene in internal affairs nor support any group of any sort against the government of Egypt."

Among the points and claims made by the lawyer:

Members of al-Gama'a are "unified in a single ideology, though there are different 'styles' of action from region to region."

Members can directly contact other members across Egypt.

Omar Abdel-Rahman was described as the mufti of the group, or alternatively as its emir. The former title is a religious position, the latter implies some degree of operational control. However, a separate individual was identified as the chief operational leader. The name of that person is redacted.

The 11 members of al-Gama'a Shura Council were named by the lawyer, but the names were redacted from the cable before its release by the State Department.

The lawyer characterized other known Egyptian Islamist groups as having been disbanded or largely imprisoned, including Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Takfir Wal Hijra. Later reporting suggests this claim was significantly inflated.

The Muslim Brotherhood was seen by al-Gama'a as part of the "governing establishment."

Al-Gama'a members "reject the concept of 'takfir,'" i.e., condemning opponents such as the government as infidels who may be attacked with impunity.

The lawyer claimed the Egyptian government had "pinned" the name Jihad on al-Gama'a in order to blame the group for attacks on Christians. The laywer denied al-Gama'a had any role in attacking Christian interests in Egypt.

The laywer accused the Muslim Brotherhood of "playing games" and acting out of personal and property interests.

"Local groups of Islamic youth exist around the country," according to the lawyer. "Because they lack proper religious guidance, they do crazy things" which are then blamed on al-Gama'a. However some of these youth are also members of al-Gama'a, he conceded.

Sayyid Qutb and his books are the group's primary ideological inspiration, particularly his anti-secular (and anti-American) tract "Milestones on the Road."

The cable concludes with a reference to a follow-up cable describing the organization's ties to foreign governments. However, the follow-up cable was not included in this FOIA release.

THE 1990 VISA

In May 1990, approximately one year after the second meeting in Egypt, Omar Abdel Rahman obtained a visa to enter the United States (Time Magazine, May. 24, 1993). The visa was issued in by the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, Sudan.

Rahman's name had been placed on a terrorist watchlist that should have kept him out of the United States. Embassy officials said the visa was issued in error and began an investigation of the embassy official who approved the passport.

That official turned out to be an officer of the CIA (New York Times, July 14, 1993). According to the Times, the CIA officer was working as a consular official as part of his official cover and did not act on behalf of the CIA. Officials described the event as a "coincidence," according to the Times.

Rahman traveled from Sudan to Pakistan, then entered the U.S. in July 1990. He was subsequently indicted and convicted for leading a cell of terrorists in New York City responsible for the World Trade Center bombing and a thwarted "Day of Terror" plot in which several New York landmarks were targeted for simultaneous truck bombings.

INTELWIRE has obtained more than 1,400 pages of declassified U.S. State Department documents concerning Egyptian radical groups. For more information about INTELWIRE research services, please contact J.M. Berger.

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J.M. Berger on Al Jazeera

Here's a clip from my al Jazeerah appearance to discuss the 1994 arrest and 2007 assassination of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. English version will be along eventually, but it will probably take a while. As you can see, I talked a little about one of my other specialty interests, Ali Mohammed.

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A New Al Qaeda Franchise in Egypt?

A statement posted on an Islamic extremist Web site earlier today was attributed to "Al Qaeda in Egypt," which is the first time I've spotted that particular nomenclature in a position of prominence.

To an extent, this is a case of "meet the new boss, same as the old boss." In most meaningful ways, al Qaeda sprang from Egypt, of course, and several years ago, al Qaeda formally merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad's expatriate branch led by Ayman Al Zawahiri. But the domestic Jihad has thus far maintained a fairly discrete identity and leadership.

Pending a better translation than I am able to provide at this time (and believe me, mine is not good), it appears this statement claims some segment of the domestic EIJ is folding into al Qaeda's robust brand name. It's signed by Hakaimh Mohammad Khalil on behalf of al Qaeda in the land of Egypt.

Khalil might be the same person as Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim, an apparent member of the corporate al Qaeda with ties to the Islamic Group and EIJ. That would be significant because other "franchise" al Qaeda operations do not appear to be as closely linked to the corporate al Qaeda leadership.

While the vagaries of translation and the anonymity of the Internet complicate efforts to assess this statement, it was posted on a high-level al Qaeda linked forum and the posting was highlighted by the forum's moderators, which is usually a good barometer of authenticity and significance. There have been scattered previous messages purporting to be al Qaeda in Egypt, but the spotlight here raises a red flag.

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Al Qaeda Declares Jihad On India

It's not exactly a surprise that al Qaeda would want to declare jihad against India -- assuming the video announcement today checks out as authentic, and it very well may not. But even a forgery is doubtless a harbinger of things to come.

Al Qaeda and its allies have been fighting a guerilla war in Kashmir, along the India-Pakistan border, for nearly two decades off and on.

What's surprising is that al Qaeda took this long to make a bold, visible move. Al Qaeda has everything to gain by inciting India, because India (with some justification) sees al Qaeda as a Pakistani problem. Last year's Mumbai bombing was carried out by LeT, one of al Qaeda's fairly close affiliates in Pakistan.

