Obama's Assassination Threat

Below are indictments of the three men arrested after allegedly threatening to kill presidential candidate Barack Obama. Media reports have tied the men to white supremacist organizations.

Indictment of Tharin Gartrell (Obama threat)

Indictment of Nathan Johnson (Obama threat)

Indictment of Shawn Robert Adolf (Obama threat)

Commentary on INTELWIRE.com

Labels: Aryan-Nations, Assassinations, INTELFILES, Obama, The-Order, white-supremacists

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

The Legacy of the Order and the Failure of the Profile

Media reports have connected Aryan Nations and The Order to a group of would-be assassins allegedly targeting Presidential candidate Barack Obama (story).

The Order traces its roots back to the 1980s. The group has been the subject of a series of revivals and survivals. For the story of one such group (or rather collection of groups), see Intelwire's exclusive report on the PATCON operation.

Members of both the original Order and the so-called Second Order are still very much alive and active. Very few of the wider network's top leaders have ever been charged with a crime.

Authorities have tried to downplay the threat presented by the three would-be killers -- Tharin Gartrell, Nathan Johnson and Shawn Robert Adolf -- who were arrested on a traffic stop after driving erratically with a carload full of guns, ammo and drugs. On the basis of the latter factor, apparently, federal authorities have publicly dismissed the seriousness of the threat.

Indictment of Tharin Gartrell

Indictment of Nathan Johnson

Indictment of Shawn Robert Adolf

However, Timothy McVeigh was at least casually acquainted with methamphetamine. McVeigh was also arrested after a similarly careless traffic stop. He was in custody for hours before the police even realized he was connected to the Oklahoma City bombing.

In short, these suspects clearly match the historical precedent and any reasonable profile of a terrorist.

If they had been Pakistanis, the country would be whipping itself into an unparalleled frenzy over the latest terrorist threat (as noted earlier today by Mark Hosenball, investigative correspondent for Newsweek, on NPR's Talk of the Nation).

This is a critical error, in my view.

These three suspects were certainly capable of carrying out the threat -- at least from an armaments point of view. The drug use is not a disqualifying factor. In fact, meth has some history as a deliberately chosen inciting device for planned violence.

The operating pattern for U.S. white supremacists groups is decentralized "leaderless resistance" which is essentially identical to the structure of the current "Al Qaeda movement" and very similar to the modus operandi in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

For all these reasons, the cavalier law enforcement posture in this case is troubling. The response to this event should be the same as if the three men had been Egyptians or Saudis or Sudanese.

Racism and sloppy assumptions are not just wrong -- they're dangerous.

Labels: Analysis, Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2002

FD-302 reports listed here are interviews of the person named, except as noted.

1/8/2002: FBI, Memorandum Captioned Ziyat Kharfan

1/15/2002: FBI, FD-302, Hotels used by hijackers

1/15/2002: FBI, FD-302, Hotels used by hijackers (2)

1/15/2002: FBI, FD-302, Hotels used by hijackers (3)

1/15/2002: FBI, Memo to FBI Legate in Saudi Arabia concerning Bandar Abdul Khair Al Hazmi

1/15/2002: FBI, FD-302, Hotels used by Hijackers (references to Omar Bayoumi)

1/15/2002: FBI Communication, Checking visitor list for unnamed prisoner at MCC Federal Prison, New York

1/28/2002: FBI, Letterhead Memorandum, Investigation of Ali Ahmad Mesdaq

2/19/2002: FBI, Memorandum, Investigation of Pilot Training in Arizona

2/19/2002: FBI Summary of Grand Jury Information

1/28/2002: FBI Document, PENTBOM, Redacted in Whole

3/7/2002: FBI, FD-302, Qualid Moncef Benomrane

3/7/2002: FBI, FD-302, Subject name redacted (likely Benomrane)

3/13/2002: FBI, FD-302, Qualid Moncef Benomrane

3/13/2002: FBI, FD-302, Subject name redacted (Saudi national)

3/27/2002: FBI, FD-302, Subject name redacted (victim family interview)

4/1/2002: FBI, FD-302, Report pertaining to alleged call from United 93

3/7/2002: FBI, FD-302 (working), Rodney McAlear (pilot training)

4/11/2002: FBI, Leads from hijacker's cars, pilot training

4/12/2002: FBI, FD-302, FNU Milton (pilot training)

4/15/2002: FBI, Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi/Al Baraka

4/15/2002: FBI, Letterhead Memorandum, Omar Al Bayoumi/Al Baraka

4/29/2002: FBI, FD-302, 9/11 Victim Phone Call

Labels: 9-11, Bayoumi, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Raissi

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Al Qaeda Founding, 20 Years Ago Today

The memo below commemorated the "official" founding of al Qaeda 20 years ago this day.

