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News, analysis and primary source documents on terrorism, extremism and national security.Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Old news...According to a new ultrasophisticated "error analysis," we have learned that Al Qaeda adds digital backdrops to its videos. Of course, if you were reading INTELWIRe, you knew that a long time ago -- through a much simpler and more reliable technique.Labels: Weblog
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Tuesday, August 21, 2007
More Of The Same: CIA Inspector General Report on 9/11 Intelligence FailuresThe CIA's IG report on pre-9/11 intelligence failures has been released (in unclassified summary form). It's more of the same thing we've been hearing for the last six years -- no accountability, no individuals are to blame. It's a tired, old tune. When a pizza doesn't get delivered in 30 minutes or less, someone gets fired. Yet, six years on, no one has been fired for any single accountability in the September 11 fiasco. Some excerpts are below, and the full document is here.The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa'ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found neither a "single point of failure" nor a "silver bullet" that would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find, however, failures to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had been able to view and analyze the full range of information available before 11 September 2001, they could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting of the spring and summer that year. (...) Labels: Weblog
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Saturday, August 18, 2007
E-Mail Scam Uses Zakat As LureThe latest version of the "Nigerian Oil" scam (the latest in my inbox, anyway) has an interesting twist -- it's targeting Muslims, with a claim that the recipient of the e-mail was selected because, as a good Muslim, he or she would be certain to make proper zakat with the untold fortunes that he or she will imminently receive.Subj: Salam Aleikun fii sabii LiiLlahi Labels: Weblog
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Sunday, August 12, 2007
The Alleged 1994 Assassination Attempt on Osama bin LadenDeclassified State Department Cable Adds Color To Little Known Sudan IncidentINTELWIRE.com Legend has it that a team of assassins tried to kill Osama bin Laden in the Sudan in 1994. But a newly released State Department cable recasts that story as a cry for help gone wrong -- the outcome of a shouting match over Islamic ethics between a murderous Libyan militant and the world's most-wanted terrorist leader. The assassination story appears to have originated with Ali Mohamed, bin Laden's chief of security through much of the 1990s. "After an attempt to assassinate Bin Laden, I went to the Sudan in 1994 to train Bin Laden's bodyguards, security detail," Mohammed said when entering his guilty plea for conspiracy in the 1998 East African embassy bombings. The claim was later picked up on by various other media outlets and authors, some of whom claimed the Saudi government has sponsored the attack. Others alleged the attack was carried out by members of Takfir Wal Hijra, a secretive terrorist sect even more radical than al Qaeda. But a declassified State Department cable, obtained by INTELWIRE under the Freedom of Information Act, offers an alternative view. The cable includes a deposition allegedly given by one of four men who killed 16 in a shooting massacre at the Thawra mosque near Khartoum, then traveled to Osama bin Laden's home nearby, where the incident took place. State Department officials could not absolutely vouch for the deposition. The cable said a reliable contact had authenticated it for embassy officials. However, "we cannot tell whether the document is authentic," said the cable's author, U.S. Foreign Service Officer Donald Petterson. Two of the alleged assassins were killed. Two more were captured, including the alleged ringleader, Mohamed Abdel Rahman al-Khulifi, whose deposition is reproduced in the cable. Al-Khulifi, a Libyan, said his team had been "assigned" to assassinate the leader of an Islamic sect based at the Thawra mosque. He met with his team in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, a notorious training site used by Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Al-Khulifi said his team was trained by members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard in the late 1980s, following which they traveled to fight in Afghanistan. They subsequently met bin Laden in Peshawar. On returning to the Sudan, the mujahideen joined the Islamic movement of Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi, who invited bin Laden to move al Qaeda to the Sudan shortly afterward. The fighters also worked for bin Laden after the move. The fighters "loved Sheikh Osama, for he has forsaken wealth and easy life and joined jihad and the endeavor to spread Islam," al-Khulifi said. Bin Laden was among the "dearest persons to me," he said. Al-Khulifi said bin Laden and Turabi told him that members of the Sudanese Ansar al-Sunnar movement were not true Muslims, that they were "spies for the Wahabi ruling family of Saudi Arabian" and "agents for the crusader embassies." In 1993, bin Laden sent al-Khulifi to Saudi Arabia on unspecified business. When he returned, al-Khulifi said, bin Laden tasked him to assassinate several Sudanese opposition figures who often visited the Thawra mosque. According to al-Khulifi, the plan proceeded with the support of Sudanese intelligence, which had a close relationship with bin Laden. The massacre "is an outcome of these services," he said. He said the mosque attack was ordered by Sudanese officials and endorsed by bin Laden. "After we executed our operation, we ... thought it wise to go to bin Laden," whose house was nearby, al-Khulifi said. "We found bin Laden in a chair in the garden of his house. When he saw me, he said angrily, 'Why did you commit such a crime? That is not what we wanted.' al-Khulifi defended his actions, saying they had "carried out God's wishes and that we were aware of all consequences." After this exchange, "bin Laden left the garden and upon entering his house, shouted 'Stop him,'" said al-Khulifi. "I knew that was an order to get rid of me, so we started shooting and bin Laden's guards did the same. There were three Iranians and an Egyptian called Jabr," al-Khulifi said. "We killed three of them," he said. "Osama bin Laden went down the basement, where there are hideouts. I know because I used to go to the house," he said. "I was hit by Ahmed the Algerian, a guard of bin Laden I used to know in Peshawar." Ahmed shot and killed another of the fighters and a wounded a third. Interestingly, al-Khulifi said the Algerian "was trained by American intelligence until early 1983." The deposition concludes with a strangely plaintive cry of abandonment, coming as it does from an admitted and unrepentant mass murderer. "My sheikh accused me of being a killer, and God knows the truth," said al-Khulifi. "I am saying this to relieve my conscience and at the same time to explain what happened so I can die in peace. ... I am convinced now that there are Islamic leaders in Sudan, but that there are no Muslims." Read the State Department Cable Analysis: Although the author of the cable stops short of vouching for the deposition, which was circulating informally around Khartoum at the time, I am inclined to believe it's authentic. If the document was forged for political purposes, it's quite ineffective as a propaganda tool. Although it implicates bin Laden and Turabi, it stops short of personally indicting Turabi as the author of the attack and casts bin Laden ambiguously, with his statement of moral dismay concerning the massacre. So it doesn't serve the political purposes of those who would oppose bin Laden and Turabi (such as the victimized sect). But neither does it clear them, laying the attack pretty explicitly at the feet of the Sudanese intelligence. Given the ambiguities about responsibility and considering the plethora of extraneous detail, the document has a strong ring of truth. Nevertheless, it should be treated with caution. INTELWIRE is continuing to investigate this incident. Labels: INTELWIRE-Exclusive, Secrets-Scandals
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Monday, August 6, 2007
So Quickly They ForgetI was surprised, but my mind was not exactly boggled, when the local news broadcast announced the new al Qaeda tape with incredulous amazement that an American was talking on behalf of the bin Laden crew. After all, it's been a good two or three months since we last heard from Azzam the America, aka Adam Gadahn. Who can be expected to remember for so long?However, I was a bit taken aback when the Counterterrorism Blog headlined an item on the release "Al Qaeda Issues Warning to America (and others) with an American Accent!" as if this were something new or unexpected. Azzam is al Qaeda's top media manager, and he has been for some time. Labels: Weblog
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Friday, August 3, 2007
Al Qaeda Web Banner Warns Of 'Big Surprise'![]() One of the most venerable, Al Qaeda-linked Web sites was running the ad pictured above today, which warns of a "big surprise" ahead and features pictures of President Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. There's a longer story here. The story says the image of Bush and Musharraf is set "in front of a burning White House." In fact, the image is a combination of an image of the two in front of the White House with the image of a burning car. There's another vehicle pictured at the beginning of the sequence, so this may have some significance in terms of a specific threat. UPDATE: It's not all that surprising. There's more archival footage of bin Laden -- which is starting to look more than a little suspicious. It's hard to imagine al Qaeda suppressing news of bin Laden's death, though that is obviously a possibility. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many other observers, bin Laden is worth far more to al Qaeda as a dead martyr than in his current absentee role. It's possible bin Laden is so far underground that even al Qaeda's leadership doesn't know where he is. Or he may have fled to Iran, in which case he could be a prisoner of the government there. Although I suspect they would allow him to issue video statements, they might want editorial control -- which could lead to a problematic standoff. It's important to note that bin Laden's son, Saad, and at least one other top al Qaeda lieutenant are believed to be under house arrest in Iran, so this line of thought isn't entirely fanciful. Another possible explanation is that bin Laden has been pushed aside, perhaps forcefully, by Zawahiri -- who has been far less shy in recent months, apparently without incurring any disproportionate risk. At any rate, the new video features a testimonial by a suicide attacker and new material from Adam Gadahn, aka Azzam the American. There is a message from Zawahiri that appears to be "new" (in the sense that it hasn't been seen before, but not in the sense that it can be dated to recent days or weeks), and a hodge-podge of footage culled from the news and other sources. In terms of al Qaeda's marketing strategy, this is another letdown for the jihadi audience, which has been eagerly awaiting new material from bin Laden. It was a highly questionable decision to banner and promote this video so aggressively, while promising a "big surprise" that did not materialize (within the context of the video, that is). The core audience is bound to be getting frustrated with the recent series of letdowns. How that will play out in terms of their enthusiasm and motivation to act is not yet clear. Labels: Weblog
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ALERTSJIHAD JOE Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, the new book by INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger, is now available in both Kindle and hardcover editions. Order today!
Jihad Joe is the first comprehensive history of the American jihadist movement, from 1979 through the present. Click here to read more about the critical acclaim Jihad Joe has earned so far, including from the New York Times, Publisher's Weekly, Redstate.com and many more. RECENTNewest posts!Oops, My Facebook Friend Just Joined AQ 'Anonymous' Hits White Supremacist Sites Omar Hammami Is Trying Very Hard To Step Into Anwa... Ex-Marine Yonathan Melaku Pleads Guilty, Jihadist ... Witness: Dennis Mahon claimed he was third man in ... Florida Jihadist Planned Norway-Style Synchronized... What Tarek Mehanna Isn't Anwar Al-Awlaki Video Release Rehashes 2010 "Messa... Monsters and Children: How Politicians Talk About ... Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military: Resources For Jour... NEWS NOWEXCLUSIVESNew York Pipe Bomb Suspect Linked to Revolution Muslim The Utility of Lone Wolves Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman Al Nasser A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds How Terrorists Use The Internet: Just Like You PATCON: The FBI's Secret War on the Militia Movement Interview About Jihad With Controversial Cleric Bilal Philips Forgeries on the Jihadist Forums U.S. Gave Millions To Charity Linked To Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki State Department Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheikh State Department Put 'Political Pressure' On FBI To Deport Brother-in-Law Of Osama Bin Laden In 1995 FBI Records Reveal Details Of Nixon-Era Racial Profiling Program Targeting Arabs Gaza Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia War U.S. Had 'High Confidence' Of UBL Attack In June 2001 Behind the Handshake: The Rumsfeld-Saddam Meeting |
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