|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MENUHOMEDAILY BRIEF JIHAD JOE J.M. BERGER RECENT WORK MULTIFACETED MEDIA GROUP LINKSBlogs of WarFlashpoint Gunpowder & Lead Internet Haganah Jihadology Jihadica Long War Journal Making Sense of Jihad Registan Selected Wisdom Views from the Occident Waq-Al-Waq TAGSAmerican TerroristsAnwar Awlaki Al Qaeda AQAP American Al Qaeda Members Inspire Magazine Revolution Muslim OKBOMB |
News, analysis and primary source documents on terrorism, extremism and national security.Monday, August 29, 2011
An Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman Al NasserTerrorist use of the Internet is a hot topic these days, but it's often discussed in very broad terms, as if the Internet itself is the story, rather than the people who use it. Abu Suleiman Al Nasser is the alias used by one of the self-professed cyber-jihadists who frequent online message boards used by Islamist terrorists and Al Qaeda sympathizers. Al Nasser has a knack for making headlines. He first came to the attention of journalists and terrorism analysts after the December 2010 suicide bombing in Stockholm. Al Nasser posted information about the identity of the bomber, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, before it became widely available in the media. Since then, Al Nasser has maintained a prolific presence online, posting a seemingly unending series of threats against European countries and other Western targets on the most important online forums used by Al Qaeda supporters and sympathizers. He has also posted what appear to be mostly aspirational ideas for terrorist attacks and tactics. Last month, Al Nasser returned to the headlines when he prematurely claimed the car bombing of government buildings in downtown Oslo on behalf of the "Supporters of the Global Jihad" – a claim he had to walk back just a few hours later, when it became clear that the bomber was a right-wing, anti-Muslim Norwegian citizen. Al Nasser recently approached me casually through a social media service online. I proposed an e-mail interview and he agreed to answer questions and to verify his identity through the forum he most often frequents. Aside from his identity as the forum participant in question, no aspect of his story could be independently verified. This is simply the story he chooses to tell about himself and why he does what he does. I believe his story is a useful tool for understanding part of the online jihadist movement, but the account should be read with a cautious and skeptical eye. I have taken liberties to clean up Al Nasser's English for publication, reviewing specific sections with him to insure accuracy. Those interested in his original, unedited language can click here to learn more. "I am from a simple Muslim family," Al Nasser writes, "and I can say that my life changed beginning with Al Qaeda." Citing the need to protect his identity, he did not provide specific details about his early life. Al Nasser grew up closely following news about Palestinian Muslims as they were "killed by Jews," in his words. These stories made him angry, he writes, but he was not moved to action until the United States invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq. From a distance, he admired figures like Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri. "Around that time, I got to know many jihadist leaders, like Abu Musab Al Suri," Al Nasser writes. Al Suri is an Al Qaeda theorist who developed ideas for "individual jihad," the concept that the future of terrorism lies with diffuse networks and lone-wolf attackers rather than with a strongly centralized organization. Al Nasser says he met Al Suri just once. "And I decided after that to be part of the jihad." Al Nasser says that he was in a hurry to join the fight, traveling to an unspecified "jihad country" where he was quickly arrested by American forces. He says he eventually left U.S. custody, but did not specify whether he was released or escaped. "I was lucky to get free from them," Al Nasser says. "That made me settle down for a time and start to study at the subject of jihad" including both religious aspects and the strengths and weaknesses of various jihadist movements. Al Nasser believes the ideology of Al Qaeda is indistinguishable from Islam, and he brushes aside the hundreds of millions of Muslims who strongly disagree. He strenuously justifies jihadist violence based on Western military actions against Muslim countries, claiming again and again that Western military provocations are the reason that terrorists target civilians without remorse. "Attacks on civilians are limited and [subject to] hard rules," he writes. "If we do it against some country that could be because of our right to treat the enemy the same way he treats us. If he kills our children, we kill his children, and if he kills our women, we kill his women. And as long as the invaders are still in Iraq and Afghanistan, we keep our right to attack the civilians." But it does not take much probing to expand this circle of violence. "The term jihad is known for every Muslim, but some Muslims think it is defensive only and just to free our countries, and that is not true," he writes. "Most of the jihad nowadays is defensive, because many Muslim countries have been invaded…. So up until now, it looks defensive, but is that what we want? Do we stop then [if the need for defense is over]? The answer is no." According to Al Nasser, violent jihad is also required to establish the rule of Islamic law in Muslim lands, to ensure that Muslims around the world are free to proselytize to non-Muslims, and to avenge insults to the prophets of Islam. "Non-Muslims can insult us or any other Muslims by words, and we could not fight for that," Nasser writes. "We will use peace in dealing with this, or just respond to them by words to defend our religion. But there are red lines in Islam that we cannot accept anyone crossing, like insulting our prophet or any of the other prophets." Despite this, Al Nasser believes "attacks" through "media or laws" can be justifiably met by violence, such as the Danish cartoons insulting the Prophet Mohammed or the French law banning Muslim women from wearing burkas. These issues are "easy" to resolve "if there are people within governments who believe in peace and who give the people their freedom," Al Nasser says. "We are not bloodthirsty, and we don't search for wars, but we fight in response to what happens. […] What we want is not how much we kill, but we want to reach our goals," he writes. After hearing his extensive justifications for violence against civilians for even simple verbal insults, I asked Al Nasser to go further and tell me how he felt about the violence. Did he regret it or celebrate it? What did he feel when he watched the violent jihadist videos that circulate through the online forums? "It makes me proud to see what the enemy of Islam gets by the hands of mujahideen," Al Nasser says. "And to be honest and more exact about my feelings, when I see video of operations done by mujahideen, I can say it is an exciting feeling and I feel encouraged to do the same." "I do not regret to see those enemies die," he continues. "They deserve that because of not listening to what we say. No jihadist groups make operations without warnings first. And you can say warnings first and second and third, because we keep every day telling them why we fight and who we will fight. But if the enemy does not listen and keeps on his way, what we can do then?" Al Nasser says his spree of online threats and claims of responsibility are part of this warning process. In the case of the Stockholm bombing, he says he knew the bomber, Taimour al-Abdaly, through an online connection but never met him face-to-face. In the wake of the bombing, he posted additional threats against NATO member countries in an audio communiqué. The threats, he says, were not intended to represent any specific organization but the Al Qaeda movement. In July, he posted a claim of responsibility on behalf of jihadists soon after the bombing in downtown Oslo, which was later revealed to be the work of Anders Breivik, an anti-Muslim activist. "I had no connection to the Norway attack, but I did write a post [on the Shamukh message board], because I thought it was al Qaeda who did it, because he used same [tactics] as al Qaeda does in operations, meaning the car bomb," Al Nasser writes. "So I thought at that time, let me write a post as initial hint of why that happened, because I do not want people think we fight just to kill for no reason," he says. "I wanted to say to them why Norway was a target for al Qaeda, and I gave the reasons, the same reasons that al Qaeda would say if they had done it." After news reports picked up his claim and subsequent reports indicated that Al Qaeda was not likely behind the attacks, Al Nasser adapted his postings to continue drumming his point home. In his mind, such messaging is a critical part of the work of jihadism. However, he says, the threats he posted were not meant to be understood as emanating from a specific organization. Al Nasser considers himself a "member" of Al Qaeda by virtue of their shared ideology, but he does not claim to be part of the organization. "I am not a leader in Al Qaeda or talking for them, but I consider myself a member of Al Qaeda and the new generation of jihadists," he writes. Following the guidance of Abu Musab Al Suri, he says that he heads a small group called Supporters of the Global Jihad. "My organization, the Supporters of the Global Jihad, is for everyone. Everyone can be a supporter to the global jihad. By spreading our thoughts and the Islamic view of our jihad, we can get more Muslims in the work," he writes. "We mostly call for lone-wolf operation, or operations by small groups of jihadists. That is because we know well that the number of members in the group affects the organization's security, and that can cause the failure of months or even years of work," Al Nasser says. The organization's work is mainly encouraging such operations and providing financial or propaganda support to fighters in other theaters. This has led some European media outlets and terrorism analysts such as Jarret Brachman to dismiss Al Nasser as a "hoaxer" or a "nutter" who lacks credibility. But while Al Nasser says he does not mean to imply a personal role in the attacks he "claims," he does hope his postings will lead to real-world consequences and says he sometimes takes concrete steps to make that happen (his claim could not be verified). "That work requires some simple, indirect connections to the mujahideen in Afghanistan or Somalia or other countries, to give them hints from time to time," he says. "For example, that was what I was doing when I called for attacks against Swedish and Finnish troops in Afghanistan [after the Stockholm attacks]. I did contact at that time some brothers connected to the Taliban, and after that some operations started in Mazar-e-Sharif , which it is one of the hardest places to work for the jihadists." For more about online jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Abu-Suleiman-al-Nasser, Internet, Jihadist-Forums, Leaderless-Jihad
