Anwar Awlaki Killed

The most wanted American in Al Qaeda, Anwar Al Awlaki, was reportedly killed in Yemen.

The details of his death are uncertain, and this is not the first time he has been reported killed.

So far, three claims have surfaced. First, that Awlaki was killed in a drone strike. Second, that he was killed by a Special Operations raid of some sort. Third, that he was killed by air strikes by either the Yemeni or U.S. governments.

J.M. Berger for Foreign Policy: Gone But Not Forgotten, Awlaki's Legacy

Awlaki was, in many ways, a unique figure in the jihadist pantheon. Born in the United States and raised mostly in Yemen, he was fluent in both English and Arabic. He rose to prominence as a mainstream Muslim speaker, winning substantial acclaim for his translation and commentary on stories from the Quran and hadith.

Awlaki was rightfully praised for his command of American idiom and ability to process Islamic content for Western audiences by drawing on his knowledge of Western pop culture. But his real strength as a preacher was storytelling. Awlaki took stories from ancient sources and embellished them, breathing live into tales that had often been passed down only in skeletal form.

His mainstream success accentuated the danger created by his public shift to extremism. Awlaki was widely loved by English-speaking Muslims around the world. The evidence strongly suggests that he was involved in extremist networks even as a young man, but to the public, he was the very face of devotional Islam. He was cited in U.S. media for his moderate statements even as he made much more radical statements behind closed doors.

In 2000 and 2001, Awlaki and his followers provided significant assistance to at least three of the September 11 hijackers, helping them find apartments, drive around the country and obtain IDs suitable for use in boarding an airplane. The evidence suggests this help was provided knowing that the men were Al Qaeda operatives, if not with specific knowledge of the plot. One of the hijackers described Awlaki as "a great man" and his "spiritual leader."

From 2002 on, Awlaki became a case study for how not to handle a suspected terrorist. Misstep after misstep from both government and media helped catapult Awlaki into global prominence as an extremist.

In October 2002, the U.S. arrested Awlaki while he was entering the country after traveling overseas but released him almost immediately under murky circumstances. Had he been arrested and prosecuted then, it might have saved American lives.

Awlaki left the country immediately after this near miss. His lectures became more and more overtly radical. Followers who had joined him for stories of the Islamic prophets could follow him as he "thought aloud" about the relationship between the West and Islam and concluded that they were fatally incompatible.

In 2004, Awlaki returned to Yemen, issuing his most famous extremist work, "Constants on the Path of Jihad." Although Constants is often attributed to Awlaki, it was not his original work. Based on an Arabic essay by one of the founders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the six hour lecture series outlined a strong argument in favor of jihad. Although Awlaki presented himself only as the translator, he extensively expanded on the original text, making it significantly more accessible and emotional. At least dozens of arrested extremists have listened to the lectures for inspiration.

Awlaki was arrested by Yemeni authorities in 2007 on the pretext of having given a fatwa approving a kidnapping by local militants. By most accounts, he emerged from prison even more heavily radicalized. Soon after, Awlaki created a blog where he praised jihadist groups such as Al Shabab. In 2009, he praised American military officer Nidal Hassan for killing American soldiers in a shooting spree at Fort Hood. Soon after, Awlaki was implicated as the teacher and guide to Omar Farouk Abdulmuttallab, who tried to bomb a Detroit-bound plane at Christmas with explosives smuggled on board in his underwear.

Awlaki also used e-mail to inspire and sometimes direct plots. He was among the most accessible and Internet-savvy extremists, personally corresponding with several suspects who were later arrested on various charges of terrorism.

A number of things happened after that. The United States leaked that Awlaki had been added to the CIA's authorized list of targets for assassination. That immediately led Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to issue a statement that the organization would defend Awlaki to the death. Soon after, AQAP issued a video interview with Awlaki in which he openly embraced Al Qaeda and its ideology, and soon after that, Awlaki issued an explicit call for Muslims living in the West to kill Americans under any circumstance.

Awlaki's standing in the jihadist world exploded in the wake of these developments, which were at least accelerated (if not wholly provoked) by the leak about Awlaki's targeting. Prior to the leak, Awlaki was someone with wide influence among Western extremists but without clear credibility among hardcore jihadists.

After the leak, Awlaki became public enemy number one. The media anointed Awlaki a "senior leader" or even "the top leader" of AQAP, a claim which was presented without evidence and which flew in the face of established reporting on AQAP's leadership.

Although some were skeptical of Awlaki having any role at all with AQAP, credible reports did support the view that Awlaki had become part of the group. Abdulmutallab reported being trained by Awlaki and the bomb in his underwear matched those created by AQAP's senior explosive expert. A subsequent bomb plot linked to Awlaki, the UPS bomb plot of 2010, also carried the technical hallmarks of AQAP. Reports from Australian media also described sightings of Awlaki at AQAP training camps.

On being adopted by AQAP, Awlaki stopped issuing audio and video in English, abandoning his most effective tool for inspiring violence, but he continued to issue statements in Arabic. More importantly, he oversaw the production of Inspire magazine, an English-language propaganda publication distributed online.

Inspire was the brainchild of American extremist Samir Khan (reportedly killed alongside Awlaki), who started it as a hobby project while living in the United States, then moved to Yemen and began publishing the magazine under the flag of AQAP, with exclusive content and oversight from Awlaki.

At the time of his alleged death, Awlaki was planning to issue a video answering questions from email correspondents. The most recent issue of Inspire, which did not feature any original content from Awlaki, also promised a forthcoming piece on the legitimacy of targeting civilians living in the West.

Both of these pieces could still surface, even if Awlaki is dead, and of course, his 100-plus hours of audio and video lectures will survive his death, likely becoming even more popular. It's worth remembering that Abdullah Azzam, killed more than 20 years ago, is still one of the most popular jihadist ideologues, whose videos still provide vast inspiration.

That "if" is an important consideration. If it turns out these reports are premature, Awlaki is uniquely positioned to capitalize. Inspire has already published articles touting Awlaki having survived a painfully close call with a drone strike in May 2011.

Inspire often employs mockery in the service of its propaganda, and Awlaki himself has a sharp sense of humor. If we have buried Awlaki too soon, we'll hear about it, and once again, our own missteps will make his legend grow.

Full story from CBS News

Intelwire coverage of Awlaki

The Atlantic: Awlaki and September 11

Foreign Policy: The Awlaki Myth

Letter from UK jihadist describes contacts with Awlaki

Is Inspire Magazine Uninspired?

For much more about Awlaki, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Journalists seeking more information or comment on Awlaki can contact J.M. Berger here.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, American-Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Aulaqi, Anwar-Awlaki, AQAP, Inspire-Magazine, Samir-Khan

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Affidavit: Rezwan Ferdaus Allegedly Planned To Bomb Capitol, Pentagon With Homemade Drones

Ashland, Massachusetts, resident Rezwan Ferdaus was charged today with plotting to use homemade drones to bomb the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol, as well as providing detonators to undercover agents which he believed were used to kill American soldiers in Iraq.

Click here for the affidavit

Below is a reconnaissance photo Ferdaus took at the Pentagon. Click image for larger version.


For more about American jihadists, including the long history of such activity in the Boston area, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Boston, homegrown-terrorism, lone-wolf, Rezwan-Ferdaus

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Letter From British Jihadi Describes Contacts With Anwar Awlaki

A letter from convicted British homegrown jihadi Rajib Karim, posted on extremist forums this week, sheds light on the methods of American Al Qaeda figure Anwar Awlaki.

Rajib Karim was an employee of British Airways, who in Marc h was sentenced to 30 years in prison for providing information about airline security for use in a terrorist plot to Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric who today works with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from his family's homeland of Yemen.

It's important to note that Karim's account contradicts evidence submitted at trial and may obviously be colored by self-interest. However the account was written after his sentencing and he admits to being guilty of several of the counts brought against him.

According to Karim, he initially sought out Awlaki not for terrorist purposes but because he wanted to emigrate to a region in Yemen where he could live under a strict interpretation of shariah law. Awlaki's audio lectures in English frequently exhort Muslims living in the West to make such a move, known as making hijrah.

But Awlaki did not help Karim follow Awlaki's own advice, according to the letter.

