New OKC Docs: Informants, Surveillance, Middle Eastern Suspects, And More

New information about the FBI's investigation of the Oklahoma City bombing has emerged in FBI documents recently released to Salt Lake City attorney Jesse Trentadue.

A lawsuit by Trentadue seeks to force the FBI to comply with Trentadue's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents pertaining to the Oklahoma City bombing.

Trentadue's lawsuit was prompted by the apparent murder of his brother while in federal custody, which Trentadue believes is connected to the investigation of the Oklahoma City bombing (previous story). For more about that case and copies of documents released thus far, click here, here and here.

FBI Bulletin, 4/19/1995

The first document, issued on the day of the attack, alerts FBI offices around the country to the bombing and requests any current leads from all FBI offices regarding "domestic terrorism" and noting the anniversary of the Waco Siege. At this stage, the public investigation of the case had not yet ruled out foreign terrorism (and a subsequent teletype indicates several Middle Eastern suspects were being monitored).

It's worth noting that as early as 1991, FBI field agents had been warning headquarters of a domestic bombing of exactly this type (INTELWIRE, 8/27/2006). Also, a video filed in court by Trentadue as part of his FOIA case shows "a press conference given in December of 2003" at which Southern Poverty Law Center director Morris Dees stated "that about six months prior to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the SPLC had warned both FBI Defendants and Attorney General Janet Reno about an impending severe domestic terrorism attack and that within minutes following the Bombing of the Murrah Building, the SPLC had telephoned the FBI to say that the 'patriot movement' was involved in that attack, not Muslim extremists."

4/19/1995: FBI Teletype, Oklahoma City bombing

FBI Status of Investigation, 4/20/1995

This teletype is an overview of the ongoing investigation. It details efforts to track Timothy McVeigh through the identification number on the truck used in the bombing. The document also states that a person of interest was "believed to be staying in a motel room in Wichita, Kansas." According to court records, FBI Special Agent Thomas Price was conducting surveillance related to the Oklahoma City bombing in Wichita on April 20, but his team was called away from that assignment to monitor Terry Nichols. The subject of the surveillance was never disclosed.

The memo also outlines leads related to "Middle Eastern males," including a lead that appears to pertain to Onis and Assad Siddiqi. Other leads -- including one pertaining to a shipment of explosives -- were redacted by the FBI before it released the document.

4/20/1995: FBI Teletype, Oklahoma City bombing, suspects

FBI Lead, Informant Report, Cincinnati, 1/5/1996

A heavily redacted teletype from the FBI field office in Cincinnati states that a confidential informant encountered a figure involved with the Aryan Nations movement who made reference to the Oklahoma bombing. A previously released document dated January 21, 1995 and linked below, adds detail to this report, indicating subject of the report was Andreas Strassmeier, a German national linked to McVeigh. Click here and here for more documents related to Strassmeier.

According to the January 21 teletype, the informant agreed to seek more information regarding the lead and was willing to travel to the Charlotte, N.C., area in order to investigate further.

1/5/1996: FBI Teletype, OKC investigation in Cincinnati

1/21/1996: FBI Teletype, OKC investigation in Cincinnati

Labels: American-Terrorists, OKBOMB, Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Many Warnings Before 9/11

If you've always wondered exactly what sort of warnings the U.S. government had before 9/11, well, you're going to have to keep wondering. But FBI documents obtained by INTELWIRE provide an improved view of those warnings -- despite heavy redactions made by the FBI before releasing. In the five months before 9/11, the FBI sent out numerous bulletins warning of attacks by al Qaeda generally, attacks on New York specifically, attacks coordinated by Abu Zubaidah and attacks in some way related to the thwarted 1995 Bojinka airliner-bombing plot, which involved a secondary plot to hijack a commercial jet and crash it into CIA headquarters. Also involved in Bojinka: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the eventual mastermind of 9/11.

4/13/2001: Bulletin, attacks planned by Al Qaeda, Abu Zubaidah

5/7/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat to New York from walk-in informant)

6/22/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (possible near-term strike on U.S. interests)

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (chatter, possible attacks abroad)

7/16/2001 to 8/1/2001: Terrorism threats

7/16/2001: Protective Services Working Group, briefing with Michael Rolince

7/20/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (includes references to Bojinka, Abdul Hakim Murad)

8/1/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat from walk-in informant, "red mercury")

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (anniversary of East African embassy bombings

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, January through September 11, 2001

1/4/2001: Summary of meeting with Yemeni officials, re: Cole Bombing

1/10/2001: Communication, photo book for witnesses, re: Cole Bombing

1/16/2001: Communication, sensitive source, Pakistan

1/31/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

2/3/2001: FD-302, interrogation of Fahd Al Quso (Cole Bombing)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

3/19/2001: FD-302, interrogation of confidential source (proffer agreement)

4/13/2001: Bulletin, attacks planned by Al Qaeda, Abu Zubaidah

5/7/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat to New York from walk-in informant)

6/22/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (possible near-term strike on U.S. interests)

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (chatter, possible attacks abroad)

7/16/2001 to 8/1/2001: Terrorism threats

7/16/2001: Protective Services Working Group, briefing with Michael Rolince

7/20/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (includes references to Bojinka, Abdul Hakim Murad)

8/1/2001: FBI "Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update" (threat from walk-in informant, "red mercury")

7/2/2001: FBI National Threat Warning, Terrorism (anniversary of East African embassy bombings

Labels: 9-11, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2003-07-18: FBI Report on Conflict Diamonds and Al Qaeda

The FBI wrote this lengthy report to rebut claims that al Qaeda was linked to the conflict diamond trade. Two versions were provided to INTELWIRE, each is differently redacted. Neither version of this report has previously seen the light of day, to my knowledge, so it's an important release.

2003-07-18: FBI Report on Conflict Diamonds and Al Qaeda

2003-07-18: FBI Report on Conflict Diamonds and Al Qaeda

Labels: conflict-diamonds, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2002-02-19: FBI Request For Information, Lotfi Raissi, Hani Hanjour

Lotfi Raissi, an Algerian living in the U.K. has been the subject of a great deal of media coverage after being accused and subsequently exonerated of involement in the 9/11 attacks. This document, and others released to INTELWIRE under the Freedom of Information Act, outlines some of the reasons the FBI originally became interested in Raissi.

2002-02-19: FBI Request For Information, Lotfi Raissi, Hani Hanjour

Labels: 9-11, Flight-Schools, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Raissi

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

FBI Document: California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

An FBI memo details the phone records of Omar Al Bayoumi, a Saudi citizen who assisted hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi in relocating to San Diego in early 2000. Bayoumi helped them find an apartment and pay their rent and introduced them to people in the local community.

Bayoumi also kept in close contact with his apparent employer, the Saudi government. The exact nature of Bayoumi's employment has remained unclear, but numerous associates suspected him of being a Saudi intelligence officer.

Read the document: 2002-04-15: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi Contacts With Saudi Government

According to the memo, local mosque members "believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque," and that Bayoumi may have been that person.

Bayoumi was "employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.," the memo states, according to "a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego."

Other FBI interviewees said Bayoumi was "an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government (who) traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior."

Another source said Bayoumi "was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration," and said he was paid $5,000 a month to be a student.

The memo below details Bayoumi's phone contacts with the Saudi government over slightly less than two months in 2000, around the time the hijackers arrived in San Diego. Phone records revealed Bayoumi called local Saudi officials, including the consulate in San Diego, 34 times. He called Saudi officials in Washington D.C. 141 times in the same period, according to the memo -- more than twice a day on average.

Calls appear to be directed to the Saudi Cultural Mission, the Saudi Education Mission, the Saudi Embassy in Washington, the Saudi Consulate in San Diego, the Saudi National Guard, and the Saudi Islamic Affairs Department.

Although the notation is unclear due to FBI redactions, it also appears Bayoumi called a U.S. Department of State diplomat.

Extensive portions of the document were redacted by the FBI, including substantial portions of FBI interviews with Saudi government officials who had contact with Bayoumi.

Labels: 9-11, INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2002-04-15: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi Contacts With Saudi Government

This FBI memo details the phone records of Omar Al Bayoumi, a Saudi citizen who assisted hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi in relocating to San Diego in early 2000. Bayoumi helped them find an apartment and pay their rent and introduced them to people in the local community.

Bayoumi also kept in close contact with his apparent employer, the Saudi government. The exact nature of Bayoumi's employment has remained unclear, but his close associates suspected him of being a Saudi intelligence officer.

According to the memo, local mosque members "believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque," and that Bayoumi may have been that person.

Bayoumi was "employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.," the memo states, according to "a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego."

Other FBI interviewees said Bayoumi was "an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government (who) traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior."

Another source said Bayoumi "was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration," and said he was paid $5,000 a month to be a student.

The memo below details Bayoumi's phone contacts with the Saudi government over slightly less than two months in 2000, around the time the hijackers arrived in San Diego. Phone records revealed Bayoumi called local Saudi officials, including the consulate in San Diego, 34 times. He called Saudi officials in Washington D.C. 141 times in the same period, according to the memo -- more than twice a day on average.

Calls appear to be directed to the Saudi Cultural Mission, the Saudi Education Mission, the Saudi Embassy in Washington, the Saudi Consulate in San Diego, the Saudi National Guard, and the Saudi Islamic Affairs Department.

Although the notation is unclear due to FBI redactions, it also appears Bayoumi called a U.S. Department of State diplomat.

Extensive portions of the document were redacted by the FBI, including substantial portions of FBI interviews with Saudi government officials who had contact with Bayoumi.

2002-04-15: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi Contacts With Saudi Government

Labels: 9-11, Bayoumi, Hazmi, INTELFILES, Midhar, Saudi-Arabia

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

11/14/2003: FBI Hijackers Chronology

Those researching the 9/11 attacks will find few documents more useful than the FBI's painstaking chronology of the hijacker's activities.

Starting with their birth, this 2003 timeline traces every documented movement of the 19 hijackers all the way through September 11.

Much of the document is redacted, and the amount of detail increases exponentially after the hijackers entered the U.S. -- scaling down to the level of individual ATM transactions. Even with its limitations and redactions, however, this is a priceless research aid.

11/14/2003: FBI Chronology of Hijacker's Movements

(Note: This is a large file.)

Labels: 9-11, Hijackers, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, 1995 to 2000

5/11/1995: FD-302, interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad (comments)

8/31/1998: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings) (comments)

9/9/1998: FD-302, interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (East African Embassy Bombings)

7/8/1999: Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

9/16/1999: FD-302, confidential informant, Al Qaeda in Africa

9/23/1999: FD-302, Confidential Informant, Somalia issues

12/29/1999: Bulletin, Millennium Bombing plot

Labels: 9-11, Bojinka, Cole-Bombing, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, KSM

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

INTELWIRE Releases FBI Documents Given To The 9/11 Commission

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

INTELWIRE has obtained more than 1,700 pages of FBI documents cited in the end notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission.

They reveal a wealth of new details about the hijacker's movements, possible links between the hijackers and the government of Saudi Arabia, and connections to extremist figures in the United States, including blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.

Related story: Document Indicates California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

The documents were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. If you are reporting from these documents, please credit INTELWIRE.com and link to this page or preferably to the INTELWIRE.com home page (http://www.intelwire.com).

The package covers a wide variety of topics, including the movements of the hijackers over more than 10 years, people who associated with the hijackers in the U.S., FBI interviews with the victims, transcripts of phone calls to the hijacked flights, intelligence obtained by overseas agencies and much, much more.

Documents are listed here both chronologically and according to the chapter of the 9/11 Report in which they appeared. The package totals more than 1,700 pages and is the largest online repository of 9/11 source documents on the Web (and still growing).

Additional FOIA requests were posed to the State Department and CIA. The CIA refused the entire request, which is under appeal; the State Department is still processing documents. Those documents will also be published hereon receipt.

These documents will also be posted individually and chronologically at INTELFILES.com, with descriptive text, and additional comment and analysis as appropriate, over the next several months.

Researchers, authors and documentary producers wishing to license or commission specific research based on these documents can contact INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger through this site. A chronologically ordered package is available to researchers, including multiple copies of documents with different redactions, INTELWIRE analysis of redactions to verify the identities of specific individuals, and broad analysis of contents.

FBI documents cited in 9/11 Report End Notes, Chronological

1995 to 2000

1/1/2001 to 9/10/2001

9/11/2001

9/12/2001

9/13/2001 to 9/30/2001

10/01/2001 to 12/31/2001

01/01/2002 to 04/30/2002

5/2002 to 12/2002

1/2003 to 12/2003

1/2004 to end of FOIA release

Documents Cited in the End Notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission:

Chapter 1: We Have Some Planes

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 2: The Foundation of the New Terrorism

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 3: Counterterrorism Evolves

Part 1

Part 2


Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Part 12

Part 13

Part 14

Chapter 6: From Threat To Threat

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Chapter 7: The Attack Looms

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 8: The System Was Blinking Red

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

When reporting from these documents, you agree to cite and link INTELWIRE.com as the source.

Related:

9/11 Report End Notes (offsite, opens in new window)

Related story:

Document Indicates California Resident Who Helped 9/11 Hijackers Was Closely Linked To Saudi Government

Selected documents from the package:

Hijackers' Timeline

Hijackers' pal Omar al-Bayoumi and the Saudi government

More information on Omar Al-Bayoumi

Still more on Omar Al-Bayoumi

Analysis of 9/11 Hijacker's Cell Model

FBI Report on Conflict Diamonds and Al Qaeda

Summary of Information (1999): Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's Education at American Colleges

Labels: 9-11, INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Documents Cited In 9/11 End Notes

The following package of documents was obtained by INTELWIRE.com from the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act. If you are reporting from these documents, please credit INTELWIRE.com and link to this page or preferably to the INTELWIRE.com home page (http://www.intelwire.com).

The documents below were released in response to a FOIA request for any FBI documents cited in the end notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission. The documents cover a wide variety of topics, including the movements of the hijackers over more than 10 years, people who associated with the hijackers in the U.S., FBI interviews with the victims, transcripts of phone calls to the hijacked flights, intelligence obtained by overseas agencies and much, much more.

Documents are listed here according to the chapter of the 9/11 Report in which they appeared. The package totals more than 1,700 pages and may be the largest online repository of 9/11 source documents on the Web.

Additional FOIA requests were posed to the State Department and CIA. The CIA refused the entire request, which is under appeal; the State Department is still processing documents. Those documents will also be published here on receipt.

These documents will also be posted individually and chronologically, with additional comment and analysis as appropriate, over the next several months. Researchers, authors and documentary producers wishing to license or commission specific research based on this document can contact INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger through this site.

Documents Cited in the End Notes of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission:

Chapter 1: We Have Some Planes

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 2: The Foundation of the New Terrorism

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 3: Counterterrorism Evolves

Part 1

Part 2


Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Part 12

Part 13

Part 14

Chapter 6: From Threat To Threat

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Chapter 7: The Attack Looms

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Chapter 8: The System Was Blinking Red

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Labels: 9-11, Hijackers, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2001-10-03: FBI Communication, associates of Omar Al-Bayoumi

The San Diego field office's investigation of Omar Al-Bayoumi yielded a great deal of data on his time at the Parkwood Apartment complex, where hijackers Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi moved after arriving in San Diego. Telephone connections put Bayoumi within three degrees of separation of the bin Laden family on one hand and blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman on the other, but the FBI's redactions of this document make the number of degrees and their intensity unclear.

Among other things, this document states:

One resident of the complex, linked to al-Bayoumi, was a Saudi citizen who hosted a party for "The Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman in October 1992. The same resident was "determined to have known Osama Bin Laden's family in Saudi Arabia and to have telephonic contact with members of Bin Laden's family who are currently in the U.S."

A telephone link also connected a resident with Anwar Aulaqi, then-leader of the Dar El-Hijra mosque in
Falls Church, Virginia and "determined... to have been the spiritual leader for hijacker Nawaf Al-Hazmi."

Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi briefly lived with Bayoumi before moving into the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex, where Bayoumi also moved.

"According to the apartment manager of the Parkwood Apartments, Al-Bayoumi occasionally paid rent for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar."

Evidence was found supporting the possibility that Bayoumi was affiliated with the Saudi intelligence service. The FBI redacted details of that evidence.

Another individual who apparently moved into the Parkwood complex may have "succeeded Omar AI-Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia."

Bayoumi or one of his associates "has had telephonic contact with Anwar N. Aulaqi," the memo reads. "Aulaqi is the Imam of a mosque in Falls Church, Virginia and is believed to have been the spiritual leader of hijacker Nawaf AI-Hazmi."

Two versions of the document were released. Each has slightly different redactions by the FBI.

FBI Communication, associates of Omar Al-Bayoumi Version 1

FBI Communication, associates of Omar Al-Bayoumi Version 2

Labels: 9-11, Bayoumi, Hazmi, INTELFILES, Midhar, Saudi-Arabia

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2001-10-08: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Isamu Dyson, aka Cayson Bin Don

Record of interrogation for an associate of Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who assisted 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi in relocating to San Diego. Associates of Bayoumi speculated that he worked for the Saudi intellgience service.

Bayoumi and an associate (Dyson, whose name has been redacted) visited the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles (on Feb. 1, 2000), just before meeting Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi for the first time (a meeting Bayoumi claimed was accidental).

"Soon a man came out and greeted [Bayoumi]. [The associate] described the man as being in his 40s, approximately 5' 8" in height with a black/grey beard down to his chest, who was wearing a suit. It appeared that [Bayoumi] and the man from the consulate knew each other. It was obvious they had met before." The two met behind closed doors for about 30 minutes.

Bayoumi picked the restaurant where he "accidentally" met the hijackers. Bayoumi told his traveling companion he had dined there before, but he incorrectly took them to a cafe with a similar name (that did not serve food). Eventually they found the right place down the street.

The hijackers entered the restaurant. The associate described his impression of the meeting as "coincidental" and said he could not recall who intiated the conversation. Some of the conversation was in Arabic, which the associate did not understand. Bayoumi offered to help the hijackers "if they liked San Diego." The hijackers drank chai tea.

A party was held at the apartment Bayoumi helped Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi secure. The party was videotaped, the associate said, although "some attendees were sensitive about not being filmed." (The party is further discussed in subsequent documents.)

Bayoumi "spent a lot of time at Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment."

2001-10-08: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Isamu Dyson, aka Cayson Bin Don

Labels: 9-11, Bayoumi, Hazmi, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Midhar, Saudi-Arabia

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2001-10-21: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Samir Abdoun

Abdoun was at his apartment with Yazeed al Salmi on September 15, 2001. Salmi told Abdoun "I knew they were going to do something, that is why I got married." According to the document, "AL-SALMI told ABDOUN he was joking, then he left the room."

Salmi had been a housemate to Nawaf Al-Hazmi in July 2000. According to the 9/11 Commission report, Chapter 7, "Salmi purchased $4,000 in traveler's checks at a bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On September 5, Hazmi deposited $1,900 of the traveler's checks into his bank account, after withdrawing the same amount in cash. It is possible that Hazmi was simply cashing the traveler's checks for a friend. We do not know; Salmi claims not to remember the transaction. After 9/11, Salmi reportedly confided to Mohdar Abdullah that he had previously known terrorist pilot Hani Hanjour. After living in the same house with Hazmi for about a month, Salmi moved to the La Mesa apartment shared by Abdullah and others."

2001-10-21: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Samir Abdoun

Labels: 9-11, Hazmi, Hijackers, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

This document is a record of the interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh.

Much of this document has been redacted. As is the case with many of the documents released, the redaction is inappropriate since much of this document was disclosed during testimony in U.S. v. Bin Laden. An extended excerpt is included below, to illustrate the unreasonable nature of the redaction.

There were two versions of the document released, each redacted differently, which illustrates the FBI's capricious approach to claiming FOIA exemptions. The redacted material revealed by the comparison is completely innocuous.

1998-08-31: FBI interrogation of Mohamed Sadiq Odeh (East African Embassy Bombings)

Testimony: U.S. v. Bin Laden, Feb. 28, 2001

1617



   1   time that you deployed to Kenya as part of your duties with

   2   the FBI?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  Was that following the bombings in Africa?

   5   A.  Yes.

   6   Q.  Let me direct your attention to later that month.  Did

   7   there come a time when you interviewed Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  Can you tell the jury what day you began to interview

  10   Mohamed Sadeek Odeh.

  11   A.  We began the interview on August 15.

  12   Q.  For how many days did you interview Mohamed Odeh in Kenya?

  13   A.  Until August 27.

  14   Q.  After that point in time, was Mohamed Odeh brought back to

  15   the United States?

  16   A.  Yes, he was.

  17   Q.  Between August 15 and the 27th, did you interview him

  18   every day?

  19   A.  Not every day.

  20   Q.  Do you know how many days you did not speak to him during

  21   that time?

  22   A.  Approximately two days.

  23   Q.  When you did interview him, what was the earliest, or when

  24   did you generally start interviewing him during each

  25   interview?



                                                                1618



   1   A.  During the daytime we started about, the earliest we

   2   started was about 9, sometimes later.

   3   Q.  How late would you work during those interview sessions?

   4   A.  We never worked past -- one time we worked till 6.  That

   5   was probably the latest.

   6   Q.  Did you always interview him for the full day or did you

   7   ever work half days?

   8   A.  We worked several half a days.

   9   Q.  Let me direct your attention to the first day of the

  10   interviews, August 15.  Do you know what time you started that

  11   day?

  12   A.  We started approximately 10:00.

  13   Q.  Where did the interview take place?

  14   A.  At Kenyan police department headquarters.

  15   Q.  Was it inside that Kenyan police headquarters building?

  16   A.  Yes.

  17   Q.  Can you tell the jury who was present for the interview?

  18   A.  Myself, two other US officials, and three Kenyan

  19   officials.

  20   Q.  Over the course of the following days, was it always the

  21   same people there?

  22   A.  No.

  23   Q.  Generally, how many American officials were present during

  24   the interview?

  25   A.  Two to three.



                                                                1619



   1   Q.  How many Kenyan officials would be present?

   2   A.  It varied.  Sometimes three, sometimes two, sometimes one.

   3   Q.  In what language did you conduct the interview?

   4   A.  In English.

   5   Q.  Did you have any difficulty understanding Mr. Odeh in

   6   English?

   7   A.  No.

   8   Q.  Did you ever have to repeat a question or have him repeat

   9   an answer to a question?

  10   A.  Yes.

  11   Q.  Did he ever ask you to repeat a question to him?

  12   A.  Yes.

  13   Q.  Can you tell the jury how you began the interview on

  14   August 15.

  15   A.  On August 15 we started the interview by first advising

  16   Mr. Odeh of his rights.  We told him that he had the right to

  17   remain silent, anything he said would be used against him.  We

  18   were going over a form that the FBI uses when dealing with

  19   subjects overseas, and the form also went on to say that if

  20   you were in the United States you would have the right to have

  21   an attorney present and if you were in the United States, if

  22   you could not afford an attorney one would be appointed to

  23   you.

  24   Q.  Let me approach you with what has been premarked as

  25   Government's Exhibit 3 for identification, and I will ask you



                                                                1620



   1   if you recognize this form?  Do you recognize Government's

   2   Exhibit 3?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What is that?

   5   A.  That is the advice of rights form that he signed.

   6   Q.  You mentioned that you read it to him.  Did you show him a

   7   copy of that form?

   8   A.  Yes.

   9   Q.  What happened when you finished reading the form or while

  10   you were reading the form and showing him a copy of the form?

  11   A.  While we were explaining the form to him he had a

  12   question.  When we were talking about attorneys, he said, he

  13   mentioned something about having an attorney available; a

  14   Kenyan attorney.

  15   Q.  What happened then?

  16   A.  He asked a couple of other questions, and that original

  17   question got lost because he followed up with another

  18   question, and eventually he stated that he would be willing to

  19   talk to us, but he did not want to sign the form, he first

  20   wanted to talk, how he called it, small talk to get to know

  21   each other.

  22   Q.  What happened then?

  23   A.  At that point we didn't want to pursue that, with that

  24   question that he had outstanding, so we broke and we went out

  25   into the hallway to discuss that amongst ourselves and with



                                                                1621



   1   the Kenyans.

   2   Q.  Did you go back into the room with Odeh after that?

   3   A.  Yes.

   4   Q.  What if anything was Odeh told at that point?

   5   A.  We told him that I had talked to the Kenyan authorities

   6   and that under their rule of law, that a Kenyan -- that they

   7   don't have the same thing as we do, they don't have the right

   8   to counsel at that stage of the investigation.

   9   Q.  What else if anything was said to Odeh at that point about

  10   his rights?

  11   A.  We told him that we could not provide him with an

  12   attorney, we did not have a United States, a U.S. attorney

  13   with us to represent him.  We told him that if he wished to

  14   have an attorney that we would respect that wish, and then the

  15   US representatives would not partake in the interview and we

  16   would leave the room.

  17   Q.  Just so we are clear for the record, he had asked about an

  18   Kenyan attorney and one of the things you made clear to him

  19   was that you did not have an American attorney available there

  20   to represent him.

  21   A.  Right.

  22   Q.  Can you explain what you understood about a Kenyan

  23   attorney.

  24   A.  We also asked him if he had his own Kenyan attorney.  He

  25   said he did not have an attorney.  We told him we could not



                                                                1622



   1   provide him a Kenyan attorney.

   2   Q.  What was he told about what his options were at that point

   3   in time?

   4   A.  We told him he had basically three options.  One was that

   5   he had the right to remain silent and he did not have to talk

   6   to either the Kenyan authorities or the US authorities, and if

   7   he invoked that right to not talk, that would have ended the

   8   matter right there.  And the second option was that if he

   9   wished to have an attorney present during that questioning,

  10   that we would oblige that and we would leave the room.  And

  11   then he would have to be with the Kenyan authorities to

  12   continue the interview or interrogation, but he also had the

  13   right to tell them that he didn't want to talk.  And the third

  14   option was that he could talk to the US authorities and the

  15   Kenyan authorities together with no attorney.

  16   Q.  What if anything did Odeh say when that was explained to

  17   him?

  18   A.  He came up with a fourth one.  He said can I just talk to

  19   the US authorities alone?

  20   Q.  What happened at that point?

  21   A.  At that point we all left the room to discuss that.

  22   Remaining in the room with Mr. Odeh was a Kenyan official, and

  23   by the time I got out to the hallway, the Kenyan official came

  24   out and said he's agreed to talk to both of us, to both

  25   authorities.



                                                                1623



   1   Q.  Did you go back in the room with Odeh at that point?

   2   A.  Yes.

   3   Q.  Did he indicate anything about whether he was willing to

   4   talk to both the Kenyan and American authorities?

   5   A.  Yes.  He said that he figured that if he spoke to the US

   6   authorities alone, that we would tell the Kenyan authorities

   7   anyway, so he figured why not just talk to both of them at the

   8   same time.

   9   Q.  What happened at that point?

  10   A.  At that point he agreed to talk and he signed the form.

  11   Q.  What happened then?

  12   A.  He asked some questions about what if I change my mind.

  13   We told him that it was fine, that he was the boss, that he

  14   was in complete control of his own way of dealing with us.  He

  15   could stop talking at any time.  He could pick and choose to

  16   answer the questions, if he didn't like a question he didn't

  17   have to answer it.

  18   Q.  Did he then answer questions after that point?

  19   A.  Yes.

  20   Q.  What did he tell you about where he was born and where he

  21   grew up?

  22   A.  He told me that he was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in

  23   Jordan.

  24   Q.  Did he indicate what his ethnic heritage was?

  25   A.  That he was of Palestinian heritage.



                                                                1624



   1   Q.  Over the course of the interviews, did he indicate what

   2   other names he was known by besides Mohamed Sadeek Odeh?

   3   A.  He is also known as Abu Yasser, Noureldine, Marwan, and

   4   Abu Moath.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether he had a son during the interview?

   6   A.  Yes.

   7   Q.  What was the son's name?

   8   A.  Yassi.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you about where he went to school?

  10   A.  He, I believe, went to school for the earlier grades back

  11   in Jordan, but in 1986 he went to university, the Far Eastern

  12   University in Manila, Philippines.

  13   Q.  Did he indicate what he studied at that school?

  14   A.  Architecture and engineering.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate whether he became involved in any studies

  16   besides school during the time he was in the Philippines?

  17   A.  Yes.  During his studies in the Philippines, he became

  18   active in Islamic societies, and he also mentioned a Kuwaiti

  19   Islamic center that he used to go to.

  20   Q.  Did he indicate what if anything he was exposed to when he

  21   would go to Islamic societies in the Philippines?

  22   A.  Yes.  He became particularly interested, he told me, in

  23   the concept of jihad by listening to tape recordings and

  24   videos of individual named Abdallah Azzam, who was the leader

  25   of Arabs who were fighting in Afghanistan.



                                                                1625



   1   Q.  Did he indicate whether there came a time when he left the

   2   Philippines?

   3   A.  Yes.  In his final year of school, he was getting ready to

   4   do his thesis, but he needed a thousand dollars, and his

   5   father sent him a thousand dollars, and when he got that money

   6   he decided to call a religious scholar back home where he came

   7   from, to ask him his advice on what to do with the thousand

   8   dollars, should he use it to complete his studies or should he

   9   use it to join the jihad movement and go to Afghanistan and do

  10   jihad.

  11   Q.  Did he indicate what advice he was given and what he did?

  12   A.  His advice that was given to him was to stop what he was

  13   doing immediately and go do jihad.

  14   Q.  What did he tell you that he did?

  15   A.  From the Philippines he traveled to -- made his way to

  16   Afghanistan but he traveled first to Hong Kong and then to

  17   Pakistan.

  18   Q.  Did he indicate where he went in Pakistan?

  19   A.  Yes.  He landed in Karachi and then went from Karachi to

  20   the city of Peshawar.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he got from Karachi to Peshawar?

  22   A.  By bus.

  23   Q.  What did he tell you that he did once he arrived in

  24   Peshawar?

  25   A.  When he first arrived at Peshawar, he went to a place



                                                                1626



   1   called Bait Al Ansar, which I think it translates to House of

   2   Support, where people who were doing that, that's the first

   3   place they stopped.

   4   Q.  Did he tell you approximately what year, and, if you

   5   remember, what month it was that he went from the Philippines

   6   to Peshawar, Pakistan?

   7   A.  I think it was October 1990.

   8   Q.  What did he tell you happened when he arrived at the Bait

   9   al Ansar in Peshawar, Pakistan?

  10   A.  He stayed there for two days, I believe, and then he made

  11   his way by bus to the Afghan border.

  12   Q.  Then what did he tell you happened there?

  13   A.  After he got to the border they transferred to another

  14   vehicle, and they went to one of the camps, called the Farouq

  15   camp.

  16   Q.  Did he tell you what city, if any, was located near the

  17   Farouq camp?

  18   A.  It's in the area of Khost.

  19   Q.  What did Mr. Odeh tell you happened at the Farouq camp?

  20   A.  That was where he received his first series of basic

  21   training.

  22   Q.  Did he tell you how long he spent at the Farouq camp?

  23   A.  Approximately two months.

  24   Q.  Did he tell you what type of training he received during

  25   those two months?



                                                                1627



   1   A.  He received military training that was broken up into

   2   three segments.  The first segment was basic use of firearms,

   3   particularly the AK47, and kind of moved up to a belt-fed

   4   machine gun.

   5   Q.  Did he describe what the second level of training was like

   6   at the Farouq camp?

   7   A.  The second level, they started learning about topography,

   8   map reading, and they got introduced to explosives,

   9   particularly C3, C4, and TNT.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what happened at the third level of

  11   training?

  12   A.  The third level of training involved more sophisticated

  13   weapons, like antitank missiles, rocket launchers, mortars,

  14   and antiaircraft weapons.

  15   Q.  Did Odeh indicate who was the person in charge of the camp

  16   at the time he was training?

  17   A.  For most of the time there, except for the first two

  18   weeks, the person in charge was a guy named Basheer.

  19   Q.  Did Odeh indicate what country Basheer was from?

  20   A.  I don't remember.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether or not he was approached by any

  22   organization at or about the time or after the time he

  23   attended the Farouq camp?

  24   A.  While at the Farouq camp, he was approached by members of

  25   the of Al Qaeda organization, if he was interested in joining.



                                                                1628



   1   Q.  Did he indicate his belief as to why he had been

   2   approached?

   3   A.  He stated that he was approached because of his good

   4   character, his understanding of the religion, and his ability

   5   to get along with other people.

   6   Q.  Did Mr. Odeh tell you at that time whether he decided at

   7   that time to join the Al Qaeda group?

   8   A.  At that time he decided against joining.  He wanted to

   9   wait for a while.

  10   Q.  Did he tell you what he then did after he finished his

  11   training at the Farouq camp?

  12   A.  After he finished the training at the Farouq camp, they

  13   were sent back to Peshawar, where they were going to be

  14   deployed.

  15   Q.  Did he indicate how long he stayed at Peshawar after he

  16   went back there?

  17   A.  He didn't stay very long.  He had to take care of some

  18   dental work.  He had dental problems.

  19   Q.  What happened after that?

  20   A.  After that, he was sent to Jalalabad to work -- that's not

  21   too far from where the fighting was going on.  He was sent to

  22   Jalalabad to work in a rear area support for the front lines.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate what role he played in the rear area

  24   support in Jalalabad?

  25   A.  I believe he was taking care of wounded.



                                                                1629



   1   Q.  Do you know if he was working as a medic?

   2   A.  Yes, medic.  He was taking care of wounded people.

   3   Q.  Did Odeh indicate how long he spent in the area of

   4   Jalalabad at that time?

   5   A.  I believe he was there for about a month.

   6   Q.  What did Odeh tell you he did after that month in the area

   7   of Jalalabad?

   8   A.  After that, he went back to Peshawar.

   9   Q.  Did he indicate what he did there?

  10   A.  After he returned to Peshawar, he was only there a short

  11   time, and then I believe he wound up going back to Jalalabad.

  12   Q.  Did he indicate what happened on his second time he went

  13   to Jalalabad?

  14   A.  The second time he went to Jalalabad, he went back as a

  15   medic and he was -- well, when he was in Peshawar that

  16   first -- after the camp, after Jalalabad the first time, a

  17   doctor, I believe his name was Mohamed, approached him and

  18   said if he wanted to go back and be a medic for a small

  19   salary, and he did.

  20   Q.  What happened when he went back to Jalalabad to serve as a

  21   medic?

  22   A.  While there, he was injured in an air raid.  He was

  23   wounded in the head.

  24   Q.  What did he do as a result of the wounds?

  25   A.  He went again back to Peshawar to recover.



                                                                1630



   1   Q.  Did he indicate what he did after he recovered from the

   2   injury?

   3   A.  I believe that --

   4   Q.  Let me ask you this.  Did he tell you about a number of

   5   different camps and places where he served --

   6   A.  He went back into Afghanistan to several of the camps.  I

   7   believe the second camp he went to after that was the Jihad

   8   Wal camp.

   9   Q.  What did he tell you -- first of all, did he tell you how

  10   long, approximately, he spent at the Jihad Wal camp?

  11   A.  I think 45 days.

  12   Q.  Did he tell you what he did at the Jihad Wal camp?

  13   A.  At that camp, they learned different military tactics.

  14   They trained in how to attack certain installations and

  15   certain points.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not he received any nonmilitary

  17   training during that time period after he was done in the

  18   Jihad Wal camp?

  19   A.  After the Jihad Wal, a friend of his asked him if he

  20   wanted to go for a three-month religious studies course.

  21   Q.  Did Odeh indicate whether he did --

  22   A.  Yes, and he did, he went to that course.

  23   Q.  Did he indicate where he attended these studies?

  24   A.  In the area, I believe, around Pakistan -- I mean, in

  25   Peshawar.



                                                                1631



   1   Q.  Did he indicate when he was done the three months of his

   2   Islamic training or study, do you recall what time frame he

   3   indicated that would be?

   4   A.  That was around early '92.

   5   Q.  Did he indicate whether or not the topic of his joining Al

   6   Qaeda ever came up again in 1992?

   7   A.  Yes.  And he was approached to join Al Qaeda at that time,

   8   and he decided that he wanted to join Al Qaeda, he was

   9   impressed with the philosophy of it and he wanted to join.

  10   Q.  Did he indicate what it was about Al Qaeda versus other

  11   groups that made Al Qaeda attractive to him?

  12   A.  He liked Al Qaeda because it represented the whole Muslim

  13   world.  He told me that he didn't want to join like a

  14   Palestinian group or another group based upon one country, one

  15   ethnic background, because Al Qaeda represented all Muslims.

  16   Q.  Did he indicate what he thought of whether or not Al Qaeda

  17   was Islamically pure as compared to the other groups?

  18   A.  He did.  He said that compared to the other groups that Al

  19   Qaeda was Islamically pure and that the leadership in other

  20   groups might do things that are not Islamically correct.

  21   Q.  Did he indicate how he went about becoming a member of Al

  22   Qaeda?

  23   A.  Yes.  He took bayat, it's called.

  24   Q.  Did Odeh explain to you what his understanding -- this

  25   will be the last question, your Honor.



                                                                1632



   1            Did Odeh indicate to you what his understanding was

   2   of what the bayat required him to do?

   3   A.  Bayat is when he pledges his allegiance to Usama Bin Laden

   4   and that he will follow his orders as long as those orders are

   5   Islamically correct.

   6            (Continued on next page)

   7

   8

   9

Labels: East-African-Embassy-Bombings, INTELFILES, Odeh

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

The Problem With FOIA

...is exemplified in the documents linked here.

The link shows an FBI FD-302. I received two copies of the same document -- as part of the same FOIA release. Both copies are redacted. So what's the problem?

1. The first copy is much MORE redacted than the second copy, even though they were part of the same release and thus, in theory, subject to the same standards.

2. So what was so vitally important that it required redaction? Among the highly sensitive redactions I found this valuable piece of information: "MURAD was read his rights in English and stated that he understood." I defy anyone to tell me why that information should have been redacted.

3. So was their rationale? The exemptions claimed on the redacted copy include b6 and b7c, both "privacy" interests. How does it violate personal privacy to say that someone who is admittedly under indictment was read his rights? And since the rest of the document is exempted under b6 and b7c, it's tough to have any confidence that the rest of the censorship is any more valid than the clearly bogus application already exposed.

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

New document blog

I have added a document blog to the site, which is where future document posts will appear. The reason for this is that I just received nearly 1,700 pages of FBI files related to 9/11, and I need a better system to make them available.

The new blog is searchable and tagged, to help researchers find documents more efficiently, and I will (over time) blog all the existing Intelwire documents so that everything can be accessed in one place. The existing document index will be maintained indefinitely, but probably not updated.

To launch the new blog, I've posted several new documents, including pre-9/11 intelligence on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (and one particular document about his college applications, including to one in Oklahoma City). I've also posted an FBI report on the 9/11 Hijacker Cell Structure. I will be posting a whole lot more in the near future, including a lot of material never seen before in public.

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

There are two versions of this document, which contain different information. The summary is a rare document indicating the FBI's interest in Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, prior to the September 11 attacks. KSM is considered the primary mastermind of the attacks. He was secretly indicted for his role in Ramzi Yousef's Bojinka plot in January 1996, but the FBI did not publicly acknowledge his existence until 1998.

It's interesting to note the pointless redactions made to these documents prior to their release by the FBI. For instance, the names of the other Bojinka plotters (Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah) have been redacted even though they are well in the public domain after a highly visible trial. The redactions are a typical example of the FBI's reluctance to release information, even when there is no legal or common-sense reason to withhold.

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

1999-07-08: FBI, summary of information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Labels: 9-11, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, KSM, Ramzi-Yousef

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, Abdul Hakim Murad

This mostly redacted document memorializes an April 14 interview with Ramzi Yousef's accomplice Abdul Hakim Murad. Arrested in January 1995 in the Philippines, Murad was a key player in the Bojinka plot and told authorities that Yousef had (in 1994 or 1995) hatched a scheme to hijack a commercial airliner and crash it into CIA headquarters.

As an aside, the timing of this interview is interesting, in that it takes place five days before the Oklahoma City bombing. On April 19, 1995, Murad told a prison guard that Yousef's "Liberation Army" was responsible for the attack, however INTELWIRE's efforts to document the FBI's follow-up investigation of that claim have thus far yielded nothing.

1995-05-11: FBI FD-302, record of interrogation, Abdul Hakim Murad

Labels: Abdul-Hakim-Murad, Bojinka, INTELFILES, Ramzi-Yousef

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2003-02-??: FBI report, The September 11 Hijacker Cell Model

This formerly classified 10-page document outlines the cell structure for the 9/11 plot, with a strong focus on methodology and how the plot was similar and different from previous al Qaeda efforts.

2003-02-??: FBI report, The September 11 Hijacker Cell Model

Labels: 9-11, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Terrorist-Cells

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

2002-06-10: FBI, request for information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed college attendance

As many people know, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed attended college in North Carolina during the 1980s. What is much less well known is the fact that he applied to several other colleges, including in Kansas, Connecticut and Oklahoma City. This document instructs FBI field offices to investigate whether those other schools had any pertinent records.

2002-06-10: FBI, request for information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed college attendance

Labels: 9-11, INTELFILES, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, KSM

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Computerworld on Mujahideen Secrets 2

Computerworld interviewed me for their story on the new mujahideen encryption software.

It's a good article overall, but it misconstrues my comment about where this stands in the history of terrorist technology.

For the record, I didn't say Secrets 2 fits in with the previous pattern of al Qaeda tech usage. Rather, I consider this a significant step forward. Al Qaeda has always been au courant with technology such as computers, password protection and Web presence. In contrast, Secrets 2 is bleeding-edge development of a type we haven't seen before. It's cause for concern.

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Al Qaeda Trains Children on Video, You Saw It Here First

CNN has a story on al Qaeda releasing videos that show young children training as terrorists. This will come as no surprise to readers of this site, who were told about this tactic more than three years ago.

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Jihadists Add Strong Encryption To Terrorist Toolbox

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Al Qaeda-linked militants have rolled out improved security software that provides above-military-grade encryption for terrorists communicating online.

A copy of the software, Mujahideen Secrets 2, was obtained by INTELWIRE and forwarded to Paul A. Henry, Vice President for Technology Evangelism at Secure Computing (www.securecomputing.com), for analysis.

According to Henry, the software is a significant upgrade to an earlier version program used by jihadists. The new software can be used to encrypt chat sessions, as well as e-mail, Web forum postings and electronic communications.

The software can easily be loaded on a USB stick, according to Henry, allowing militants to encrypt communications from otherwise insecure locations such as Internet cafes.

The software is extremely easy to use, Henry said. This is a significant factor, since the computer skills (and general intelligence) of al Qaeda operatives run the gamut from highly advanced to embarrassingly inadequate.

On the higher end of that spectrum, Al Qaeda has traditionally employed fairly sophisticated computer techniques, but until recently, its implementation has generally lagged industry standards.

During the early and mid-1990s, terrorists were early adopters of laptop computers, PDAs, online publishing and digital file archiving. But while their computer habits were savvy, they were usually less than professional-level.

For instance, a laptop computer recovered from Ramzi Yousef in 1995 contained deleted files that were able to be recovered by forensic analysis. Yousef was sophisticated enough to use passwords, but not strong encryption. He removed old and sensitive files, but he didn't know to run a file shredder.

With the new software, Yousef's hard drive would have been a much tougher nut to crack. In addition to its 2,048-bit encryption, Mujahideen Secrets 2 includes a shredder and file and folder encryption.

The move to stronger encryption may have been prompted by security breaches on jihadist Web sites back in September, when the U.S. government and counterterrorism analysts obtained copies of an Osama bin Laden video release before it was widely introduced on the Web. At the time, several key jihadist sites temporarily suspended operations to address the breach.

However, it's unlikely the bulk of those security issues will be solved by strong encryption. While the debut of the software represents a significant and dangerous new development for counterterrorism officials, encryption and straight-up network security do not appear to have been the key factors in earlier breaches. The best encryption in the world won't help if you give away your passwords and encryption keys.

Mujahideen Secrets 2 appears to have been assembled and compiled from both open-source and copyrighted material, according to Henry. The software may be detectable when operating over networks or on targeted machines. This could be useful for counterterrorism professionals tracking terrorist and militant Web usage.

Labels: Analysis, INTELWIRE-Exclusive

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Why 'Islamic Terrorists' And Not 'Christian Terrorists'?

Juan Cole rings in on the "Islamophobia" debate today in Salon. While his piece is bound to provoke a lot of debate on many fronts, I want to focus on one particular inaccuracy which has been continually invoked over the last 12 years. Cole writes:

But people are not "Islamic," they are Muslim. And one most certainly does insult Muslims by tying their religion to movements such as terrorism or fascism. Muslims perceive a double standard in this regard: Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols would never be called "Christian terrorists" even though they were in close contact with the Christian Identity Movement.

Cole chooses his words much more carefully here than other people who raise the question of why we don't call McVeigh and Nichols "Christian terrorists," but the fallacy remains. The primary reason we don't call them Christian terrorists is that there is absolutely no evidence that McVeigh and Nichols were religiously motivated.

Nichols found God in prison, but when you look at the record of how the Oklahoma City bombing came about, it's clear that religion was not a significant factor. Neither McVeigh nor Nichols ever showed the slightest interest in religion prior to the Oklahoma City bombing. Neither man was devout. Neither man proselytized, and neither was associated with any religious congregation or visibly a member of any religious sect.

It's true that the conspirators had allies in the Christian Identity movement. But every indication that can be gleaned from the record -- including the trial transcripts, interviews and other research -- strongly argues that McVeigh and Nichols acted primarily out of anti-government sentiment.

Racial views influenced their actions and associations, of course. But the literature found by investigators pointed squarely at anti-federalism as the overriding motivation for the Oklahoma City bombing. Virtually no material with any substantial religious content was found among the conspirators' possessions. McVeigh, in his final days, made numerous statements about his political and anti-government views, but never delivered a religious manifesto or invoked God in anything but the most casual manner.

There's another important distinction to be made here when discussing Islamic terrorism (or Muslim terrorism, as Cole would have it). Even if McVeigh and Nichols had been zealous Christian Identity adherents acting in the name of the Christian Identity movement, there a vast difference in how Identity relates to Christianity vs. how al Qaeda-style jihadism relates to Islam.

Identity has never been more than a fringe movement with low membership and an extremely low active membership, around 25,000 believers of which only a fraction are politically or militantly active. Identity is defined primarily by fringe racial beliefs that have no real parallel or support in mainstream Christianity. That's not to say that mainstream Christianity has never supported or justified racism, simply that the theological underpinning of Identity (white supremacy, see link for more information) is pretty much unrelated to the formal theological arguments historically used by mainstream Christian movements used to support racism and anti-Semitism.

The Identity movement is socially stigmatized everywhere -- it has no defenders, supporters or sympathizers in the world of mainstream Christianity. Institutional Christianity -- whether Catholic or Protestant -- has never given Identity an iota of support or provided it with any ideological cover.

Contrast that to the al Qaeda movement. Whether one likes to admit it or not, Al Qaeda's theological beliefs are not nearly as far removed from mainstream Islam (on a worldwide basis) as Identity beliefs are from mainstream Christianity. For instance, a 2005 Pew survey of Muslim attitudes found that 60 percent of Muslims in the relatively liberal nation of Jordan had "a lot or some confidence" in Osama bin Laden to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

You would be hard pressed to show that half of all Christians can even accurately describe the Identity movement, let alone identify any of its leaders or sympathize with its views. Around the world, bin Laden -- and the ideology he represents -- has a significant following among Muslims worldwide (link to Pew study). That doesn't mean all Muslims are terrorists, nor does it justify bigotry or wild assumptions, nor does it justify a world war against Islam.

But it does mean that al Qaeda is a much, much larger problem for Muslims than Identity is for Christians. In part, this is because the theological authority and hierarchy in Islam is much more diffuse than it is in Christianity, allowing for substantial regional variations and a wide array of competing views on what, exactly, constitutes valid Islamic opinions.

But it's also because al Qaeda uses mainstream Islamic concepts to build its theology (or rather, the parts of its theology offered for public consumption). Identity is built on beliefs that are not shared by any mainstream Christian movements, such as its teaching that non-whites are "mud people" created by God prior to the creation of Adam and Eve. There are no credible intellectuals in the Identity movement, and members expend little effort trying to justify their theology to outsiders.

In contrast once again, we've seen that Al Qaeda spends a tremendous amount of time and energy crafting Islamic legal arguments with the intention of persuading mainstream Muslims that its actions are just (see story for an example).

Al Qaeda uses concepts that are more firmly rooted in Islam, with the most obvious of these being its interpretation of jihad as justifiable military action in defense of what al Qaeda defines as appropriate targets (including the reclaiming of lands which were once Muslim or the oppression of Muslim people).

To broaden the problem even further, many Muslims who are not supporters of al Qaeda are nevertheless swayed by extremely similar legal opinions and interpretations when it comes to terrorist acts committed in support of the Palestinian cause, including those carried out by groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Al Qaeda uses a lot of the same terminology and invokes much of the same religious precedent, the main difference is that al Qaeda has globalized the context to allow combat in more places and against a wider array of enemies.

While I agree with Cole that there are looming and current problems that stem from the semantics of how we talk about terrorism, the issue here is the extent to which terrorists successfully justify their actions to the mainstream Muslim community and the extent to which they employ language and arguments which are reasonably grounded in popular Muslim thought.

Ultimately, the definition of "Islamic terrorism" derives from the actions and beliefs of the terrorists, but it carries weight (and provokes controversy) because of the success of jihadist movements in justifying themselves to the wider Muslim population and situating their actions within the context of Islamic law.

The phrase "Islamic terrorism" is not so much an indictment of Islam as it is an important and necessary description of the demographic group from which the terrorists seek to win support (with some degree of success).

Timothy McVeigh and other oft-named "Christian terrorists" like the IRA do not overtly seek to mobilize the whole of Christianity in their support, and they do not spend intellectual capital justifying their actions to the wider Christian audience. That's a critical difference, and it's the primary reason we don't talk about "Christian terrorists" all that much.

I should note that Al Qaeda does also have strong components within its theology that are much further outside the mainstream and much shakier in terms of its claim on legitimacy, but those elements are not its defining characteristics in the wider discussion. They tend to bear more on al Qaeda's internal thinking and conduct, and I do plan to discuss elements of that issue in the future.

Labels: American-Terrorists, OKBOMB, Weblog

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