Sunday, August 21, 2011
Hyping The Terrorist Internet: The "You Name It" ProblemAs most readers know, I have a healthy respect for the dangers of terrorist use of the Internet. But at the same time, I think U.S. media and policymakers tend to oversell the impact and uniqueness of how Al Qaeda and its admirers and adherents use the Web.While reading Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda it occurred to me that this is the "You Name It" Problem. "General Abizaid was the Centcom commander and he essentially felt like we were losing daily, not just the broader battle of ideas, but we were losing the war in Iraq and Afghanistan because the way the terrorists dominate in either putting out beheadings or you just name it," said a counterterrorism official involved in the discussions.A paragraph or two later, Abaizaid is quoted directly: Yet when you looked at the enemy, the enemy was moving in the cyberspace world in a way that allowed them to recruit, train, organize, equip, proselytize, educate -- you name it! -- conduct intelligence operations."Recruit, train, organize, equip, proselytize, educate -- you name it! -- conduct intelligence operations" is actually just "recruit, train, equip and conduct intelligence operations" when you remove redundancies. Serious, yes, but a shorter list. Meanwhile, the phrase "you name it" is designed to invoke all manner of mysterious goings-on that we are encouraged not to actually name, so that they can remain mysterious. The vast majority of work and activity taking place on extremist forums is the same activity that extremist networks engage in offline. The Internet is a magnifier and accelerator, as it is in other aspects of life, but it has not, for the most part, fundamentally changed the work of extremism. Some things are easier, like exposing people to various sorts of training manuals in dangerous techniques. Other things are harder, like ensuring that recruits are actually competent to perform dangerous techniques. Inspire magazine is a terrorist magazine just like dozens of its predecessors. It's not something fundamentally new, it's just being distributed more efficiently and at lower cost. We need to be concerned about the ways that Internet use expands the reach and speed of terrorist organizations, but we also need to stay grounded, understand the basics and describe them in clear and concrete ways. During a recent conversation about the Internet as a "driver" of radical activities, I pointed out that terrorists used printed newsletters and magazines before there was an Internet. Yet no one talks about the role of paper in driving extremist activities. The Internet is an important tool, but it's just a tool. We should be talking about WHAT extremists are doing online, rather than marveling at the fact they are doing it ONLINE. For more about Internet radicalization, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: Domestic-Extremism, Internet, Jihadist-Forums, Radicalization
Friday, August 19, 2011
Finding A Way Forward For CVEI recently came across an interesting discussion on an extremist Internet forum about a particular brand of ideology and whether it had outlived its usefulness. The discussion continued for more than 130 pages (when rendered as a PDF), and it was a fascinating look at how extremist ideologies can decay and even collapse.As I've said before, I am not a fan of the idea of government policies for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). But I recognize the desire for such strategies and approaches, and I continue to think about the issue in an effort to find ways to contribute something positive rather than complain from the sidelines. With this recent example in mind, I went back and revisited the Obama administration's new "strategy" for fighting violent extremism. I found myself thinking about goals and end states for counterradicalization programs. Part of the problem I have with the President's plan and others I have encountered has to do with their goals. WRONG CVE GOALS 1. Make good citizens 2. Instill values 3. Create community or government partners 4. Actively address or remove grievances 5. Change underlying beliefs I outlined most of my objections to these goals in a previous post and one before that. The short version is that I think it's devilishly difficult to tell people how to think, especially when those people are already suspicious of you. The goals above smack of social engineering and manipulation. Manipulation is what the bad guys do. It shouldn't be what we do, even if it was likely to work, which it's not. That doesn't mean we have to sit idly by and ignore centers of radicalization, such as online forums, groups within communities, or within formal terrorist and extremist networks here and abroad. We just need goals that are more realistic and that reflect what actually happens when people abandon violent extremism. To that end, I suggest that we want would-be violent extremists to arrive at the following end-states: RIGHT GOALS – The Five Ds 1. Discouraged 2. Disillusioned 3. Divided 4. Doubt-filled 5. Directionless Discouraged means that would-be extremists believe they cannot achieve the goal of promoting or institutionalizing their ideology. Most -- but not all -- people will be reluctant to take action if they believe that action is pointless or purely symbolic. Disillusioned means that they have lost faith in specific leaders and co-ideologists whom would-be extremists see as failing to live up to the ideals they espouse. It's important to keep in mind that while violent ideologies seem negative to those of us on the outside looking in, adherents seem themselves as idealists and utopians. A disillusioned idealist creates powerful negative energy within a community. Divided is an obviously desirable trait. The more disagreement and paranoia fester within a group of people, the less capable that group is of collective action. There are multiple lines of disagreement that can be opened and aggravated by strategic government policies and disruptive psychological operations. Doubt is one of the most powerful emotions we can experience as humans, and it saps the will to take dramatic or extreme action. Doubt can apply very broadly within extremist communities -- it can mean doubt about particular elements of the ideology, doubts about co-ideologists' sincerity or intelligence, doubts about the pragmatism of the movement's goals, or doubts about the safety of forums in which extremist conversations are held. Doubt is an element of the first three goals, and can also be a goal unto itself. The important thing to remember is that there is great utility in planting seeds of doubt that deter action, as opposed to trying to uproot an entire existing worldview and replace it with a new one. Directionlessness is the final piece of the puzzle. Even if extremists manage to overcome the first four Ds to remain committed and unified, differences over strategic direction can render them paralyzed. This is a particularly tricky area for government to meddle in -- namely because there is always a risk of pushing individuals or the collective into a specific direction. I suspect it is better to look at directionlessness as a barometer for success rather than as a tactical goal. Aside from the considerations I have written about previously, this approach has a couple of specific advantages. All other considerations aside, it's simply easier to destroy than it is to create. And most CVE discussions are about creating positive communities by targeting people who have not yet been radicalized rather than disrupting extremist communities as they exist. Perhaps more importantly, the Five Ds approach is not exclusive to Muslim radicalization. For all that people talk about not singling Muslims out for corrective actions, the fact is that the President's CVE prescription and most others I have encountered target Muslims very specifically and call for tactics of engagement which cannot realistically be applied to, say, white supremacists or pedophiliac religious cults. Remember that online conversation I mentioned at the top, the one that got me thinking about this again? It was found on a white supremacist forum. Disruption has the potential to work with any kind of extremism, and it's essential that any CVE policy we undertake be flexible enough to deal with threats from all quarters. For more about radicalization and American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: CVE, Domestic-Extremism, Radicalization
Thursday, August 18, 2011
Oklahoma City Bombing: FBI Informants Reported on ABC News, McVeigh Defense TeamFBI informants reporting on the Oklahoma City bombing provided the bureau with leads taken from ABC News and Timothy McVeigh's defense team, according to documents filed in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.A confidential informant in the St. Louis, Missiouri, area "learned of the following information as a result of interviews and contacts made by the ABC News team covering OKBOMB," the FBI's code name for the investigation, according to an FBI FD-302 record dated April 3, 1996. The informant said government documents including "telephone records and grand jury information" had been "leaked" to attorneys for both Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirator, Terry Nichols. The informant said the information was "being used to fuel belief that a government conspiracy exists to 'cover up' government mistakes," the document states, including information indicating that the goverment was warned of the April 19, 1995 attack ten days in advance. The material was being used to bolster claims that "the government had a confidential informant next to McVeigh." The informant also provided information on reporting by the late J.D. Cash regarding the bombing and the possibility of additional conspirators. According to the document, the informant also provided information on gun dealer Roger Moore and German neo-Nazi Andreas Strassmeier, both of whom have been the subject of scrutiny for their relationships to McVeigh and possible roles in the bombing plot. According to the informant, "some right-wing group supporters believe [Strassmeier] is an FBI informant." A second document from the same informant again provided information learned "as a result of interviews and contacts made by the ABC News Team covering OKBOMB" related to Elohim City, a white supremacist compound in rural Oklahoma where Strassmeier lived and worked as security director. A third document identifies a numbered informant in Oklahoma who claimed to be alerting the FBI to a planned ABC expose concerning the bombing. This informant was relaying information from "a confidential source who works for a news agency." A fourth document from April 16, 1996, was previously released and identifies a numbered FBI informant based in New York who was "a senior official employed by ABC News for over fifteen years." This informant was pressured into revealing the name of a ABC News source -- Vincent Cannistraro -- who had provided information pointing to overseas involvement in the attack. This informant was later allegedly identified as Christopher Isham, who denied providing information to the FBI. The complete set of new Oklahoma City bombing documents were filed as support for a sweeping motion that details the FBI's noncompliance with previous court orders regarding disclosure of documents related to the Oklahoma City bombing. Salt Lake City attorney Jesse Trentadue sued the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to the Oklahoma City bombing after his brother, Kenneth, was found dead in a federal prison cell soon after the bombing. Trentadue won a wrongful death suit against the Bureau of Prisons for covering up key details of his brother's death, which the Bureau claimed was a suicide. Documents previously disclosed as part of the lawsuit can be found here, here and here. Labels: Andreas-Strassmeir, Informants, Jesse-Trentadue, OKBOMB, Oklahoma-City-Bombing, Roger-Moore, Terry-Nichols, Timothy-McVeigh
Monday, August 15, 2011
Unlocking 9/11: A Collection of Primary Source Documents on September 11To mark the upcoming 10th anniversary of September 11, I have collected scores of 9/11 Commission and declassified State Department and FBI documents concerning the attacks at a new Web site, Unlocking911.com. The most recent additions can always be found here.The site will repost material from INTELWIRE and new documents will be added to the archive as the anniversary approaches. There will be a special focus on material related to Americans who may have played a role in assisting the attacks. For even more about the role of Americans in the September 11 attacks, check out my new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere and on Kindle. Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, American-Al-Qaeda, September-11
Thursday, August 11, 2011
Listening to Anwar AwlakiI have a new piece in Foreign Policy on Anwar Awlaki:On Tuesday, Aug. 9, Naser Abdo, an American soldier, was indicted for plotting a terrorist attack against soldiers stationed at Fort Hood -- just the latest in a series of U.S. citizens who have been inspired to violence by the words of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American imam who went rogue and today threatens the United States from his father's country of Yemen.Click here for the full story For more than 10,000 words of additional perspective on Awlaki, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Anwar-Awlaki, Foreign-Policy, Jihad-Joe
Saturday, August 6, 2011
Jihad Joe, The New Book On American Jihadists, Now Available For Kindle My new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale at bookstores everywhere, is now available in a Kindle Edition. Buy it now! Here's a look at some of the substantial critical acclaim Jihad Joe has received since its release: "J. M. Berger's "Jihad Joe," a sober, factual account of the Americans who have been lured to the cause of religious violence, offers a useful reminder that this phenomenon is nothing new, long predating the Sept. 11 attacks. ... At a time when some politicians and pundits blur the line between Islam and terrorism, Berger, who knows this subject far better than the demagogues, sharply cautions against vilifying Muslim Americans. ... It is a timely warning from an expert who has not lost his perspective." Scott Shane, The New York Times | Full review "Berger's work is detail-packed and focused, and a useful resource for that reason alone. But it is also and specifically the work of someone who has read and talked with and listened to the people he is writing about, and his work carries their voices embedded in his own commentary. It thus joins such works as Jessica Stern's Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill and Mark Juergensmeyer's similarly named and similarly excellent Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. ... Berger's is a book to read, certainly -- and more significantly perhaps, a book to admire." Charles Cameron, Zenpundit.com | Full review "How these American jihadists became radicalized, recruited and trained, and the types of terrorist activities they conducted (and still engage in) whether abroad or in America, constitute the core of Mr. Berger’s important book. ... Mr. Berger’s comprehensive list - one of the most exhaustive I’ve found in any book on this subject... those who have fought the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan, been present at the founding of al Qaeda, and fought as jihadists in Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia and Yemen." Joshua Sinai, The Washington Times | Full review "Berger lifts the veil on the phenomenon of American jihadists in this timely and chilling examination. ... Drawing on detailed case studies of individual American jihadists, the author concludes that they are a diverse group and their "path to radicalization begins with a rock-solid belief that Muslims are a victim class. ... Berger's exposé painstakingly lays out the scope and character of the American jihadist movement and points the way to a national debate on solutions." -Publisher's Weekly | Full review "The book's journalistic language makes it an easy read... the better choice for those seeking journalism that is more objective and somewhat broader and deeper in scope." Library Journal | Full review "A fascinating journey into the rise, expansion, and future of American jihadism. J. M. Berger goes beyond the Awlaki mania to investigate firsthand the changing nature of the terrorist threat to the United States." -Jean-Charles Brisard, former chief investigator, 9/11 families' lawsuits "Jihad Joe is a hell of a book -- authoritatively reported, well sourced, and painstakingly researched. This is required reading for anyone seeking to understand the true nature of the terrorist threat that confronts us. -Josh Meyer, former terrorism/national security reporter, Los Angeles Times, and director of education and outreach, Medill National Security Journalism Initiative, Northwestern University "What J.M. did exceedingly well is bring together not only the stories [of American jihadists], but also a little empirical research on all of the issues and phenomena we're tracking. And that's really important, really significant. It brings some of the art with the science. It's very comprehensively put together." Frank Cilluffo, Homeland Security Policy Institute | Video of book discussion "J.M. Berger's Jihad Joe is a timely MUST READ. It provides the first comprehensive background and analysis on Americans joining the jihadi movement over the past thirty years. It adds to the growing body of literature on the jihadi phenomenon and offers new research that better contextualizes the current rise of American involvement in the jihadi movement. Most importantly, Jihad Joe, unlike many recent works, is non-partisan and non-political. The methodical research speaks for itself, which is reassuring in an over-politicized environment." -Aaron Y. Zelin, curator of Jihadology.net | Zelin interview with Berger "A must-read insight into America's Muslim 'holy warriors.' ... Jihad Joe is meticulously researched and refreshingly free of rhetoric." -David Hebditch, documentary filmmaker and coauthor of How To Stage A Military Coup Labels: Bosnia
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Who Really Inspired Nasser Abdo?New details continue to emerge regarding Nasser Abdo, the would-be terrorist who was arrested before he could carry out an attack on military personnel stationed at Fort Hood.Abdo's own words indicate he was inspired by Nidal Hasan, the Army major and devotee of Anwar Awlaki who killed 13 people in a shooting spree in November 2009. And a search of his hotel room revealed he was also reading Inspire magazine, which is published by Awlaki and his followers and urges Americans to take up "individual jihad" by plotting solitary attacks. But here's something else to consider. Abdo, it now appears, was planning to carry out a complex attack using a bomb, in combination with a shooting attack, while wearing a fake military uniform. Just days earlier, Norwegian right-winger Anders Breivik had carried out a complex attack that combined a bomb with a shooting spree, employing a fake police uniform in the process. Breivik's attack was carried out July 22. Abdo didn't purchase the guns and other supplies for his attack until July 27. We don't know enough to draw any firm conclusions here, but I will be very curious to see how the timeline of Abdo's alleged attack plays out as his court case progresses. One of the worrisome things about Breivik's spectacular terrorist attack is that its most successful features are relatively easy to emulate compared to the work of a bomb design genius like Ramzi Yousef, or expensive and complicated attacks like September 11 which require a robust support network. My concern is that Breivik has provided a "proof of concept" not previously seen in the terrorist world, which shows terrorists of any ideology just how much impact one person can have. Could Abdo have been moved closer to action by this example? We don't have enough information to be certain, but it's a provocative -- and worrying -- question. For much more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: Anders-Behring-Breivik, Anwar-Awlaki, Fort-Hood, Inspire-Magazine, Nasser-Abdo, Nidal-Malik-Hasan, Oslo
White House Strategy On Violent Extremism: Full Of Sound And Muted FuryThe first thing that leaps out at you when you read the strategy to "prevent violent extremism" rolled out by the White House yesterday is the extraordinarily high ratio of words to ideas. In a document with only eight pages of text, one finds very little content.There are very few action verbs to be found, and absolutely no research cited in support of the documents many underlying assumptions. The concept of fighting the radicalization of Americans at the "idea" level has grabbed Washington by the throat, and there is precious little prospect that it will loosen its grip any time soon. At virtually every level of government, people and teams have been tasked to battling radicalization. The White House document reflects much of the conversation about radicalization inside the Beltway. Everyone urgently believes that something has to be done, but no one is quite sure exactly what. And the current bipartisan philosophy of American government emphasizes immediate action over considered strategy in any given situation. What little remains after deleting the torrent of unfocused rumination runs into many of the problems I have previously identified with counter-radicalization at the government level. To its credit, the White House strategy document acknowledges several of these issues. Unfortunately, its response is to soldier on anyway. There are a handful of basic proposals here. One section calls for "Enhancing Federal Engagement with and Support to Local Communities that May be Targeted by Violent Extremists. "Targeted" here means "targeted for recruitment," which should have been clearer. This section makes no mention of the word "Muslim," which was a deliberate but misleading choice by the White House which I will address later on. Under this heading, the White House lays out a very broad range of possible problems in communities which should be addressed under the theory that they somehow contribute to radicalization. These include "jobs, education, health, and civil rights." There is no evidence that the first three factors substantially contribute to radicalization. If I am understanding the document correctly, the idea is that engaging at-risk communities with these services is important because it means those communities are not ONLY interacting with the government as the subject of investigations. In other words, the federal government should be Nurturing Mother, in addition to its roles as Disciplinarian Father and Watchful Big Brother. Another section calls for "building expertise" in preventing violent extremism. I would be interested to know who has such expertise, because there aren't many successful initiatives in this space to which one can point. The bright spot in this section is the following sentence: Misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm our security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners. We also are working to support and expand community oriented policing efforts by our state, local, and tribal partners, and to assist them in enhancing cultural proficiency and other foundations for effective community engagementThat is jargonese for "no more Walid Shoebats and Robert Spencers training law enforcement," which is a good, if obvious, move. Under the heading "Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda While Promoting Our Ideals," the White House puts forth a fairly confused set of principles which don't seem to move the needle much. Again, the obvious point is the most successful here -- continuing to communicate through government messaging that the U.S. is not at war with Islam. Of course, that theme has been a constant element of our messaging for a decade now, and yet it still finds plenty of traction for reasons that are the subject of another analysis on another day. Promises to focus on communicating "clearly about al-Qa’ida’s destructive and bankrupt ideology" presume that government understands this ideology well and how it contributes to violence by extremists, which is a pretty questionable presumption. Under the guiding principles, a series of bold-face statements really begin to get into the weeds of concepts that don't work and/or are likely to become political hot potatoes. For instance, there is an assertion (expanding on the element noted above) that providing social services to communities can help prevent radicalization. Ask Norway how that approach is working out for them. And I repeat, there is absolutely no hard evidence to suggest jobs, health care or education are statistically significant factors in radicalization. What studies do exist suggest just the opposite -- that these issues have no meaningful impact on the problem. The principles also touch on the question of civil liberties and civil rights. Unlike the aforementioned, there is some support for this as a factor in radicalization based on what radicals tell us in their own words. I explore this more fully in my book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam. Unfortunately, this issue isn't as cut and dried as one might hope. Civil rights are sometimes part of the fabric of what leads someone to violence, but not always, and how radicals perceive their civil rights in America does not always correspond to the reality of their civil rights. This is also a topic for more detailed discussion another day. The guiding principles end with some uplifting talk about what should not be considered part of the violent extremism paradigm. The statements as formulated are correct (i.e., opposing U.S. policy doesn't make you a violent extremist), but they also smack of artificial limitations on how we should talk about this issue, which are probably not helpful. While opposing U.S. policies doesn't make you a violent extremist, most violent extremists do oppose U.S. policy, so it's not exactly a non-issue here. All of these points are orbiting a central problem with the approach outlined in the White House strategy, which is that it is focused on the poorly defined problem of "violent extremism" rather than the clearly defined problem of "violence by extremists." While it might appealing to fight the "ism" as the perceived source of the "ist," we're talking (to some extent) about the same distinction the Obama Administration made between a war on terrorism and a war against terrorists. The administration chose the "ist" over the "ism" in that calculation, and the same general principle applies here. Stopping those who attempt to commit violence is an achievable goal. Stopping the ideas that fuel violence is not. If Al Qaeda's ideology is "bankrupt," it will collapse in the free market of ideas and become even more isolated on the fringes of society than it already is. Our role as a society is to hold the line responsibly until that collapse in complete and avoid playing the role of "enemy of Islam" that Al Qaeda has written out for us. On that front, a final note: The White House sought to stress that the principles in this document are not focused primarily on Muslims but can be applied to all sorts of violent extremism. I am hard-pressed to see how this strategy of engagement and community relations could be applied to white supremacists or the sovereign citizen movement. And Al Qaeda ideology is the only ideology discussed in the report. The report explicitly states that efforts to fight extremism should not isolate communities as targets of government scrutiny. If that's really the goal, the White House should try to produce a product in this space that isn't transparently targeting Muslim extremism above all else. Or even better, they can make the credible, non-religious, non-bigoted case for why Al Qaeda-related extremism deserves a special focus compared to other forms of extremism (primarily their emphasis on mass casualty attacks). Make the case and be blunt about it. There's more than a whiff of hypocrisy in this document, and that smell easily ruins the bouquet. For more about the radicalization of Americans, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: Counterterrorism, CVE, Domestic-Extremism, President-Obama, Radicalization, White-House
Monday, August 1, 2011
Is Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Uninspired? I have a slideshow up on the Huffington Post which offers side-by-side comparisons of pages from Inspire Magazine, the new English-language project from Anwar Awlaki and Samir Khan, two Americans associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "Inspire" is only the latest in a long line of jihadist and terrorist magazines in English and Arabic. While it does break some ground, its originality has been vastly overstated. Here's a look at some of its venerable but less celebrated predecessors.View the slideshow For more about Inspire, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere. Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan
|
ALERTSJIHAD JOE Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, the new book by INTELWIRE's J.M. Berger, is now available in both Kindle and hardcover editions. Order today!
Jihad Joe is the first comprehensive history of the American jihadist movement, from 1979 through the present. Click here to read more about the critical acclaim Jihad Joe has earned so far, including from the New York Times, Publisher's Weekly, Redstate.com and many more. RECENTNewest posts!Ex-Marine Yonathan Melaku Pleads Guilty, Jihadist ... Witness: Dennis Mahon claimed he was third man in ... Florida Jihadist Planned Norway-Style Synchronized... What Tarek Mehanna Isn't Anwar Al-Awlaki Video Release Rehashes 2010 "Messa... Monsters and Children: How Politicians Talk About ... Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military: Resources For Jour... Nasser Al-Awlaki Blasts U.S. For Killing of Son an... Kevin Harpham Sentencing Exhibits Zawahiri Calls For Release of American Jihadist El... NEWS NOWEXCLUSIVESNew York Pipe Bomb Suspect Linked to Revolution Muslim The Utility of Lone Wolves Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman Al Nasser A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds How Terrorists Use The Internet: Just Like You PATCON: The FBI's Secret War on the Militia Movement Interview About Jihad With Controversial Cleric Bilal Philips Forgeries on the Jihadist Forums U.S. Gave Millions To Charity Linked To Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki State Department Secretly Met With Followers of Blind Sheikh State Department Put 'Political Pressure' On FBI To Deport Brother-in-Law Of Osama Bin Laden In 1995 FBI Records Reveal Details Of Nixon-Era Racial Profiling Program Targeting Arabs Gaza Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia War U.S. Had 'High Confidence' Of UBL Attack In June 2001 Behind the Handshake: The Rumsfeld-Saddam Meeting |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