According to Karim, he chose to contact Awlaki because "I needed someone whom I could trust and who would be a man of influence in that region. ... He was a well respected scholar, he was from an influential tribe." Additionally, Karim does not speak Arabic and hoped Awlaki, who is fluent in both Arabic and English, could help him get settled.

Karim wrote to Awlaki, outlining his wish to emigrate and mentioning that he worked for British Airways. On hearing Karim's profession, Awalki's wrote back immediately.

"[Hearing] that you intend on making hijrah, I immediately wanted to contact you to tell you that my advice to you was to remain in your current position," Awlaki wrote.

Karim, by his own account, did not want to remain in the U.K. but having gotten Awlaki's attention was loath to say anything that might cause Awlaki to stop writing.

According to Karim, he decided to string Awlaki and portray himself as too incompetent to pull off an act of terrorism in the UK, in the hopes that Awlaki would eventually decide to help him make hijra.

This idea was doomed to fail. In my soon-forthcoming article on Awlaki's "Constants on the Path of Jihad," I examine Awlaki's focus on taking any kind of terrorist action over taking pragmatic action calculated to succeed.

According to Karim, he proceeded to Google information about airline security and sent Awlaki the top search results, while claiming to have access to more sensitive areas of the industry.

At the same time, he wrote things that Karim thought "would have made [Awlaki] at least question my suitability for doing a terrorist attack in UK," raising a series of technical questions about whether Islam permitted him to take various steps, raising doubts about his commitment and asking to come to Yemen. Awlaki was not swayed.

If Karim's account is credible, the contradiction between Awlaki's lectures and his private statements is striking. Awlaki has repeatedly urged Western Muslims to make hijra to Muslim lands rather than live among "infidels."

However, the e-mails do line up with arguments presented in AQAP's English-language "Inspire" magazine which urges Western Muslims to remain where they are, and to focus on carrying out lone-wolf-style terrorist attacks at home in the West rather than traveling to join jihadists who are fighting in regional conflicts.

This strategy is a departure from previous jihadist concepts. In the past, jihadist ideologues have urged Muslims to become foreign fighters by traveling from the West for training and to gain experience in battle in jihadist conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Yemen.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates have increasingly embraced the lone wolf model over the foreign fighter model, despite its many limitations.

The foreign fighter model has numerous advantages to movements like Al Qaeda, including stronger justifications and the opportunity to subject recruits to extended religious indoctrination. Foreign fighters are far more likely to become experienced terrorist operatives and bring long-term value to the movement. In contrast, most lone wolves fail in their attacks and are arrested in short order, essentially removing them from the playing field before they even begin.

For more about Anwar Awlaki and other American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda-In-The-Arabian-Peninsula, Anwar-Awlaki, individual-jihad, Inspire-Magazine, lone-wolf, Rajib-Karim

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Declassified State Department Cables On Al Qaeda-Linked Cell in California

State Department cables obtained by INTELWIRE describe Ayman Al Zawahiri's trip to California in 1995 and the activities of an Al Qaeda-linked terrorist cell in Northern California.

The general outline of the cell's activities has been previously reported in newspapers and in Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam.

The documents, obtained from the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act, detail the trial of a group of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operatives captured in Egypt and Albania, with the latter being deported to Egypt. Because of this, the trial became known as the "Returnees from Albania" case. One of those tried in the case was Khaled Abu El Dahab, a naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in California with the notorious Al Qaeda infiltrator Ali Mohamed. Dahab was arrested in Egypt.

Click here to read the full documents

According to the cables:

Zawahiri [who was at the time emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad] visited the U.S. in early 1995 using a forged passport, primarily to collect contributions from Islamist circles. Abu ad-Dahhab placed Zawahiri at the Al-Nur mosque in Santa Clara, California. Three American citizens of Egyptian extraction who, per Abu ad-Dahhab, helped Zawahiri' s 1995 visit were Ali Abu al-Sa'ud Mustafa [Ali Mohamed] and two brothers, Ali and Hassan Zaki, all living in the San Franscisco area. Mustafa had served in the U.S. army for several years. [Egyptian newspaper] Al-Hayat of February 11 adds that Egyptian authorities may ask the U.S. to render Mustafa for trial in the "returnees" case, primarily for his EIJ fundraising. Mustafa apparently told Abu ad-Dahhab that the money that Mustafa had raised was used to plan the 1995 bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. Mustafa is also wanted for helping to train EIJ operatives in bomb-making techniques, per Al-Hayat.