If al Qaeda stages and claims spectacular attacks in India, India may consider an attack on Pakistan -- al Qaeda's home base -- as retaliation and preemption (under the Bush doctrine). Since both Pakistan and India are nuclear powers, that creates a real risk of unthinkable carnage.

Furthermore, any sort of shooting war between Pakistan and India would almost certainly destabilize the Musharraf regime, giving that nation's powerful Islamist factions an opportunity to seize control of the country and its nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan is already one of the countries most at risk in the current political environment -- a coup or civil war could easily end with al Qaeda and Taliban sympathizers in charge. And any sort of substantial chaos in Pakistan exponentially increases the odds al Qaeda can contrive access to nuclear materials.

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Infidel Bugs Spoil Al-Libbi's Eulogy of Dadullah

A new videotape was released today by al Qaeda's Abu Yahya al Libbi. The video is devoted, in part, to eulogizing and vowing revenge on behalf of slain mujahideen, particularly Mullah Dadullah, a senior Taliban military commander killed in May.

Insects can be seen buzzing around al Libbi's face at various points during the video -- he ignores them at first but eventually loses patience and attempts to shoo them away, albeit maintaining a perfect poker face in the process. (Click here for video excerpt.)

The light-colored insects may suggest an outdoor or tented filming location. If al Libbi is really unlucky, they could be an unusual variety of bug specific to a certain location. Al Qaeda might end up regretting its commitment to DVD-quality video standards if some enterprising intel analyst deduces al Libbi's location by improbably identifying the winged pests.

The video is in Arabic and lacks the English subtitles of al Libbi's last release. The video continues a recent trend of very strong production values in al Qaeda releases, including a computer-generated backdrop.

Several recent releases have featured highly realistic backdrops -- which are almost indistinguishable from a real room. In this case, the backdrop is more cartoonlike and visibly unreal to even a casual viewer.

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New Yahya Al Libbi Video Coming Soon

A Web site used by al Qaeda-linked militants has posted a notice that a new video is forthcoming from Abu Yahya al-Libbi, a rising star in the ranks of al Qaeda. If you missed my analysis on him last week, check it out here. I expect to post details of the video when it becomes available.

Labels: Abu-Yahya-Al-Libi, Weblog

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Changes Coming In The Intelligence Authorization Act for 2008

The Senate Intelligence Committe delivered several rebuffs to the White House in the recent report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for 2008. The Act contains several significant new provisions that will change how the intelligence community works on some sensitive matters. Among the changes:

A provision allowing the declassification of documents in the public interest -- at the best of Congress, without presidential approval. Previously, the president had complete control over the declassification process.

Requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to sumbit a report to Congress on its compliance with laws passed in 2005 and 2006 dealing with the treatment of detainees in top-secret CIA prisons. This section drops the term "war crimes" into the discussion.

Strengthened reporting of covert actions, as well as stipulating that a previous legislative mandate to report covert actions also includes reporting "any change to a covert action finding" rather than the previous "any significant change."

Required substantially increased reporting of actions before secret courts under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This is one of the most important tools used for domestic spying.

Demands copies of ALL president's daily briefs mentioning Iraq be sent to congressional intelligence committees. This one is probably the most direct challenge to the unfettered authority of the White House, though much of the rest will rankle as well.

Insitutes accountability reviews for intelligence failures. This is a long overdue step.

Gives the DNI new power to appropriate funds and personnel from a particular agency into an interagency effort.

Adds two new critical technology positions and institutes an inter-agency Inspector General for the intelligence community.

Increased penalties for disclosing the identity of intelligence operatives.

The CIA prison program got more space in the comments section:

More than five years after the decision to start the program, however, the Committee believes that consideration should be given to whether it is the best means to obtain a full and reliable intelligence debriefing of a detainee. Both Congress and the Administration must continue to evaluate whether having a separate CIA detention program that operates under different interrogation rules than those applicable to military and law enforcement officers is necessary, lawful, and in the best interests of the United States.

Moreover, the Committee believes that the demonstrated value of the program should be weighed against both the complications it causes to any ultimate prosecution of these terrorists, and the damage the program does to the image of the United States abroad.


It also expressed deep concern about al Qaeda's continued ability to survive and thrive in the face of our most aggressive tactics.

The Committee is concerned with recent assessments that indicate al-Qa'ida has regenerated and resumed its operational planning against western targets from its relative safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Despite the apprehension and death of key leaders, al-Qa'ida continues to train operatives and expand its reach, as evidenced by the 2007 North Africa attacks by the newly named "al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb."

The resurgence of al-Qa'ida, nearly six years after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, suggests the Intelligence Community should reevaluate its current strategy to defeat the al-Qa'ida network. The Committee addresses this issue further in the classified annex.

For the full report, click here.

See also: Outsourcing Intelligence

Agency said it increasingly "finds itself in competition with its contractors for our own employees."

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