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News, analysis and primary source documents on terrorism, extremism and national security.


Monday, July 26, 2010
 

Wikileaks: KBR employs 35 "bad guys" at Bagram Air Field

February 2007: Afghan Army official tells U.S. Army task force Gladius that KBR is employing 35 criminals and/or insurgents at Bagram Air Field:

7DA8A3D1-8430-4933-8DAC-82E547622CCB 2/12/2007 14:30 Non-Combat Event Meeting 2007-044-070121-0363 "Key Leader Engagement. Parwan PSC. Governor Taqwa, Bazir Selangi (Deputy GOV), GEN Salim (ANP Chief), GEN Khalil Amil (NDS Chief)." "Key Leader Engagement

Date of meeting: 121000LFEB07

Date of Report: 131100LFEB07

Derived From: Parwan PSC. Governor Taqwa, Bazir Selangi (Deputy GOV), GEN Salim (ANP Chief), GEN Khalil Amil (NDS Chief).

Summary: (S//NF) During a scheduled weekly meeting with the head Parwan Provincial Government officials TF Gladius was given the following information in reference to the BAF Security Zone (BSZ) and areas around Parwan Province: background information on the new Deputy Governor of the Parwan District, confirmation of Engineer Hamidallah being in the AO and the Governors want to employ him to work for the local government, possible Criminal or Insurgents working on Bagram Air Field (BAF) for KBR, HIG plans in the Kohi Safi and BSZ area, IED TTP to be employed against Government Officials in the Parwan Province, and plans for ANP in the Kohi Safi District.

(S//NF) Background information on the new Deputy Governor of the Parwan Province. The new Deputy Governor of the Parwan Province is Bazir Selangi (NFI). He is from the Selang area of the Parwan Province which is located in the northern portion of the province. DEP GOV Selangi was the commander of the United Front during the Taliban rule. He was also the Chief of Police (CoP) for Kabul (date of office wasnt given). Selangi was a Division Commander for troops in Wardak and Jalalabad during the Taliban Regime and was a Chief of Police (CoP) in Nangahar as well (NFI).

(S//NF) Confirmation of Engineer Hamidullah being in the AO and Governor Taqwas willingness to hire him. Governor Taqwa speaks frequently with Engineer Hamidullah on the telephone and believes that he is of good nature and wants to hire him to work for the government of Parwan Province. Earlier reporting shows that Engineer Hamidullah is spreading anti US/Coalition/IRoA sentiments within the Parwan and BSZ area. With this information known by the Parwan government leaders, they still believe that he is good natured and want to employ him. GEN Salim (Parwan ANP Chief) will investigate and confirm if Engineer Hamidullah is still conducting these operations before he is employed.

(S//NF) Possible criminals or insurgents working for KBR at BAF. GEN Salim informed TF Gladius that there are approximately 35 bad guys working for KBR on BAF. GEN Salim may be referring to criminals or low level insurgents who are working as local contracts on BAF. If the individuals mentioned were Taliban or HIG, GEN Salim would have mentioned the groups by name (NFI).

(S//NF) Taliban and HIG plans in the Kohi Safi and BSZ area. There are two Taliban (TB) commanders in a refugee camp in Pakistan (NFI) that are believed to be targeting the Kohi Safi and BSZ area. These two individuals are named Perferoq and Qari Nazr Gul (NFI). These TB Commanders are reported to be developing IED TTPs using motorcycles as SVBIEDs targeting Parwan Provincial government officials and offices (NFI).

(S//NF) Plans for the ANP in the Kohi Safi District. The Parwan leadership believes that the Kohi Safi ANP Chief, Gul Said is uneducated and not aggressive. In order to support the Kohi Safi ANP Chief, GEN Salim is committing up to 200 ANP into the Kohi Safi District. These men will be trained, equipped and sent to work in the Kohi Safi District (NFI)." RC EAST NEUTRAL FALSE TF GLADIUS (DSTB) TF GLADIUS None Selected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42SWD1528774655 35.01441956 69.16755676 UNKNOWN UNKNOWN NEUTRAL GREEN SECRET

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Sunday, July 25, 2010
 

Wikileaks Document: Afghan Intelligence Said In June 2007 That Osama Bin Laden Died In Peshawar Hospital

Updated 7/26/2010, 2:30 p.m. Eastern

Don't assume this is correct (I am assuming it is not), but a single-source intelligence report from the Afghanistan National Directorate of Security reported in June 2007 that Osama bin Laden had died in a Peshawar hospital.

According to an intelligence report leaked by Wikileaks:
NDS is also reporting that UBL had been transported to Peshawar hospital in Pakistan for treatment, where he has died. NDS stressed that this was a single source report and had not been verified.
Interestingly, there is virtually no other information about Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri to be found in the files, at least not by name. (There are a few more references to bin Laden in the remaining 15,000 or so records which Wikileaks has not yet issued but which select news organizations have viewed.)

One finds only the barest scraps of intelligence; nothing that points to bin Laden or Zawahiri being located in Afghanistan (no surprise there), and nothing that points to any degree of operational control over Afghan forces by either man. There are less than five references to each man in 76,000 records.

Compare that to almost 400 references to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an Al Qaeda ally) and his network of fighters, and at least 85 references to Jaliluddin Haqqani (a Taliban Ally) and his network of fighters. There are 70 references to high-value targets -- including a handful of named Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders.

There are fewer than 200 references to Al Qaeda. Compare that to 6,000-ish references to the Taliban. Most references to enemy forces refer to ACM (Anti-Coalition Militia) or INS (insurgents), but the comparison between Al Qaeda and Taliban references is very interesting and perhaps telling. I've been one to argue that the estimate of 50 to 100 Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan is too low. Does this call that into question? It's hard to say. There are a number of factors that could skew this sample. But this is certainly one of the most important data points to date.

(Here's a contrarian point of view citing some documents I haven't seen in my download from the Wikileaks site and others which I feel are being overrepresented in the article.)

Importantly, there are more than 200 references to Iran -- more than there are to Al Qaeda, although dozens are in longish diplomatic cables. Most non-diplomacy citations were in reference to weapons and dozens of reports of IED components which were manufactured in Iran. Additionally, there are references to smuggling routes for both trained fighters and weapons coming from Iran into Afghanistan. One record describes an alleged terrorist facilitator moving Al Qaeda personnel and other militants through Afghanistan to Iran.

Other tidbits:
November 2006: AQ (NFI) trained 30 women (NFI) to execute suicide attacks against all foreigners in AFGHANISTAN. The women trained at a base located in MIRALI/MIRAMSHAH/ PAKISTAN (NFI); they are Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs and Pakistanis. Seven of them are now located in KABUL (NFI) and they will execute suicide attacks against CF/ISAF (NFI).
Speaking of bombs, there were around 14,000 reports of IED encounters, which is an extremely worrisome number. Even allowing for the numerous false alarms, we're talking about IED production at a staggering level. With so many incidents, Darwin tells us that IED makers are learning a lot about what works and what doesn't, and the fittest who survive the war will be extraordinarily dangerous.

Fortunately, thus far, the IED production capacity has been pretty focused on the actual war/insurgency. But eventually we're going to be gone, or at least less engaged, and the survivors will turn their eyes in a systematic way to training foreigners or traveling abroad to ply their skills. We've been lucky that we haven't had a second Ramzi Yousef yet -- a super-competent bomb builder with both ambition and ancillary skills such as language and disguise. But we won't be lucky forever.

One of the memos records a non-combat meeting in November 2006 attended by military personnel during which a supposedly pro-government fatwa was read on the permissibility of killing Muslims.
a). First if some one kills Muslims, he should be revenged for

b). If a person is married and do have illegal sexual affairs with some one else, then he should be punished to death for that.

c). the third thing is if a Muslim convert to other religions, then he/she should be punished to death.

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Friday, July 23, 2010
 

Zachary Adam Chesser aka Abu Talha Al Amrikee Indictment

Here's the full document:

Zachary Chesser Indicment

My favorite comment on the arrest so far comes from Revolution Muslim founder Yousef Al Khattab (no longer involved with the site), who described Abu Talha's output on his blog as "Tourette's Dawa."

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Wednesday, July 21, 2010
 

Abu Talha al-Amrikee aka Zachary Chesser Arrested, South Park Creators Can Rest Easy

Aficionados of this site and your finer American Jihadist propaganda will be pleased to hear that Abu Talha al-Amrikee, aka Zach Chesser, has been arrested and charged with material support for terrorism after being intercepted on his way to Somalia to join Al Shabab.

Chesser (who reads this site) was bringing his baby boy along for the ride as "cover," and -- fellow jihobbyists take note -- it looks like he is spilling his guts to the FBI.

Chesser was most notorious for threatening the creators of South Park in respect to their "likely" demise should they show an image of the Prophet Mohammed. For more of Zach's greatest hits, see the links below.

  • Interview with Abu Talha posted on Al Maktaba blog

  • Counter-counter-counter terrorism: The writings of Abu Talha

  • South Park Threats

  • More South Park Threats

  • Al Qaeda North America on Twitter?

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    Wednesday, July 14, 2010
     

    Inspire, Abu Talha and More...

    A couple of short notes on recent buzz around the Web:

    OVERESTIMATING INSPIRE

    Coverage of AQAP's Inspire continues to disappoint, although it's improved since the full issue was posted. I continue to think this is not as much of a quantum leap forward as its reception might indicate. I suspect aspiring jihadists are more likely to burn down their moms' kitchens than create a successful bomb with the recipe provided in the magazine, and beyond that, there isn't much about Inspire that is groundbreaking.

    The magazine's graphic design has been praised by various reporters and analysts. Personally, I found it rather busy and distracting, not to mention undercutting the alleged serious-mindedness of the content. One thing is certain -- all the rave reviews guarantee we'll be getting a second issue, which was far from certain given the fiasco around its release.

    THE NEW BIN LADEN

    Inspire has also kicked off a minor flurry of attention for Awlaki including some retreads of the premise that has been kicking around for a while: Is Awlaki the new bin Laden?

    The answer to that is pretty easy. "No."

    First off, Awlaki's never seen actual combat, and frankly, I don't think he's the type. Bin Laden's military exploits may be greatly exaggerated, but they do, in fact, exist. Unless and until Awlaki gets out there with a machine gun, he's not likely to become the leader of what is essentially a military organization. He can be the spiritual head or a senior advisor, up to a point, but he's not blind, so he has no excuse for not fighting.

    Secondly, while everyone generally agrees Awlaki has become "operational," there is no evidence he has a head for operational details or tactics. Bin Laden is quite the opposite. He understands the value of planning, and he has been hands-on supervisor for some of Al Qaeda's greatest triumphs. He notoriously pointed out the weak points in the U.S. embassy in Nairobi during the planning of the East African Embassy bombings. Awlaki, so far, has directed a college student to set his pants on fire.

    Thirdly, he's American. Whether due to the local angle or unconscious bias, the fact of his American citizenship automatically causes the media to inflate his dangerousness.

    Of course, I am not saying Awlaki isn't dangerous or important. He's both of those things. But we need to keep him in perspective.

    ABU TALHA SPEAKS

    Speaking of people whose status benefits from media coverage, the always engrossing Al Maktaba blog has an interview with Abu Talha Al Amriki, aka Zach Chesser. Turns out the heat from the South Park death threat has driven the American jihad supporter into radio silence, at least as far as using his own name. When reading, keep in mind that Abu Talha has advised pro-jihad Muslims only to talk to us "counterterrorism analysts" in order to "feed them outright lies."

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    Sunday, July 11, 2010
     

    Full AQAP Inspire Issue Posted Online

    I am fighting deadlines today, but I wanted to make a couple of quick observations following on my earlier pieces.

  • Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 1 of 2
  • Coverage of AQ's "New English Magazine," 2 of 2

    First, and most important, if the editors of Inspire are to be believed, then Anwar Awlaki did play a direct role in the creation and production of Inspire. There is at least one article by Awlaki which is characterized as an original piece written for the magazine.

    So clarifying some earlier questions, the magazine is, at the least, formally endorsed by Awalki. I suspect we're still looking at a jihobbyist production, but as I noted earlier, Awlaki and AQAP's active role in the magazine does open the door to a "material support of terrorism" charge for any Americans who helped produce it.

    The most important article in AQAP Inspire is not Awlaki's fairly pedestrian article on the Danish cartoons, but a guide for aspiring Westerners about what to expect and how to prepare when you go to jihad overseas.

    The format still strongly resembles Jihad Recollections, but it seems to me the content is a bit more sophisticated and a bit more activist in terms of what it expects its readers to do after perusing the issue.

    Overall, I'm sticking with much of my earlier analysis of the magazine as cited above. I will say that the magazine is, in some ways, a step up from Al-Hussam in terms of its sophistication as a magazine. It's probably also an upgrade in terms of content, except for the impression that its main participants (writers of original articles and editors) appear to the reader's eye to be mostly noncombatants -- a category that includes Awlaki, I might add. Al-Hussam had tremendous credibility for its unpretentious style and links to actual fighters. In contrast, Inspire is a bit effete.

    That's all for now, but I may ring in with some additional thoughts later.

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    Monday, July 5, 2010
     

    AQAP Inspire Magazine Is Nothing New

    All this has happened before, and it will happen again. Despite the fact that so many in the media and government are only just discovering that jihadists are trying to recruit Westerners, these programs have been going on -- successfully -- for decades. There is nothing new about what AQAP Inspire is trying to do.

    As I noted earlier, Inspire is likely the product of online jihad enthusiasts rather than created by an active jihadist organization.

    In contrast, earlier examples, like the Al-Hussam newsletter shown below, were produced by jihadists with credibility, in this case the legitimate successor to Abdullah Azzam's Services Office, which stage-managed the Arab jihad against the Soviets. I've spent a lot of time with Al-Hussam and its modern counterparts as research for my forthcoming book on American jihadists.




    The difference between the 1980s, the 1990s and today is not so much a change in the jihadists. It's a change in media technology. Jihadists in the '80s and '90s distributed propaganda on videotape and paper newsletters.

    Jihadists today have access to sophisticated publishing software that can be purchased off the shelf, relatively inexpensive, and they don't need to print their product on paper (despite what NPR would have you think).

    More importantly, jihadists today have access to the Internet for distribution. This, more than anything, opens the door for amateur jihad enthusiasts to put out products like Inspire. Al-Hussam, in contrast, was put out by professional jihadists.

    Another difference, and an extremely important one, is that Al-Hussam had to be printed (which cost money), mailed (which cost money), or handed out at mosques, which cost money and also required approval from the mosque. Even 15 years ago, some mosques refused to allow this content and banned Al-Hussam from being distributed on their grounds. It would be an even tougher sell today.

    The total bill for printing and mailing Al-Hussam was significantly north of $1,000 per issue, and its reach was limited by the number of copies that were printed. The total bill for an issue of Inspire was probably zero dollars, and if not for the drama around its release, it could have reached an unlimited number of people.

    The Internet has served as a platform for jihadists for more than a decade, and while its use is ever-growing, it's not new. Inspire isn't new. None of this is new, and it's not really news.

    Now don't get me wrong. I am all in favor of using incremental developments like the release of the magazine to discuss the overall issue of jihadist propaganda in English and otherwise. And I am happy to do so, whether here or in interviews.

    But it should be an educated discussion, and not "Watch Out, Condé Nast: Al-Qaida Launches English-Language Lifestyle Mag." (Sorry, Danger Room.)

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    Friday, July 2, 2010
     

    Al Qaeda's New Magazine, Or Was It Web Site, Or Is It Really Al Qaeda? Or... Or...

    This week saw the debut of a new English-language magazine called "Inspire" and branded as coming from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or rather, the first three pages of such a magazine. I don't think I've ever seen such a crazy welter of bad coverage.

    To start with, dozens of news outlets began trumpeting Al Qaeda's new English-language "Web site" -- apparently an army of supposedly tech-savvy reporters and/or headline writers are unable to distinguish between PDF documents and Web sites. Apparently many major news outlets are also incapable of distinguishing between Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hint: Osama bin Laden is only directly involved with one of these groups. (At most.)

    Then, the real hand-wringing began (and continues today). Was it REALLY an Al Qaeda magazine or was it fake? Few of the reporters could answer that question because they were all afraid to open it and actually read the magazine. Turns out the PDF got corrupted or was parsed wrongly in the first place, so the file just had three pages and then a lot of alphanumeric junk. Reporters and jihadis alike leapt to the conclusion that the file was some sort of Trojan horse that would beam your sexual preferences directly to the CIA. (Hint: The author prepared the PDF on a Mac.)

    So reporters began not just reporting but analyzing a document they had not viewed, and which even if they had viewed it, they could basically only have read the cover and the table of contents. However, if they HAD read the three pages they might have noticed that it did not match their imaginings. Click here for the most egregious example of would-be analysis of a document that the analyst clearly had not even glanced at and the broader logic of which wouldn't stand up even if the actual magazine reflected the author's assumptions. (Hey, Max, in case you missed it, the "secretive" Ayman Al-Zawahiri and other top AQ leaders like Abu Yahya Al-Libi have written and distributed plenty of books online since 9/11, a publishing process which is identical to putting out this magazine.)

    Could it be a FAKE? Let's take a moment to consider what that even means. First off, no one except hyperbolic journalists are even claiming that this magazine was produced by Al Qaeda Central. (Spoiler Alert! That's the one with Osama bin Laden.) The only question here is:

  • Was the document produced by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula proper or by its online jihobbyist fans?
  • If the latter, did AQAP formally endorse the publication?
  • If none of the above, was the document created by the CIA or online terrorist hunters to serve as misinformation or a trap?

    The answers to these questions, in my opinion, are Jihobbyists, Maybe, and No.

    The table of contents pretty clearly indicates that the magazine consists mainly of transcripts of earlier communiques by celebrity jihadists such as Bin Laden and AQAP's own Anwar Awlaki. There is nothing in the table of contents which suggests new or original material by anyone important. Click here to see the TOC as an image if you are too terrified to find and open the PDF.

    The selection of authors (lots of celebs and relatively little from AQAP's main leaders) plus the fact that there doesn't seem to be any original material suggests that the person who assembled the magazine was not part of AQAP proper. In fact, the format of "Inspire" strongly resembles last year's "Jihad Recollections," composed by American jihadist blogger Samir Khan of North Carolina.

    So assuming it is not a trap, a point which I will not belabor because those who think it is a trap are unlikely to be swayed by anything I say, the main question is whether AQAP formally endorsed the publication or played any other role in its publication. And to be honest, there is really only one reason to care about that question -- "material support."

    When a lone American like Khan makes what is essentially a fan magazine about Al Qaeda, there is room for debate about whether he is exercising his first amendment rights. If an American like Khan is creating a magazine at the behest of AQAP or with its direct cooperation, that is material support for a terrorist organization, and as the Supreme Court recently ruled, exactly this kind of material support is appropriate for prosecution by the Justice Department.

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    ALERTS

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    Jihad Joe by J.M. BergerJihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, the new book by INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger, is now available in both Kindle and hardcover editions. Order today!

    Jihad Joe is the first comprehensive history of the American jihadist movement, from 1979 through the present. Click here to read more about the critical acclaim Jihad Joe has earned so far, including from the New York Times, Publisher's Weekly, Redstate.com and many more.

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