Mohamed and Zawahiri were convicted in absentia during the trial, however Mohamed was by this point under indictment in New York for his role in the 1998 East African Embassy bombings. Dahab was convicted and sentenced to prison. His current status is unknown, although according to some accounts he died in prison.

Although the cell was initially organized under the banner of EIJ, testimony from both Mohamed and Dahab, as well as other witnesses, indicated that both men took orders directly from Osama bin Laden at times, and both took part in highly sensitive Al Qaeda activities, including communications, security and the planning of terrorist attacks. For most meaningful purposes, the cell is considered an Al Qaeda operation.

Also convicted in absentia during the "Returnees" trial was Mohammed Al Islambouli, the brother of Sadat assassin Khaled Al Islambouli, who recently returned to Egypt after the fall of Mubarak and was promptly arrested. The cables state that "some observers [in Cairo] believe Muhammad Islambouli is connected with the EIJ defendants through setting up terrorist training camps in the Balkans."

If you see any interesting tidbits in this material not covered here, feel free to discuss them with me on Twitter.

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Ali-Mohamed, American-Al-Qaeda, American-Terrorists, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Egypt, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, Jihad-Joe, Khaled-Al-Dahab

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

The Utility of Lone Wolves, Or Lack Thereof

The death of Osama bin Laden came and went, and nary a midnight howl was heard from the lone wolf terrorists of the American jihadist movement.

Now the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attack has come and gone, and the lone wolves again stayed in their lairs.

What can we conclude from this?

There's no question that the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism kills. In the United States, 17 Americans have died in acts of "individual jihad" by Al Qaeda sympathizers. We have also seen a number of near misses, from the jihadist movement and others, such as the averted Martin Luther King Day bombing attempt carried out in Spokane by a white supremacist.

If there were any doubts that lone wolves can be deadly, they were dispelled by Anders Breivik, the Norwegian anti-Muslim crusader who in July killed 69 young people in a coordinated attack using guns and a car bomb.

But there's a difference between being deadly and being the Number One threat to U.S. national security. Lone wolves are perhaps the most likely form of terrorist attack, and the most common, but not the most existentially important issue in the world of challenges this country faces.

The failure of lone wolf jihadists to strike at important moments, such as the 9/11 anniversary or after the death of bin Laden, keenly illustrates the current limitations of the "individual jihad" movement endorsed by such al Qaeda ideologues as Abu Musab Al Suri and Anwar Awlaki. The individual jihad has also been encouraged by Al Qaeda's central command, including in a video released earlier this year.

But the major events (or rather non-events) of this year illustrate that the methodology of individual jihad is neither strategic nor tactical in its current form. If individual jihadists can't be relied on to act when the stakes are obviously high, such as the death of bin Laden or the most-watched anniversary of 9/11, they probably can't achieve meaningful goals for Al Qaeda and its supporters.

How useful would U.S. drones be if they only fired missiles at random intervals and couldn't be directed to the right place at the right time? Individual jihadists have not demonstrated their ability to target and act with timely strategic or tactical intent.

Again, I want to stress, that doesn't mean they aren't dangerous. They have killed before and will kill again, and Brevik has demonstrated that the lone wolves of today can carry out attacks on a scale previously unimagined.

But the lone wolves have repeatedly highlighted their weaknesses, including the aforementioned failure to act when they can have the most impact and a failure to follow the guidelines Al Qaeda has laid out for them.

What we are left with is a series of radicalized but ultimately weak individuals who usually fail in their efforts to carry out even modest attacks on U.S. soil, and who create no synergy with other Al Qaeda ventures or communications.

Their efforts often seem to casual observers to be motivated more by mental illness than ideology. Their inadequacy inspires more contempt than fear. Their failure to show up when people are most afraid of them diminishes their impact when they eventually get around to acting.

So what real threat does the lone wolf jihadist present to America? There are three ways that they can cause significant damage going forward:

1) Al Qaeda might figure out the right approach to make the lone wolves conform more closely to its priorities. We've seen distinct efforts to accomplish this, including the As-Sahab video linked above and recent issues of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Pensinsula's Inspire magazine. So far, it hasn't been working all that well, but Al Qaeda will continue to adapt its approach.

2) Lone wolves may follow the example of Anders Breivik and become more ambitious and effective in their attacks, magnifying the impact of their efforts. This is the biggest concern, in my opinion, and we need to closely monitor the impact of that event.

3) The U.S. may choose to take a counterproductive approach to dealing with the legitimate threat of lone wolf terrorism by overemphasizing its prevalence or its relationship to mainstream Islam.

On the last point, I will refer back to some of my previous comments about "countering violent extremism" initiatives.

Al Qaeda has always been most effective when it could manipulate us into taking actions which reinforce its worldview. The most obvious risks are an excessive emphasis on lone wolves as being representative of American Muslims in general or a concerted government effort to create "acceptable" forms of Islam in the United States through counterradicalization programs that delve too deeply into religion at the expense of focusing preventing on acts of violence through law enforcement and disrupting nodes of radical activity.

For more about American jihadists and lone wolf terrorism, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abu-Musab-Al-Suri, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, CVE, homegrown-terrorism, individual-jihad, lone-wolf, Radicalization

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Well, Is Al Qaeda Winning Or Not?

Some of my favorite thinkers have diametrically opposing pieces in The Atlantic today. Will McCants and William Rosenau write about How We Won the War on Terror, while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes that Al Qaeda is Winning.

Followers of my work will know that I reviewed and agreed with the thesis put forward by Gartenstein-Ross in his new book, Bin Laden's Legacy.

However McCants is a powerhouse in this field, and the piece he and Rosenau put forward makes some very valid points, arriving at a completely different conclusion but ultimately making some of the same policy prescriptions as Gartenstein-Ross.

While there are many reasons I agree with Gartenstein-Ross' thesis, I want to talk briefly about an issue that neither column raises, but which I think is chiefly responsible for Al Qaeda's failure to mount a successful mass casualty attack since 9/11.

For more than a decade prior to September 11, Al Qaeda and its close allies ran a series of mass production terrorist training camps in the AfPak region. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, along with substantial pressure on Pakistan, has crippled that training camp network.

Although the camps have not been totally eliminated, they have been massively disrupted. In the past, the camps could and did process hundreds of recruits at any given time, providing religious indoctrination, basic military training and advanced military training. The training could take place over the course of months or years, and there were relatively few obstacles to traveling to the camps.

Such camps still exist, but they're no longer centralized. They are harder to reach, and the courses they offer are less thorough and much more rushed.

When we talk about Al Qaeda winning or losing, we have to account for the fact we are fighting a war of containment rather than clear victory. The continued pressure we are exerting over the training camp network is largely responsible for Al Qaeda's inability to carry out mass casualty attacks or to train loosely affiliated comrades to do the same.

Since 9/11, we have seen foiled attacks and we have seen failed attacks. On the latter front, from Times Square to the underwear bomber to the lone wolves, lack of training is an overwhelming theme. Training camps still exist, but they are smaller and less secure, with fewer experienced personnel. The training regimen is rushed, candidates enter and are turned around very quickly for attacks without the months or years of advanced training and religious indoctrination seen in the past.

If Faisal Shahzad or Omar Abdulmutallab had been thoroughly and competently trained, their attacks could easily have succeeded, and we'd be having a very different conversation today.

Without fully operational mass-production training camps, there would not have been a World Trade Center bombing in 1993, there would not have been the East African embassy bombings in 1998, and there would not have been a September 11.

Unfortunately, there are two reasons why we can't declare victory on this issue.

First, it is obvious to everyone that we can't stay in Afghanistan forever. Our success in the AfPak region, such as it is, is based on a strategy of constant pressure.

In the absence of that pressure, and under any foreseeable (to me) scenario involving a weak Afghan government and an ambivalent Pakistani military-intelligence apparatus, I see very little reason to think that Al Qaeda's camps won't regenerate once we leave the region. We have the tool of drones today, which we didn't have before, but it's not a magic wand that can operate forever without restraints, especially in the absence of local support.

Second, Al Qaeda now has growing opportunities to train operatives in other places, most notably Somalia and Yemen, and future prospects in Iraq and various points around Africa. Those operations are still small relative to their AfPak predecessors, but they appear to be growing.

We have drone operations in some of these locations, but as noted above, I'm not convinced they can be as effective over a long haul as our substantial military presence in the AfPak theater.

Despite coming at it from different angles, McCants and Gartenstein-Ross -- and a growing chorus of other experts -- all agree that we need to scale back our military and security outlay for reasons both financial and sociological, and I agree with that as well.

But we need to accept that such cutbacks will likely enhance Al Qaeda's prospects for successful attacks in the medium-term future. That enhancement, combined with the wild political uncertainties of the Arab Spring, make it hard for me to be optimistic that we have won -- or can be said to be winning -- our war with Al Qaeda in the foreseeable future.

A final note of caution: The complex attack carried out in Norway by Anders Breivik is likely to inspire imitators. Breivik did something that no one else has -- he showed that a single person can carry out a spectacular terrorist attack, and he provided a detailed account of how he accomplished the task. This could be a game-changer even in the absence of a robust training network, but if and when the network regenerates, the new breed of instructors will most certainly be studying Breivik's tactics (as will other, non-AQ actors).

The war against al Qaeda is most certainly changing, but I'm hard pressed to see how that change puts us in the position of winning or having won. It's arguably an overstatement to say Al Qaeda is winning, per se, but it is successfully executing a large part of the "bleed-to-bankruptcy" strategy it has delineated in its statements. The Arab Spring, the death of bin Laden and other factors may well help us, but we are a long way from seeing the ultimate impact of those events.

For more about al Qaeda training camps and the terror network's American recruits, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: 9-11, Al-Qaeda, East-African-Embassy-Bombings, Faisal-Shahzad, September-11, Umar-Farouk-Abdulmutallab, World-Trade-Center-Bombing

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

BloggingHeads: J.M. Berger and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross on the Decade Since 9/11

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, the author of Bin Laden's Legacy, sits down with me for a Bloggingheads.tv session in which we discuss the war on terror since 9/11, whether Al Qaeda is winning, Ali-Frasier, whether it's more cost-effective to have a Global War on Drunk Driving than a Global War on Terror, if the Libya intervention becomes a good idea just because it isn't a disaster yet, and whether Islamism and terrorism are the same problem, or different problems....



For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Al-Qaeda, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jihad-Joe, Libya

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Documents Seen In Secrets of 9/11 And More

A few notes on recent developments:

INTELWIRE has created a new site to host documents related to September 11, as seen on Fox News Reporting: Secrets of 9/11, which aired this weekend in updated form.

Click here to visit Unlocking911.com

This week, I wrote a review of the new book Review: Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on Terror by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. I highly recommend this important book, and you can buy it here.

Daveed and I also recorded a new entry for the popular online show, Bloggingheads, which should appear in the coming week. We discuss his book, my book, terrorism in the 10 years since 9/11 and the Arab Spring. I will post again once it's live.

I'll be appearing on Al Hurra television this week (Arabic-language only) including on September 10 and 11 to discuss America and the state of Al Qaeda since the attacks.

And look for a major piece early this week, "The People Vs. Anwar Awlaki: In the Matter of September 11." I will post the link once it becomes available.

All the latest from J.M. Berger:

Interview with Online Jihadist Abu Suleiman

Slideshow: Is Al Qaeda's Inspire Uninspired?

Analysis: White House PVE strategy light on new ideas

A Way Forward for CVE: The Five Ds

How Terrorists Use The Internet: Just Like You

Hyping the Terrorist Internet

The Atlantic: Why Johnny Jihad Doesn't Listen

Inspire Issue Six: Martyrs and Mixed Messages

FBI Spied on ABC News, McVeigh Defense Team in OKC Probe

For more about American jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Al-Qaeda, Anwar-Awlaki, September-11

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

Unedited Abu Suleiman Interview

For more about online jihadists, check out J.M. Berger's new book, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, on sale everywhere.

Labels: Abu-Suleiman-al-Nasser, Internet, Jihadist-Forums

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