8/11/1988: Tareekh Osama memo

The document was provided by the Motley Rice law firm, which obtained it as part of its lawsuit on behalf of the victims of the September 11 attacks.

Labels: INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

It Was 20 Years Ago Today...

While many experts (including myself) will give you a wide range of possible dates when Al Qaeda became meaningfully functional as a terrorist/jihadist organization, there is only one date that is crystal clear.

Twenty years ago today, Osama bin Laden (Abu Abdullah) and Mohamed Loay Bayazid (Abu Rida Al Suri) held a meeting regarding "the establishment of the new military work" -- including the general terrorist training camp, the special camp and above them both, "The Base," or in Arabic, Al Qaeda.

8/11/1988: Tareekh Osama memo

It's telling that the media -- usually obsessed with anniversaries -- has not spent much capital on the observance of this landmark meeting. Seven years after 9/11, the mainstream media is still woefully uneducated as far as Al Qaeda is concerned.

According to the memo, written by Abu Ridah, "initial estimate, within 6 months of Al Qaida (the Base), 314 brothers will be trained and ready."

Within a few weeks of the meeting, more than 30 people had been recruited, according to subsequent documents (included in the PDF above).

The follow-up memos discuss taking over the infrastructure of Abdullah Azzam's Makhtab al-Khidamat (The Services Office), an organization which had managed foreign fighters during the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the organization from which Al Qaeda was splitting.

A little more than a year later, Azzam would be assassinated by a car bomb, after which Al Qaeda completely absorbed the operations of the Services Office.

There are also several references in the documents to seizing control of Al Jihad magazine, which had just a few months earlier published a jihadist manifesto by Azzam entitled "The Solid Base" -- in Arabic, Al-Qa`idah al-Sulbah. This remains the most likely explanation of Al Qaeda's name, although alternative theories abound.

The document linked above was provided by the Motley Rice law firm, as part of its lawsuit on behalf of the victims of the September 11 attacks.

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Oct. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2001

FD-302 reports listed here are interviews of the person named, except as noted.

10/1/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Ramez Tawfik Noaman (1)

10/1/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Ramez Tawfik Noaman (2)

10/2/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Julie Sweeny (victim's family)

10/3/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Abu Jandal (former bin Laden bodyguard)

10/3/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Abu Jandal (2)

10/3/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Abu Jandal (3)

10/3/01: FBI Communication, PENTTBOMB, Omar Al Bayoumi

10/6/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Jimi Nouri

10/8/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of (name redacted), San Diego investigation

10/8/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi (San Diego hijackers associate, Hani Hanjour associate, interview related to proffer)

10/12/01: FBI Memorandum, Sawyer Aviation records

10/17/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Tina Beth Arnold (Sawyer Aviation)

10/17/01: Redacted document re: San Diego investigation

10/17/01: Redacted document re: San Diego investigation (2)

10/17/01: Redacted document re: San Diego investigation (3)

10/17/01: Redacted document re: San Diego investigation (4)

10/21/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Samir Abdoun

10/23/01: FBI memorandum, Anwar Aulaqi

10/23/01: FBI interview requested in Yemen pertaining to California investigation

10/23/01: FBI memorandum to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, redacted

10/28/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Malek Mohamed Seif

10/28/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Samir Abdoun

10/28/01: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Samir Abdoun (2)

11/11/01: FBI memorandum re: British reporter inquiry

Labels: 9-11, INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Recent INTELWIRE Documents

A few documents recently posted on INTELWIRE. Look for the next batch of 9/11 files soon, and a lot more interesting material in the works.

Rumsfeld-Saddam meetings

State Department Cable, Dec. 7, 1983

State Department Cable, Dec. 8, 1983

State Department Cable, Dec. 10, 1983

State Department Cable (1), Dec. 14, 1983

State Department Cable (2), Dec. 14, 1983

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

Anthrax Investigation:

Affidavit in support of search warrant, 10/31/2001

Affidavit in support of search warrant, 10/31/2007

Salim Hamdan Trial Documents

Unclassified Hamdan Affidavit

Allegations against Hamdan

Summary of expected testimony

List of detainees sought by defense as witnesses

Letter from prosecutor Maj. Robert Preston protesting irregularities in Gitmo cases in general

D.C. Madam Investigation

Postal Inspector Files (1991-1992)

Oklahoma City Bombing

June 20, 1995 FBI memorandum, United States Nationalist Party

Read the June 13, 1995, FBI airtel, Mark Thomas

August 22, 1996 FBI teletype, McVeigh phone call

Labels: INTELFILES

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Anthrax documents

Two key documents from the 440-page FBI anthrax release today:

Affidavit in support of search warrant, 10/31/2001

Affidavit in support of search warrant, 10/31/2007

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Hamdan Trial Documents

Osama bin Laden's former driver, Salim Hamdan, was found guilty of material support of terrorism today by a military tribunal, but acquitted of conspiracy charges for aiding al Qaeda.

I'm posting a few of the more interesting primary source documents, culled from several thousand pages of filings in the case. The most interesting material, not surprisingly, has been redacted.

Unclassified Hamdan Affidavit

Allegations against Hamdan

Summary of expected testimony

List of detainees sought by defense as witnesses

Letter from prosecutor Maj. Robert Preston protesting irregularities in Gitmo cases in general

Labels: Weblog

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Behind the Handshake: The Rumsfeld-Saddam Meeting

By J.M. Berger
INTELWIRE.com

Around the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a photo of Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam Hussein began circulating on the Web.

Declassified documents recently obtained by INTELWIRE under the Freedom of Information Act reveal details of the discussion behind the handshake, and how the meeting came to be.

Rumsfeld was appointed special envoy to the Middle East by President Ronald Reagan in November 1983. Rumsfeld was dispatched on a tour of the region shortly thereafter.

In December 1983, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William L. Eagleton Jr. proposed a meeting between Rumsfeld and Iraqi officials as part of that trip. The Iraqis responded that the proposed timing of the visit "would not be convenient." A schedule change was offered on the condition that Iraq's president would receive Rumsfeld during the trip.

"The Iraqis will be aware that by meeting their scheduling needs he will expect to see Saddam Hussein," the Dec. 7 cable states. "The atmosphere for such a visit should be positive."

State Department Cable, Dec. 7, 1983

A message from President Reagan was drafted for the trip.

"I have become convinced of the important role Iraq can play in helping bring greater peace to the Middle East," Reagan wrote in the Dec. 8 draft.

"The United States strongly desires an end to the Iran-Iraq war. I have no illusions that the many differences between Iraq and the United States can be easily or quickly resolved," the message stated. "However, I am gratified that the dialogue between us, laboriously and patiently nurtured, has improved our understanding of each other.

"The United States stands ready to exchange ambassadors to make formal recognition of this fact whenever you decide that such a step will support the interests of your country. Until then, I want you to know that I attach great importance to continuing and improving our dialogue," the message said.

Coming in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war, the initiative was considered highly sensitive.

"Do not, repeat not, discuss letter outside embassy or with non-American personnel," the cable states.

State Department Cable, Dec. 8, 1983

The presidential message also proposed formalizing relations between the U.S. and Iraq.

I have no illusions that the many differences between Iraq and the United States can be easily or quickly resolved. However, I am gratified that the dialogue between us, laboriously and patiently nurtured, has improved our understanding of each other," the message stated. "The United States stands ready to exchange ambassadors to make formal recognition of this fact whenever you decide that such a step will support the interests of your country."

The Iraqis arranged accommodations for the trip.

State Department Cable, Dec. 10, 1983

In contrast to the friendly tone of the presidential message, a secret cable to Rumsfeld from Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger spelled out U.S. concerns about the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.

"Successful Iraqi disruption of Iranian oil exports could prompt Iran to take reprisals against third countries or shipping in the Strait of Hormuz," the cable stated, strongly urging Iraq to exercise restraint but pointedly and repeatedly refusing to suggest any negative consequence if Saddam failed to do so.

Rumsfeld's visit was presented as an unambiguous sign of support for the Iraqi dictator.

"We are willing to take more symbolic steps in bilateral areas, if Iraq believes these can give any morale boost to war effort or impetus to its diplomatic efforts. Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit could be seen in this (context) and of course, we remain ready to exchange ambassadors with Iraq without preconditions," Eagleburger wrote.

However, such offers were left to Rumsfeld's discretion.

"You should mention symbolic bilateral moves in the context of the war only if you sense that the atmosphere is correct," the cable said.

The cable makes clear that U.S. support for Iraq came without preconditions for good behavior from the Hussein regime.

"We are not making increased U.S. support for Iraq contingent upon Iraqi behavior in the Gulf," Eagleburger wrote.

If that wasn't clear enough, Eagleburger added, "A defeat for Iraq would be a strategic defeat for the U.S. ... We have an interest in Iraq's survival as a strong and independent state that can promote the stable development of its region."

Eagleburger also indicated it would intervene with the Reagan administration's allies in the oil industry to build Iraq's oil exports.

"We are talking with oil industry representatives about their plans for
construction of new alternative facilities for Iraq's oil exports," the cable stated.

State Department Cable (1), Dec. 14, 1983

State Department Cable (2), Dec. 14, 1983





A meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was held prior to the meeting with Hussein, on December 19, 1983.

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

The unredacted State Department cable describing the meeting, as released to INTELWIRE, notably omits mention of Rumsfeld discussing Iraqi use of chemical weapons and violations of human rights, points which were described in an earlier FOIA release to George Washington University.

External link: George Washington University National Security Archive

The earlier document, written by Rumsfeld, was not included in the FOIA release to INTELWIRE although it falls within the scope of INTELWIRE's FOIA request.

The meeting with Saddam Hussein took place the following day.

"In his 90-minute meeting with Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein Showed obvious
pleasure with president's letter and Rumsfeld's visit," a summary of the meeting stated.

"Our initial assessment is that meeting marked positive milestone in development of US-Iraqi relations and will prove to be of wider benefit to US posture in the region," the cable stated.

"Iraqi TV photographed Saddam's initial greeting of Rumsfeld and presentation of President Reagan's letter," the cable said.

"Rumsfeld told Saddam US and Iraq had shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion," the cable stated. Rumsfeld also expressed interest in "seeing Iraq increase oil exports."

Saddam offered an ironic analysis of the Middle East conflict between Syria and Lebanon.

"(The) US had originally acted with indifference both toward Syrian invasion of Lebanon and toward the (Iran-Iraq) war, for which it decided to 'let this group of lunatics bash each other,'" the cable quoted Saddam as saying. "What ... would have happened to the states of the Gulf and Arabian peninsula if Iraq had not stood fast? No one would have been able to put out the fire. Zionism was in fact encouraging it to burn."

Rumsfeled responded with a lengthy statement largely endorsing Saddam's stated world view.

"Nations, Rumsfeld said, were better off taking long-sighted view and US had to try to take a comprehensive view. Our understanding of the importance of balance in the world and the region was similar to Iraq's."

If Rumsfeld made a direct response to Saddam's statements about "Zionism," it was not recorded. However, he did discuss Israel.

"To the extent there was excessive focus on Lebanon, Rumsfeld continued, it could distract attention from need to address more fundamental problems, such as security of the Gulf and circumstances of the Palestinian people." Rumsfeld added that the U.S. wanted to "promote a fair peace between the Arabs and Israel, one that recognized the circumstances of the Palestinian people."

Rumsfeld also suggested that the U.S. would consider guaranteeing the security of a possible Iraqi oil pipeline through Jordan against attack from Israel.

In another statement filled with retrospective irony, Rumsfeld said "Nations which export terrorism and extremism ought to be recognized as such. People should know that terrorism has a home -- in Iran, Syria and Libya."

State Department Cable, Dec. 20, 1983

Additional documents relating to U.S. support for Iraq during this time frame were obtained as part of the same INTELWIRE Freedom of Information request and will be published soon.

Labels: INTELWIRE-Exclusive, Iraq, Secrets-Scandals

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink