List of Al Qaeda Members, As Of July 27, 2007

INTELWIRE Sourcebook: List of Al Qaeda Members
INTELWIRE Sourcebook (Compact): List of Al Qaeda Members

Labels: INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

INTELWIRE Publishes 'Al Qaeda In America' Sourcebook

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

INTELWIRE has released the Al Qaeda In America Sourcebook, the first volume in a series documenting al Qaeda's terrorist sleeper network in the United States.

The latest INTELWIRE Sourcebook presents more than 430 pages of court records and intelligence documents about al Qaeda sleeper agents in the United States, including American citizens Ali Mohamed, Wadih El Hage, Jose Padilla, and more. It also includes an exclusive, never-before-published analysis of al Qaeda's American sleeper network by INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger.

These primary sources are required reading for journalists, counterterrorism professionals, academics and independent researchers. The volume is also accessible to general readers.

The contents of this wire-bound collection were selected and compiled by INTELWIRE.com's J.M. Berger, lead researcher of the cable TV documentary on Ali Mohamed, National Geographic Presents: Triple Cross: Bin Laden's Spy In America.

Preview Table of Contents.

Click here to buy

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Jihadists, American-Terrorists, INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Full Text: July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Al Qaeda Threat To U.S. Homeland

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has released
a summary of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of
al Qaeda's current threat to the U.S. Homeland. The full text
of the NIE is reproduced below.

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Key Judgments We judge the
US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat
over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic
terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by
their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued
effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their
capabilities. We assess that greatly increased worldwide
counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have
constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US
Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the
Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These
measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United
States since 9/11.

We are concerned, however, that this level of international
cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and
perceptions of the threat diverge.

Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist
threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to
plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni
communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its
capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated
key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a
safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although
we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United
States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11,
we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put
operatives here.

As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in
a heightened threat environment.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its
capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation
with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that
al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and
capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible
and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a
desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its
association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the
broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to
recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland
attacks. We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting
is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic,
and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass
casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population. The group is
proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive
devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and
overcoming security obstacles.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to
acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it
develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks
outside the United States in the past, may be more likely to
consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it
perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the
group or Iran. We assess that the spread of
radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites,
increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the
growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western
countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the
West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the
United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement
of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United
States— who are becoming more connected ideologically,
virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist
movement—points to the possibility that others may become
sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence
here as legitimate. We assess that this internal Muslim terrorist
threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.
We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often
referred to as “single-issue” groups by the
FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years
given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is
likely to be on a small scale. We assess that globalization
trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable
even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with
one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize
resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized
terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist
plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive
efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will
also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at
the local level relate to strategic threat information and how
best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of
legitimate interactions.

Labels: INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New Bin Laden Video Released

I've posted a quick and dirty analysis over at NowPublic.com

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Televising Revolution in the Middle East

I've posted a story over at NowPublic.com on how television is subverively introducing Western values in the Middle East. But there's a twist -- you won't believe which country is producing the most progressive content. If you enjoy the story, please do link it, leave a comment and/or register a vote in its favor.

Read the story

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink